It cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has held
that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under
Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a ‘Court’ for
:the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. The question is
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 41A of the
Bombay Public Trusts Act, whether the Charity
Commissioner acts as a ‘Court’ and exercises judicial or
quasi judicial power. This Court has already taken a view in
the case of Damodar v. Dy. Charity Commissioner, reported
in 2011(6) Mh.L.J. 431, and Vanmala v. Dy. Charity
Commissioner, reported in 2012(3) Mh.L.J. 594, that the
power conferred by Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts
Act is purely an administrative power and it is neither a judicial or quasi judicial power. Hence, in such proceedings,
the Charity Commissioner does not act as a ‘Court’ within
the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. The provision of
Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act is not attracted.:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CONTEMPT PETITION NO.227 OF 2012
Budhasao Sitaramsao Dhenge, V V.G. Katgaye,
Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Citation;2013(2) MH L J 220
1. The complaint in this contempt petition is about
willful disobedience/breach of the orders dated 2852012
and 462012 passed by the learned Joint Charity
Commissioner, Nagpur, below Exhibits 20 and 31
respectively in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 41A
of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 in the proceedings,
i.e. Application No.3 of 2010.
2. Assuming that there is noncompliance or
disobedience of such order, the question is whether the
provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 is attracted or not. The reliance is placed by Shri
Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, upon the
decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. Shamrao and
others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, reported in
(2003) 3 SCC 563. He has urged that the Apex Court has
held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed
under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is a
‘Court’ for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. He
further submits that Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts
Act does not make any distinction between the orders passed
in exercise of administrative power and judicial or quasi
judicial power. Hence, the provision of Section 2(b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act is attracted.
3. The provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act being relevant, is reproduced below :
“2(b). “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience
to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or
other process of a Court or wilful breach of an
undertaking given to a Court.”
It is obvious from the aforesaid provision that it is only the
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of
the Court or willful breach of the undertaking given to the
Court, which attracts civil contempt. Necessarily, therefore,
it is the direction or the order passed in quasi judicial or
judicial proceedings by a ‘Court’, which would attract the
definition of ‘civil contempt’ under the Contempt of Courts
Act. It is not the direction or order passed in exercise of
administrative power, which is contemplated by Section 2(b)
of the Contempt of Courts Act.
4. It cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has held
that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under
Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a ‘Court’ for
the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. The question is
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 41A of the
Bombay Public Trusts Act, whether the Charity
Commissioner acts as a ‘Court’ and exercises judicial or
quasi judicial power. This Court has already taken a view in
the case of Damodar v. Dy. Charity Commissioner, reported
in 2011(6) Mh.L.J. 431, and Vanmala v. Dy. Charity
Commissioner, reported in 2012(3) Mh.L.J. 594, that the
power conferred by Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts
Act is purely an administrative power and it is neither a
judicial or quasi judicial power. Hence, in such proceedings,
the Charity Commissioner does not act as a ‘Court’ within
the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. The provision of
Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act is not attracted.
5. In view of above, the contempt petition is
dismissed.
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