Monday, 5 August 2013

Order of temporary injunction can be executed as per section 36 read with Order 21 of Civil procedure Code,



 In substance, an order under Order 
39 Rule 1 and 2 and Order 39 Rule 2A operates 
in   two   different   eventualities.   Only   because 
such   litigant   has   filed   an   application   under 
Order   39   Rule   2A   for   alleged   breach   of 
injunction,   his   prayer   for   execution   of   the 
temporary   injunction   order   within   the 
parameters of section 36 read with Order 21 of 
the   Code,   can   not   be   refused. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD.

APPELLATE SIDE, CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.: 735 OF 2010
Satyapal S/o Vaidyaram Katariya,

VERSUS


Sanjay S/o Jagannath Kanjune,

Citation;2010 AIR BOMBAY R (supp)280
CORAM:  S. B. DESHMUKH  J.
DATED:­ 8th FEBRUARY, 2010.



1.

A   short,   but   interest   question,   whether 
execution   of   any   order   passed   by   the   Civil 
Court   is   permissible   under   Order   21   of   the 
Code   of   Civil   Procedure?   [the   Code,   for 
short], arises in this petition.
5.
To   decide   this   question,   raised   in   this 
writ   petition,   I   am   listing   down   facts   which 
are not disputed by the parties.
(a)
The   petitioner   is   the   original   plaintiff 

(b)
Suit   filed   by   the   Petitioner   has   been 
followed   by   an   application   seeking   temporary 
injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the 
(c)

Code against the defendants.
The   learned   15th   Joint   Civil   Judge, 
Junior Division, Aurangabad passed an order on 
9th   September,   2008   allowing   the   application 
for   temporary   injunction   restraining   the 
defendants,   their   relatives,   servants   or   any 
person on their behalf from making obstruction 
in the suit land,  from digging pits, removing 
soil   from   the   suit   property   etc.   till   the 
disposal of the suit.
(d)
Order   passed   below   Exhibit­5   in   Regular 
Civil   Suit   dated   9th   September,   2008,   by   the 
learned   15th   Joint   Civil   Judge,   Junior 
Division,   Aurangabad,   was   subjected   to   Misc. 
Civil Appeal No.105 of 2008 before the learned 
District   Judge­1,   Aurangabad   by   the 
defendants.

Misc.   Civil   Appeal   No.165   of   2008   filed 
by the nine defendants, was heard and finally 
dismissed   by   judgment   and   order   dated   7th 
November,   2008.     This   order   is   passed   by   the 

learned District Judge­1, Aurangabad.
Order   passed   by   the   learned   District 
Judge­1, Aurangabad in Misc. Civil Appeal NO.
165   of   2008   was   further   challenged   by   filing 
Writ   Petition   NO.1171   of   2009   in   this   High 
Court.     This   writ   petition   was   filed   by   nine 
defendants   in   the   suit   and   indisputably   has 
been withdrawn.
(g)
It is made clear that order of  temporary 
injunction   passed   by   the   trial   Court   under 
Order   39   Rule   1   and   2   of   the   Code   has 
attributed finality.
(h)
The   successful   litigant/   plaintiff 
unfortunately was not able to enjoy the fruits 
of   temporary   injunction   granted   by   the 
competent   civil   Court   and   had   attributed 
finality   up   till   High   Court.     The   original 

plaintiff   was   therefore   required   to   file 
execution   petition,   seeking   execution   of   the 
order   of   temporary   injunction   granted   by   the 
  This   execution 
competent   Civil   Court.  

petition   was   presented   to   the   office   of 
learned   Civil   Judge,   Senior   Division   at 
Aurangabad.     This   execution   petition   was 
registered   as   R.D.   No.102   of   2007   by   the 
learned   Civil   Judge,   Senior   Division, 
Aurangabad.
(i)
In   R.D.   No.102   of   2009,   original 
defendants   filed   application   Exhibit­16   on 
28th July, 2009 praying for dismissal of R.D. 
No.102 of 2009.
(j)
The   original   defendant   also   filed 
application   Exhibit­17   on   the   same   day   i.e. 
28th   July,   2009   praying   for   dismissal   of   the 
R.D. NO.102 of 2009.
(k)
It   is   admitted   by   the   parties   that 
application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code 
was filed by the plaintiff.  Copy is on record 

