" If the land owners are not paid and compensated within two years after the declaration of the acquisition of the proposed land, the whole process of acquisition fails" The Division Bench of Supreme Court of India, presided by Hon Justice Mr. G. S. Sanghavi and Hon Justice Mr.S.J. Mukhopdhyay has recently set an important landmark judgment in a well debated Appeal by the appellants, R. Indira Sharadchandra and others against Tamilnadu Housing Development Board. The time which is lapsed during the court litigation are exempted from the aforesaid period of limitation set for completion acquisition process in due course of laws. This landmark ruling will now help all those effected land owners who are awfully damaged due to the delayed process of acquisition of land.
1. The question which arises for consideration in
this appeal is whether the acquisition of the
appellant's land lapsed on account of non-passing of
an award within the period specified in Section 11A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act').
2.The appellant's land was acquired by the State
Government for and on behalf of Tamil Nadu Housing
Board. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was
issued on 01.11.1982 and was published in the Official
2
Gazette on 24.11.1982. The declaration under Section
6 was issued on 2.2.1985. The same was published in
the Official Gazette dated 20.02.1985 and in the local
newspapers on 22.5.1985.
3.The writ petition filed by the appellant and others
questioning the acquisition of land, which came to be
registered as Writ Petition No.3646 of 1987 was
allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated
24.10.1991. That order was set aside by the Division
Bench in Writ Appeal No.406 of 1994 filed by
respondent Nos.1 to 3. Thereafter, the Special
Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neighbourhood Scheme,
Ayyan Thirumaligam Road, Salem passed an award dated
10.12.1996.
4.Immediately thereafter, the appellant and proforma
respondent Nos. 4 to 7, whose name were deleted vide
order dated 25.01.2010, filed Writ Petition No.19284
of 1996 for grant of a declaration that the
acquisition of their land will be deemed to have
lapsed because the award was not passed within two
years. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 contested the writ
petition by asserting that the award was passed within
3
two years from the date of receipt of the copy of the
Division Bench judgment dated 29.8.1996.
5.The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
and declared that the acquisition of the writ
petitioners' land will be deemed to have lapsed
because the award was passed after more than two years
counted from the date of last publication of the
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.
6.The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the
appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and set
aside the order of the learned Single Judge by relying
upon the judgments of this Court in Narasimhaiah v.
State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88; State of
Tamilnadu v. L. Krishnan, (1996) 1 SCC 250; Executive
Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division v. Suresha
Nand Juyal (1997) 9 SCC 224; Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment
Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501; Municipal council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48; Tej
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2003) 4 SCC 485; and Padma
Sundara Rao (Dead) & Others v. State of Tamilnadu &
Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533. In the opinion of the
4
Division Bench, the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of
Tamil Nadu(supra) cannot be applied to the cases in
which the acquisition proceedings had become final.
The Division Bench was also of the view that the writ
petition filed by the appellant herein and the
proforma respondents was highly belated.
7.Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside because
the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court
on the interpretation of Section 11A of the Act is
contrary to its plain language and the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of
Tamil Nadu (supra). Learned counsel submitted that
the observations made in the last paragraph of the
Constitution Bench judgment suggesting that the law
laid down by it will not apply to the cases in which
the acquisition had become final has no application to
the present case because the land owners had
questioned the acquisition and at the time of decision
of the Constitution Bench, the writ petition filed by
them was pending consideration.
5
8.Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 made
half-hearted attempt to support the impugned judgment
by asserting that the period of two years prescribed
under Section 11A of the Act should be counted not
from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench
but from the date, on which copy thereof was supplied
to the concerned authority, i.e., 1.11.1996. He
further argued that the ratio of the Constitution
Bench judgment in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil
Nadu (supra) cannot be invoked by the appellants
because once the Division Bench set aside the order of
the learned Single Judge, the acquisition proceedings
became final.
9. We have considered the respective submissions.
Section 11A of the Act, which has bearing on the
disposal of this appeal reads as under:
"11A. Period within which an award shall be made - The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.
6
Provided that in a case where the
said declaration has been
published before the commencement
of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of
two years from such commencement.
Explanation- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court
shall be excluded."
