Supreme Court of India
Anil Rai vs State Of Bihar on 6
August, 2001
Author: Thomas
Bench: K.T.Thomas
I read the judgment drafted by
Brother Sethi J. I am in full agreement with the conclusions regarding the
merits of the case. Regarding the aspect of delay in pronouncing judgments
after conclusion of arguments I wish to add a few words on my own in support of
all what Sethi J. has said about it.
In 1961 a learned judge of the Patna
High Court expressed his anguish when a magistrate took nine months to
pronounce a judgment. The words used by him for expressing his judicial wrath
is the following:
"The magistrate who cannot find
time to write judgment within reasonable time after hearing arguments ought not
do any judicial work at all. This Court strongly disapproves the magistrates
making such a tremendous delay in the delivery of his judgments."
Now when two judges of the Patna
High Court took two years for pronouncing a judgment after concluding arguments
when the parties were languishing in jail, the counsel appearing in this Court
in challenge of the said judgment asked in unison whether the exhortation made
by the Patna High Court in 1961 is not intended to apply to the High Court.
A glimpse on the situation of the
case as it remained in the High Court persuades me to feel that what happened
in this case is only the tip of the iceberg. When the sessions court convicted
nine persons on different counts including murder as per his judgment dated
4.5.1991, all the convicted persons filed appeals before the High Court of
Patna. While remaining in jail the convicted persons waited for their turn to
reach for the High Court to get time to hear their appeals. It took five years
for such turn to reach. Advocates engaged by them then addressed arguments
before the Division Bench and learned judges on conclusion of arguments on
23.8.1995, adjourned the appeals sine die for judgment. The convicted persons
while remaining in jail again waited for the D' day. The members of their
family would naturally have been anxiously waiting for the same, but days and
weeks and months and even years passed without anything happening from the
Court. In the meanwhile, one of the convicted persons died in jail. By then
even the anxiety of the other convicted persons would have died down and
appeals would have been consigned to records. It is difficult to comprehend how
the judges would have kept the details and the nuance of the arguments in their
memory alive after the lapse of a long long period.
Unfortunately, the judges concerned
had no concern until one of them reached near the date of his superannuation.
They then reminded themselves of the obligation of delivering the judgment. It
was thus that the impugned judgment had come out, at last, from torpidity.
If delay in pronouncing judgments
occurred on the part of the judges of the subordinate judiciary the whip of the
High Court studded with supervisory and administrative authority could be used
and it had been used quite often to chide them and sometimes to take action
against the erring judicial officers. But what happens when the High Court
judges do not pronounce judgments after lapse of several months, and perhaps
even years since completion of arguments? The Constitution did not provide
anything in that area presumably because the architects of the Constitution
believed that no High Court judge would cause such long and distressing delays.
Such expectation of the makers of the Constitution remained unsullied during
the early period of the post Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later
years have shown slackness on the part of a few judges of the superior Courts
in India with the result that once arguments in a lis concluded before them the
records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves normally forget the
details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced. Sometimes the
interval is so long that the judges forget even the fact that such a case is
pending with them expecting judicial verdict. Though it is an unpleasant fact,
it is a stark reality.
Should the situation continue to
remain so helpless for all concerned. The Apex Court made an exhortation in
1976 through a judgment which is reported as RC Sharma vs. UOI [1976(3) SCC
574] for expediting delivery of judgments. I too wish to repeat those words as
follows:
"Nevertheless an unreasonable
delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained
by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when
written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the
litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more
important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of
litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay
between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments."
Quarter of a century has elapsed
thereafter but the situation, instead of improving has only worsened. We
understand that many cases remain in area of "judgment reserved" for
long periods. It is heartening that most of the judges of the High Courts are
discharging their duties by expeditiously pronouncing judgments. But it is
disheartening that a handful of few are unmindful of their obligation and the
oath of office they have solemnly taken as they cause such inordinate delay in
pronouncing judgments. It is in the above background, after bestowing deep
thoughts with a sense of commitment, that we have decided to chalk out some
remedial measures to be mentioned in this judgment as instructions.
Sethi J. has enumerated them
succinctly as follows:
i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may
issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment
is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where,
on the first page, after the cause-title date of reserving the judgment and
date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.
ii) That Chief Justices of the High
Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers
of the various benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of
cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the
period of that month.
iii) On noticing that after
conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of
two months the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench
concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the
desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments
have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of
conclusion of the arguments amongst the judges of the High Court for their information.
Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
iv) Where a judgment is not
pronounced within three months from the date of reserving judgment any of the
parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with
prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed
before the bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
v) If the judgment, for any reason,
is not pronounced within a period of six months any of the parties of the said
lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief justice of the
High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any
other bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the
said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.
I have chosen to reiterate the above
instructions in this separate judgment only for providing added emphasis to
them. I make it clear that if the Chief Justice of a High Court thinks that
more effective measures can be evolved by him for slashing down the interval
between conclusion of arguments and delivery of judgment in that particular
court, it is open to him to do so as substitute for the measures suggested by
us here-in-before. But until such measures are evolved by the Chief justice of
the concerned High Court we expect that the measures suggested above would hold
the field. I may also mention that the above- enumerated measures are intended
to remain only until such time as the Parliament would enact measures to deal
with this problem.
With the above words I respectfully
concur with all what brother Sethi J. has said in his judgment.
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