Annexure R­A (Page 47).   In this application, 
filed   by   the   plaintiff,   prayer   is   made   that 
contempt   proceedings   may   be   initiated   against 
the   defendants   and   they   may   be   punished 

according to law.   This application was filed 
by plaintiff on 16th February, 2009.
The   original   plaintiff   has   also   filed 
(l)
summary   criminal   case   No.6925   of   2008   in   the 
court   of   learned   Judicial   Magistrate,   First 
Class,   Aurangabad   for   the   alleged   offences 
under   section   504,   506,   441,   447   of   I.P.C. 
against   around   12   persons.     Out   of   these   12 
persons,   10   persons   are   defendants   in   the 
suit.     In   this   complaint,   alleged   offence   is 
dated 22nd September, 2008.
6.
Learned   counsel   for   the   plaintiff   points 
out   the   nature   of   the   suit,   the   facts   and 
proceedings   noticed   herein   above.     They   have 
not been disputed by the counsel appearing for 
the   defendants.     Learned   counsel   for   the 
petitioner submits that Regular Darkhast filed 

by   the   petitioner   is   maintainable   and   order 
impugned   in   this   writ   petition   is   per­se 
illegal.   Per contra, learned counsel for the 
Respondents   vehemently   urged   that   plaintiff 

has filed an application under Order4 39 Rule 
2A   of   the   Code,   which   is   pending.     Execution 
petition     is   not   maintainable.     He   submits 
that the two proceedings for the same purpose 
i.e.   Regular   Darkhast   No.102   of   2009   and 
application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code 
are   not   maintainable.     Grievance   raised,   is 
within   the   parameters   of   section   10   of   the 
Code.
7.
The   suit   filed   by   the   petitioner   is 
pending before the civil Court, copy is not on 
record.     Counsel   for   the   petitioner   submits 
that   suit   is   for   perpetual   injunction.     This 
is not disputed by the Respondents.   From the 
facts,   it   is   manifest   that   despite   the   grant 
of temporary injunction by the competent civil 
Court,   the   petitioner,   who   possess   the   order 

of   temporary   injunction,   is   unable   to 
cultivate   the   land/   enjoy   the   suit   property 
and, therefore, has moved Regular Darkhast No.
102   of   2009.     Expression   "decree"   is   defined 

under   section   2   (2)   of   the   Code   of   Civil 
Procedure,   1908   (the   Code,   for   short),   which 
reads as follows:
"Decree   means   the   formal   expression 
of   an   adjudication   which,   so   far   as 
regards   the   Court   expressing   it, 
conclusively determines the rights of the 
parties with regard to all or any of the 
matters in controversy in the suit and may 
be either preliminary or final.  It shall 
be   deemed   to   include   the   rejection   of   a 
plaint   and   the   determination   of   any 
question within section 144, but shall not 
include ­
(a)
any adjudication from which an appeal 
lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b)
any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation.   ­   A   decree   is 
preliminary when further proceedings have 
to   be   taken   before   the   suit   can   be 
completely disposed of.  It is final when 
such   adjudication   completely   disposes   of 

the   suit.     It   may   be   partly   preliminary 
and partly final;
Thus, decree  is the formal  expression of 
an   adjudication   which   so   far   as   regards   the 
Court   expressing   it,   conclusively   determines 
ig
the   rights   of   the   parties   with   regard   to  all 
or   any   of   the   matters   in   controversy   in   the 
suit   and   may   be   either   preliminary   or   final. 
In the case on hand, there is no decree passed 
in   favour   of   either   of   the   parties,   is   an 
admitted position.   We are concerned with one 
more definition i.e. "decree holder".  Section 
2 (3) provides that "decree­holder" means any 
person   in   whose   favour   a   decree   has   been 
passed   or   an  order   capable   of   execution   has 
been made.
8.
Facts   which   have   been   noticed   herein 
above, do show that the petitioner is a decree 
holder.     To   become   a  decree   holder,   does   not 
necessarily   mean   that   person   must   hold   a 
decree   passed   by   the   competent   civil   Court. 
Definition   of   "decree   holder"   takes   in   its 

sweep  any   person  in   whose   favour  an   order, 
capable of execution, has been made.
9.
Expression   "order"   is   defined   under 
section 2 (14) of the Code meaning thereby the 
ig
formal   expression   of   any   decision   of   a   Civil 
Court which is not a decree.   In the case on 
hand,   in   my   view,   order   passed   by   the 
competent   Civil   Court   under   Order   39   Rule   1 
and 2 of the Code, restraining the defendant, 
from   interfering   possession   of   the   plaintiff 
over   the   suit   property   is   an   order   under 
section 2 (14) of the Code.
10.
Having   held   that   the   order   of   temporary 
injunction   is   an   order   within   the   parameters 
of section 2 (14) of the Code, now it would be 
essential to consider, as to whether the order 
of   temporary   injunction,   passed   by   the 
competent   Civil   Court   can   be   sought   to   be 
executed   with   the   mechanism   provided   under 
Order   21   of   the   Code.     At   this   juncture,   it 
would be beneficial to refer to section 36 of 