10.A reading of the plain language of the above
reproduced section makes it clear that the Collector
is obliged to make an award under section 11 within a
period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration. If no award is made within that
period, the acquisition proceedings automatically
lapses. By virtue of the explanation, the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken
pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a
Court is to be excluded in computing the period of two
years. This means that if any action or proceeding
required to be taken after the issue of declaration
under Section 6 is stayed by a Court, the entire
7
period of stay will get excluded in calculating the
period of two years within which an award is required
to be made by the Collector. As a corollary to this,
it must be held that once the stay order passed by a
Court is vacated or ceases to operate, the clog put on
the running of the period specified in the main
section is removed.
11.There is nothing in the Section 11A from which it
can be inferred that the stay order passed by the
Court remains operative till the delivery of copy of
the order. Ordinarily, the rules framed by the High
Court do not provide for supply of copy of judgment or
order to the parties free of cost. The parties to the
litigation can apply for certified copy which is
required to be supplied on fulfillment of the
conditions specified in the relevant rules. However,
no period has been prescribed for making of an
application for certified copy of the judgment or
order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of course,
once an application is made within the prescribed
period of limitation, the time spent in the
preparation and supply of the copy is excluded in
8
computing the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal or revision.
12.In the present case, we find that the Division
Bench of the High Court had allowed Writ Appeal No.406
of 1994 vide judgment dated 29.8.1996. In the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to
the writ petition of the appellant and the proforma
respondent, the date of supply of copy of the judgment
of the Division Bench was mentioned as 1.11.1996 but
the date on which the application was made for supply
of copy was not disclosed. In any case, the fortuitous
factor i.e. the time taken in supply of copy of the
judgment cannot extend the period of two years
specified in Section 11A.
13.In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu
(supra), the Constitution Bench referred to the
earlier judgments including the judgment of three
Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka and Ors etc. (1996 (3) SCC 88) and
observed :
"3. The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is, whether after quashing of
9
notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") fresh period of one year is available to the State Government
to issue another notification under Section 6. In the case at
hand such a notification issued under Section 6 was questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three- Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v.
State of Karnataka and held that the same was validly issued.
4.Learned counsel for the
appellants placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court
in A.S. Naidu v. State of T.N. wherein a Bench of three Judges held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond
the prescribed period of the notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. It has
to be noted that there is another
judgment of two learned Judges in
Oxford English School v. Govt. of
T.N. which takes a view similar to that expressed in A.S. Naidu case. However, in State of Karnataka v.
D.C. Nanjudaiah view in Narasimhaiah case was followed and it was held that the limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made.
10
10. What appears to have weighed with the three-Judge Bench in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) is set out in paragraph 12 of the judgment, which reads as under:
"Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that if the construction as put up by the learned counsel for the appellants is given acceptance i.e., it should be within one year from the last of the dates
of publication under Section 4(1), the public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be
illustrated thus: In a given case where the notification
under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and declaration was published within
one month and as the urgency in
the opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory
tactics of the interested person
and the court ultimately finds after two years that the
exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give
an opportunity to the interested
person and the State to conduct
an enquiry under Section 5-A, then the exercise of the power
11
pursuant to the direction of the
court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct the enquiry. If the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1).
A valid notification under
Section 4(1) become invalid. On
the other hand, after conducting
enquiry as per court order and,
if the declaration under Section
6 is published within one year from the date of the receipt of
the order passed by the High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since
the action was done pursuant to
the orders of the court and compliance with the limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act would
be made."
11. It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of
inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of
12
Notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be
fixed with reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994 (1) SCC 44), it was held by this Court that though no
period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be
acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count.
13
16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus curia neminem gravabit' highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.
17. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) and Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed.
18. There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have obtained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been
14
paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed."
(emphasis supplied)
14.In our view, the last paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment has no bearing on this case because at the time
of pronouncement of Constitution Bench judgment, the writ
petition filed by the appellant and the proforma
respondents for grant of a declaration that the
acquisition will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-
making of award for two years was pending before the High
Court.
15.Although, the Division Bench has referred to a large
number of judgments which lay down the proposition that
the High Court would not entertain belated challenge to
the land acquisition proceedings but the impugned
judgment does not contain any discussion on this issue.
That apart, we find that the appellant and the proforma
respondent had moved the High Court without any delay.
Rather, they had filed writ petition immediately after
pronouncement of the award. Therefore, they could not
15
have been non-suited by the Division Bench of the High
Court by invoking the rule of laches.
