As far as complaints are concerned, though the F.I.Rs. have got the endorsement that they were received with the original complaints, no complaint whatsoever is annexed to the F.I.Rs. Even as per the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha, no information was received by the concerned Police Officer from any person nor was there any complaint lodged with the Police Officer and no complaint as such was also lodged by the officer concerned. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha that the panchanama itself is the complaint cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination.
24. In the absence of the F.I.Rs. mentioning any allegation whatsoever nor is there any material prima facie constituting any of the offences under the P.C. Act being made out from a bare reading of the F.I.Rs., category (1) mentioned in Bhajan Lal's case, therefore, gets attracted with all force.
25. Whether the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. has been satisfied in all these cases is the next point for consideration. A plain reading of Section 154(1)of the Cr, P.C. makes it clear that in respect of the information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, that information received orally requires to be reduced into writing and if the information is given in writing, then, the Police Officer in charge of the police station shall have to enter that in a book kept by such officer in such form and only thereafter, investigation can be taken up.
In the case of Ashok Kumar Todi, the Apex Court has considered the definition of "investigation" as defined under Section 2(h) of the Code and went on to observe thus at paragraph 48:
48. Under the scheme of the Code, investigation commences with lodgment of information relating to the commission of an offence. If it is a cognizable offence, the offence in charge of the police station, to whom the information is supplied orally has a statutory duty to reduce it to writing and get the signature of the informant. He shall enter the substance of the information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, in a book prescribed by the State in that behalf. The officer-in-charge has no escape from doing so if the offence mentioned therein is a cognizable offence and whether or not such offence was committed within the limits of that police station. But when the offence is non-cognizable, the officer in charge of the police station has no obligation to record it if the offence was not committed within the limits of his police station. Investigation thereafter would commence and the Investigating Officer has to go step by step.
30. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court that in respect of a cognizable offence, the officer in charge is duty-bound to reduce the information received by him to writing and then has to register the case and thereafter can proceed with the investigation and he has no other option open to him. Therefore, the Police Officer in charge is duty-bound to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
31. In the cases of the present petitioners, there has been no such compliance of the mandatory provision of law as contained in Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., and the seizure panchanama cannot take the place of complaint or information. Thus, it is clear that the procedure followed by the Police Officer concerned is contrary to the mandatory provisions as contained in Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
In the light of the aforesaid position in the law laid down by the Apex Court in particular in the aforementioned cases, the entire proceeding leading to conducting the seizure panchanama even without registering the cases as required under Section 154 of the Cr, P.C. is illegal, contrary to law and is in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C., and the act on the part of the Police Officer concerned is nothing but an act which could be termed as abuse of the process of law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Decided On: 03.09.2012
Appellants: L. Shankaramurthy and Others
Vs.
Respondent: State by Lokayuktha Police, City Division, Bangalore Urban Division, Bangalore
Vs.
Respondent: State by Lokayuktha Police, City Division, Bangalore Urban Division, Bangalore
Citation;2013(1)crimes 320 (karnataka)
1. All these petitions are under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the grounds urged by the respective petitioners being common and the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the parties also being common to these petitions, these petitions are disposed of by this common order. At the outset, it has to be mentioned that, this Court had granted interim stay of the proceedings and LA. to vacate stay is also filed by the respondent-Lokayukta in all these petitions and therefore this Court heard learned Counsel Sri M.S. Bhagwat for the petitioners and Smt. T.M. Gayathri for the respondent-Lokayukta on the merits of these petitions.
2. The facts common to all these petitions are that, cases were registered against the respective petitioners herein under Section 154 of Cr. P.C. by the Lokayukta Police in respect of the offence under Sections 8 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short). FIRs came to be registered in all but one case on the basis of the panchanama drawn on 18-5-2012. Insofar as Cri. P. No. 2142 of 2012 is concerned, the FIR was registered on 25-2-2012 based on the mahazar drawn on the previous day i.e. on 24-2-2012.
3. The further undisputed facts common to all these petitions are that, except the FIR, which is produced at Annexure-A to these petitions, no complaint was lodged by any person nor was there any complaint by the very Police Officer who registered the case. Though, according to the learned Counsel for the Lokayukta, the concerned Police Officer went to the office of the Sub-Registrar and in the presence of the panchas, the panchanama was drawn, yet there was no information given by anyone with the concerned Police Officer nor is there any material placed to show that on the basis of the credible information, the Police Officer concerned visited the office of the Sub-Registrar and drew the panchanama.
4. Yet another fact with regard to which no dispute is there between the parties is that, in all these cases the petitioners were arrested and brought to the police station and only thereafter, cases came to be registered against all of them. With the aforesaid facts in common, the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioners requires to be taken note of at this juncture.
5. The first of the grounds put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that, without there being the complaint and without there being any information, the concerned Police Officer, without even registering the cases as required under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., which is a mandatory provision, has proceeded to the spot viz., towards the office of the Sub-Registrars and panchanamas were drawn. This procedure followed is contrary to the statutory provisions as contained in the Cr.P.C., and, therefore, the investigation taken up without being preceded by a complaint or a case being registered, therefore, becomes illegal.
6. Relying on several judgments of the Supreme Court, it is argued that once an information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before the Police Officer in charge of a police station, the Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information and only thereafter he can proceed with the investigation. As this mandatory requirement of law is not followed in the instant cases, the F.I.Rs. are liable to be quashed on the said ground alone.