"36. Application   to   orders.­   The 
provisions   of   this   Code   relating   to   the 
execution of decrees (including provisions 
relating to payment under a decree) shall, 
ig
so far as they are applicable, be deemed 
to   apply   to   the   execution   of   orders 
(including payment under an order).
Part   II   of   the   Code   is   titled   as 
11.
"Execution", Subtitle is  General.   Section 36 
lays   down   that   the   provisions   of   this   Code 
relating   to   the   execution   of   decrees 
(including   provisions   relating   to   payment 
under   a   decree)   shall,   so   far   as   they   are 
applicable,   be   deemed   to   apply   to   the 
execution   of   orders   (including   payment   under 
an order).   The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 
is   a   procedural   code   for   conduct   of   civil 
cases.   Ordinarily, there are two branches of 
law;  civil laws and penal laws.  Procedure to 
be   followed   in   relation   to   conduct   of   civil 
cases,   is   provided   under   the   Code   of   Civil 
Procedure.     So   far   as   penal   laws   are 

concerned,   procedure   therefore   is  
  made 
available   under   the   Code   of   Criminal 
Procedure,   1898.     The   procedural   laws   under 
the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   and   the   Criminal 

Procedure   Code   have   undergone   amendments   from 
the   competent   Legislature   from   time   to   time. 
The   Higher   Courts   in   the   country   and 
Legislature   are   worried   and   concerned   about 
pendency   of     cases   in   various   Courts   and   at 
all   levels.     To   curtail   life   span   of   civil 
cases,   the   Legislature,   in   its   wisdom,   has 
recently   introduced   and   implemented   some 
amendments.   In substance, time span of civil 
cases   in   various   Courts   is   being   tried   to   be 
curtailed   down   by   the   Legislature   and   the 
Honourable   Supreme   Court   is   also   of   the   same 
view.     Every   endeavor   is   being   suggested   and 
tried to be implemented.  
The   Civil   Procedure   Code   primarily 
consists   of   two   parts.     The   first   part 
comprises   of   various   sections   right   from 

sections   2   to   section   158.     The   first   part 
i.e.   section   2   to   158   can   be   said   to   be     a 
substantive   part   of   the   Code   of   Civil 
Procedure.  The procedure for carrying out the 

objects of section 2 to 158, is laid down in 
the   schedule,   which   is   titled   as   the   First 
schedule.   Order 1 makes reference to parties 
to suits.   Last is the Order 52 in the first 
Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code.  When it 
comes   to   interpretation   of   the   provisions   of 
the Civil Procedure Code, ordinarily, sections 
in the first part of the Code and the orders 
which are made available in the first schedule 
are considered conjointly.  Primacy however is 
to   be   given   to   the   substantive   part   of 
sections in the Code.
12.
In   the   case   on   hand,   section   36   is   the 
provision,   which   I   have   referred   here   in 
above.     In   my   view,   it   is   substantive 
provision   which   has   made   applicable   procedure 
for seeking implementation of the order, with 

the aid of Order 21 of the Code.  In this view 
of   the   matter,   any   order   passed   under   the 
provisions   of   the   Code   after   hearing   the 
parties and not altered by superior Court, in 
ig
my view, is implementable with the assistance 
of Order 21 of the Code.   Grant of temporary 
injunction   which   has   been   uphold   up   to   the 
High   Court   is   an   important   and   significant 
facet   of   order   passed   by   the   competent   civil 
Court,   in   the   case   on   hand.     Such   order   is 
required   to   be   honoured,   obeyed   and 
implemented.  Orders passed by the Civil Court 
are   not   for   decorating   the   dwelling   of   the 
decree   holder.     Order   passed   in   accordance 
with   the   provisions   of   law   are   required   to 
executed   and   holder   thereof   is   entitled   to 
fruits   of   the   order   in   accordance   with   the 
provisions of law.  
13.
The   Legislature,   however,   in   its   wisdom, 
has made available the mechanism for execution 
of decree for perpetual injunction,   Order 21 

Rule 32 and also Order of temporary injunction 
with the assistance of section 36 and Order 21 
of the Code.
Many   a   times,   winner   litigant,   so   far 
14.