16.In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned
judgment is set aside and the order passed by the
learned Single Judge is restored.
...........................J.
(G.S. SIGHVI)
..........................J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
October 14, 2011.
New Delhi.
16
Supreme Court of India
R.Indira Saratchandra vs State Of T.Nadu & Ors. on 14 October, 2011
Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya
1. The question which arises for consideration in
this appeal is whether the acquisition of the
appellant's land lapsed on account of non-passing of
an award within the period specified in Section 11A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act').
2.The appellant's land was acquired by the State
Government for and on behalf of Tamil Nadu Housing
Board. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was
issued on 01.11.1982 and was published in the Official
2
Gazette on 24.11.1982. The declaration under Section
6 was issued on 2.2.1985. The same was published in
the Official Gazette dated 20.02.1985 and in the local
newspapers on 22.5.1985.
3.The writ petition filed by the appellant and others
questioning the acquisition of land, which came to be
registered as Writ Petition No.3646 of 1987 was
allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated
24.10.1991. That order was set aside by the Division
Bench in Writ Appeal No.406 of 1994 filed by
respondent Nos.1 to 3. Thereafter, the Special
Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neighbourhood Scheme,
Ayyan Thirumaligam Road, Salem passed an award dated
10.12.1996.
4.Immediately thereafter, the appellant and proforma
respondent Nos. 4 to 7, whose name were deleted vide
order dated 25.01.2010, filed Writ Petition No.19284
of 1996 for grant of a declaration that the
acquisition of their land will be deemed to have
lapsed because the award was not passed within two
years. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 contested the writ
petition by asserting that the award was passed within
3
two years from the date of receipt of the copy of the
Division Bench judgment dated 29.8.1996.
5.The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
and declared that the acquisition of the writ
petitioners' land will be deemed to have lapsed
because the award was passed after more than two years
counted from the date of last publication of the
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.
6.The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the
appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and set
aside the order of the learned Single Judge by relying
upon the judgments of this Court in Narasimhaiah v.
State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88; State of
Tamilnadu v. L. Krishnan, (1996) 1 SCC 250; Executive
Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division v. Suresha
Nand Juyal (1997) 9 SCC 224; Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment
Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501; Municipal council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48; Tej
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2003) 4 SCC 485; and Padma
Sundara Rao (Dead) & Others v. State of Tamilnadu &
Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533. In the opinion of the
4
Division Bench, the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of
Tamil Nadu(supra) cannot be applied to the cases in
which the acquisition proceedings had become final.
The Division Bench was also of the view that the writ
petition filed by the appellant herein and the
proforma respondents was highly belated.
7.Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside because
the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court
on the interpretation of Section 11A of the Act is
contrary to its plain language and the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of
Tamil Nadu (supra). Learned counsel submitted that
the observations made in the last paragraph of the
Constitution Bench judgment suggesting that the law
laid down by it will not apply to the cases in which
the acquisition had become final has no application to
the present case because the land owners had
questioned the acquisition and at the time of decision
of the Constitution Bench, the writ petition filed by
them was pending consideration.
5
8.Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 made
half-hearted attempt to support the impugned judgment
by asserting that the period of two years prescribed
under Section 11A of the Act should be counted not
from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench
but from the date, on which copy thereof was supplied
to the concerned authority, i.e., 1.11.1996. He
further argued that the ratio of the Constitution
Bench judgment in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil
Nadu (supra) cannot be invoked by the appellants
because once the Division Bench set aside the order of
the learned Single Judge, the acquisition proceedings
became final.
9. We have considered the respective submissions.
Section 11A of the Act, which has bearing on the
disposal of this appeal reads as under:
"11A. Period within which an award shall be made - The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.
6
Provided that in a case where the
said declaration has been
published before the commencement
of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of
two years from such commencement.
Explanation- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court
shall be excluded."
10.A reading of the plain language of the above
reproduced section makes it clear that the Collector
is obliged to make an award under section 11 within a
period of two years from the date of the publication
of the declaration. If no award is made within that
period, the acquisition proceedings automatically
lapses. By virtue of the explanation, the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken
pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a
Court is to be excluded in computing the period of two
years. This means that if any action or proceeding
required to be taken after the issue of declaration
under Section 6 is stayed by a Court, the entire
7
period of stay will get excluded in calculating the
period of two years within which an award is required
to be made by the Collector. As a corollary to this,
it must be held that once the stay order passed by a
Court is vacated or ceases to operate, the clog put on
the running of the period specified in the main
section is removed.