temporary   injunction   is   concerned,   are/   is 
anxious   to   seek   implementation   of   the 
temporary   injunction.     It   would   be   unjust   to 
say   to   such   litigant   to   wait   till   passing   of 
the   decree   by   the   civil   Court   i.e.   perpetual 
injunction.   It is more unjustifiable in this 
era of inter­net.   It is for this reason, in 
my view, section 36 will have to be read with 
order 21 of the Code.
15.
The submission of learned counsel for the 
Respondent   cannot   be   countenanced   for   more 
than   one   reasons.     Order   39   Rule   2A   of   the 
Code has been brought on statute entirely for 
different   purpose.     There,   in   that   case,   if 
case   is   established   within   the   parameters   of 
Order   39   Rule   2A   of   the   Code,   consequences 
would follow.   There, the prime importance is 

given to disobedience or breach of injunction. 
Consequences are made available under Order 39 
Rule   2A   (2)   of   the   Code.     Many     times, 
litigant   holding   the   order   of   temporary 
ig
injunction may be interested only in enjoying 
his   own   property   by   restraining   the 
defendants.   He/she   may not be interested to 
seek   attachment   of   the   property   of   the 
defendant   and/   or   see   the   defendant   in   civil 
prison   as   provided   under   Order   39   Rule   2A   of 
the Code.   In substance, an order under Order 
39 Rule 1 and 2 and Order 39 Rule 2A operates 
in   two   different   eventualities.   Only   because 
such   litigant   has   filed   an   application   under 
Order   39   Rule   2A   for   alleged   breach   of 
injunction,   his   prayer   for   execution   of   the 
temporary   injunction   order   within   the 
parameters of section 36 read with Order 21 of 
the   Code,   can   not   be   refused.     The   order 
impugned,   in   this   writ   petition,   in   my   view, 
is perverse,   relegating the winner litigant/ 

petitioner   to   the   date   of   filing   of   the   suit 
that too without remedy despite the fact that 
petitioner   is   holding   lawful   order   passed   by 
the competent Civil Court which is final.  The 
ig
trial   Court   failed   to   consider   all   these 
aspects of the matter.
The   second   submission   of   the   learned 
16.
counsel   for   the   Respondents,   that   such   an 
exercise   is   hit   by   section   10   of   C.P.Code, 
cannot   be   accepted   also   for   more   than   one 
reasons.     Section   10   speaks   about   suit. 
Expression   "suit"   is   not   defined   under   the 
Code.   Expression   "suit"   means   any   proceeding 
by   a   party   or   parties   against   another   in   a 
court   of   law.   [Black's   law   dictionary]. 
Expression "suit" is employed twice in section 
10.  At the out set, it has been provided that 
no   Court   shall   proceed   with   the   trial   of   any 
suit   in   which   the   matter   in   issue   is   also 
directly   and   substantially   in   issue   in   a 
previously   instituted   suit   between   the   same 

parties.   ...   ...     What   is   contemplated   under 
section 10, in fact, is pendency of two suits. 
If   section   10   in   its   entirety   is   considered, 
it is difficult to accede to the arguments of 

learned   counsel   for   the   Respondent.       It   is 
the   lame   attempt   on   the   part   of   the 
Respondents   to   multiply   the   harassment   which 
is   being   already   suffered   by   the   petitioner/ 
plaintiff.     This   argument,   therefore,   I   am 
rejecting.
17.
I   am   of   the   considered   view   that   the 
order impugned is per­se illegal, requires to 
be   quashed   and   set   aside.     Regular   Darkhast 
filed   by   the   petitioner   needs   to   be   restored 
on   the   file   of   the   learned   Civil   Court   which 
shall   hear   the   parties   and   pass   appropriate 
orders   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of 
law.
18.
Writ   petition   is   allowed.     Order   passed 
below   Exhibits   16   and   17,   impugned   in   this 
Writ   Petition   is   quashed   and   set   aside. 

Regular   Darkhast   No.102   of   2009   stands 
restored   on   the   file   of   learned   executing 
Court which shall hear the parties and proceed 
with the said execution in accordance with the 
19.

provisions of law.
Rule   is   made   absolute,   in   above   terms, 
20.
with no orders as to costs.
Both the learned counsel have pointed out 
that writ petition No.2966 of 1994 in between 
the   present   petitioner   and   State   of 
Maharasthra is pending in this High Court.   I 
am clarifying that I have not heard either the 
State   or   the   Petitioner   in   relation   to   the 
subject   matter   of   Writ   Petition   No.2966   of 
1994.     This   order   shall   be   construed   only 
among the plaintiff and defendants in Regular 
Civil Suit no.303 of 2008 and Reguar Darkhast 
No. 102 of 2009.
Dated:08/02/2010.

Print Page

No comments:

Post a Comment