11.There is nothing in the Section 11A from which it
can be inferred that the stay order passed by the
Court remains operative till the delivery of copy of
the order. Ordinarily, the rules framed by the High
Court do not provide for supply of copy of judgment or
order to the parties free of cost. The parties to the
litigation can apply for certified copy which is
required to be supplied on fulfillment of the
conditions specified in the relevant rules. However,
no period has been prescribed for making of an
application for certified copy of the judgment or
order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of course,
once an application is made within the prescribed
period of limitation, the time spent in the
preparation and supply of the copy is excluded in
8
computing the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal or revision.
12.In the present case, we find that the Division
Bench of the High Court had allowed Writ Appeal No.406
of 1994 vide judgment dated 29.8.1996. In the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to
the writ petition of the appellant and the proforma
respondent, the date of supply of copy of the judgment
of the Division Bench was mentioned as 1.11.1996 but
the date on which the application was made for supply
of copy was not disclosed. In any case, the fortuitous
factor i.e. the time taken in supply of copy of the
judgment cannot extend the period of two years
specified in Section 11A.
13.In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu
(supra), the Constitution Bench referred to the
earlier judgments including the judgment of three
Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka and Ors etc. (1996 (3) SCC 88) and
observed :
"3. The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is, whether after quashing of
9
notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisiton Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") fresh period of one year is available to the State Government
to issue another notification under Section 6. In the case at
hand such a notification issued under Section 6 was questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three- Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v.
State of Karnataka and held that the same was validly issued.
4.Learned counsel for the
appellants placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court
in A.S. Naidu v. State of T.N. wherein a Bench of three Judges held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond
the prescribed period of the notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. It has
to be noted that there is another
judgment of two learned Judges in
Oxford English School v. Govt. of
T.N. which takes a view similar to that expressed in A.S. Naidu case. However, in State of Karnataka v.
D.C. Nanjudaiah view in Narasimhaiah case was followed and it was held that the limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made.
10
10. What appears to have weighed with the three-Judge Bench in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) is set out in paragraph 12 of the judgment, which reads as under:
"Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that if the construction as put up by the learned counsel for the appellants is given acceptance i.e., it should be within one year from the last of the dates
of publication under Section 4(1), the public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be
illustrated thus: In a given case where the notification
under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and declaration was published within
one month and as the urgency in
the opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory
tactics of the interested person
and the court ultimately finds after two years that the
exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give
an opportunity to the interested
person and the State to conduct
an enquiry under Section 5-A, then the exercise of the power
11
pursuant to the direction of the
court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct the enquiry. If the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1).
A valid notification under
Section 4(1) become invalid. On
the other hand, after conducting
enquiry as per court order and,
if the declaration under Section
6 is published within one year from the date of the receipt of
the order passed by the High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since
the action was done pursuant to
the orders of the court and compliance with the limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act would
be made."
11. It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of
inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of
12
Notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be
fixed with reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994 (1) SCC 44), it was held by this Court that though no
period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be
acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count.
13
16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus curia neminem gravabit' highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.
17. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) and Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed.
18. There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have obtained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been
14
paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed."
(emphasis supplied)
14.In our view, the last paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment has no bearing on this case because at the time
of pronouncement of Constitution Bench judgment, the writ
petition filed by the appellant and the proforma
respondents for grant of a declaration that the
acquisition will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-
making of award for two years was pending before the High
Court.
15.Although, the Division Bench has referred to a large
number of judgments which lay down the proposition that
the High Court would not entertain belated challenge to
the land acquisition proceedings but the impugned
judgment does not contain any discussion on this issue.
That apart, we find that the appellant and the proforma
respondent had moved the High Court without any delay.
Rather, they had filed writ petition immediately after
pronouncement of the award. Therefore, they could not
15
have been non-suited by the Division Bench of the High
Court by invoking the rule of laches.
16.In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned
judgment is set aside and the order passed by the
learned Single Judge is restored.
...........................J.
(G.S. SIGHVI)
..........................J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
October 14, 2011.
New Delhi.
16
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