7. It is then argued that, even the F.I.Rs that are registered against the petitioners mention nothing about any allegations whatsoever against the petitioners and all that the F.I.Rs mention is that a case is registered in respect of the offences under Sections 8 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. Though the endorsements in the F.I.Rs also mention that the F.I.Rs were received with the original complaints, no complaint whatsoever is there on record in any of these cases and all that is there is the panchanamas that were drawn prior to the cases being registered. Therefore, the panchanama itself is illegal and cannot be looked into.
8. The next ground urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that, the respective petitioners were arrested and brought to the police station and were detained there and only thereafter, cases came to be registered. A plain look at the date and time of the F.I.Rs. and the panchanamas in all these cases will also make it clear that the F.I.Rs were registered subsequent to the panchanamas being drawn at the spot. Therefore, the arrest of the petitioners even prior to the cases being registered against them is illegal and is indicative of misuse or rather abuse of power by the Police.
9. The next contention put forward is that, in the absence of complaint from anyone and no complaints also being annexed to the F.I.Rs. and F.I.Rs. also not mentioning about the petitioners in respect of the alleged offences, none of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 can be said to have been made out. As there are no allegations in the F.I.Rs. the question of attracting any of the offences under the P.C. Act, therefore, does not arise and, as such, the P.C. Act itself is not applicable to the instant cases.
10. The next contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that, the ingredients of Section 8 of the Act also are not made out from a bare perusal of the F.I.Rs. as well as the panchanamas. Even though the panchanamas are illegal, even for argument sake if the contents of the panchanamas are considered, it cannot be said that any of the offences under the P.C. Act is made out against the petitioners. Neither the F.I.Rs. nor the panchanamas mention about any demand made by the accused persons nor is there any allegation that the petitioners accepted any amount as bribe from any one and whatever money that was recovered from each one of the petitioners was returned back to them as it was found that they were in possession of their personal amount and nothing else.
11. It is, therefore, argued on the aforesaid submissions that the entire proceedings stand vitiated for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., and in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to by him. It is, therefore, submitted that the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed as an abuse of the process of law. Hence, relying on the Apex Court decision in the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and OthersMANU/SC/0115/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 604: 1992 Cri. L.J. 527 (SC): 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426, and drawing the attention of this Court in particular to paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33, the submission made is that the proceedings against the petitioners are liable to be quashed as there is an abuse of the process of law and the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C. also have not been followed by the concerned Police Officer.
12. The further submission made is that, the petitioners were subjected to humiliation before the public without a complaint being there against anyone of them and the petitioners' physical person being checked and were found that they were only in possession of their legitimate personal amount and nothing else and further, taking the petitioners to custody and keeping them at the police station and thereafter registering cases also go to show that the humiliation suffered by the petitioners has caused immense agony to them and it was only after the Trial Court granted them bail that the petitioners could come out of the custody.
13. As far as the contents of the panchanamas are concerned, the submission made is that, the amounts said to have been collected or seized by the police were from different persons who were present in the office of the Sub-Registrar in connection with their respective cases or rather documents to be registered and even the members of the public were also subjected harassment by the police. As such, the submission made is that, this Court has got power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to interfere in cases of the present nature and the proceedings are liable to be quashed to prevent abuse of the process of law.
14. As far as the bar contained under Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act is concerned, the submission made is that, as none of the offences under the P.C. Act gets attracted to the petitioners herein, the question of Section 19(3)(c) coming into operation also does not arise. On these submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners sought for quashing of the proceedings against the petitioners to meet the ends of justice.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, in regard to the aforesaid submissions, relied upon the decisions in the cases of Bhajan Lal; Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others MANU/SC/8037/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 1322 : 2006 Cri. L.J. 1622 (SC) : 2006 AIR SCW 1021 : 2006 SCC (Cri.) 678 : (2006) 2 SCC 677; Lallan Chaudhary and Others v. State of Bihar and Another MANU/SC/4524/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 3376 : 2006 AIR SCW 5172 : (2006) 12 SCC 229, Mahadevappa v. Karnataka Lokayukta and Another MANU/KA/0076/2009 : 2011 (3) Kar. L.J. 279 : ILR 2009 Kar. 947; 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 702, Thottkat Kunjiram Madhav v. Commissioner of Police, Bangalore and Others MANU/KA/1021/2002 : ILR 2002 Kar. 2852and Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan MANU/SC/0162/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 1254 : 2011 Cri. L.J. 2317 (SC): 2011 AIR SCW 1994 : (2011) 3 SCC 758.
16. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha argued that, though no complaint was lodged by any one with the police nor was there any information received by the concerned Police Officer, yet, on the basis of the credible information, the Police Officer concerned was deputed to the spot and, therefore, there is nothing illegal in the procedure followed by the concerned Police Officer in going to the spot and drawing up the panchanamas and thereafter coming to the police station, arresting the accused and then cases being registered. It is argued that the very mahazar itself is the complaint. Therefore, the question of not following the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C. does not arise.
17. It is then submitted by referring to the contents of the seizure panchanamas in all these cases that the Police Officer who conducted the panchanamas has recovered various amounts from various persons present in the office of the Sub-Registrar at the time of raid and money was found in the possession of a person who is said to be a writer and the said person had collected the amount on behalf of the Sub-Registrars and, therefore, the contents of the panchanama make out a case against the petitioners and whatever defects or irregularities pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners can be urged by him before the Trial Court.
18. It is then argued that, in view of Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act and the Apex Court decisions in the cases of State of Karnataka and Another v. Pastor P. RajuMANU/SC/3533/2006 : 2006 (5) Kar. L.J. 337 (SC) : ILR 2006 Kar. 3848 (SC) : 2006 (5) AIR Kar. R. 441 (SC) : (2006) 6 SCC 728: 2006 AIR SCW 3916: AIR 2006 SC 2825, and Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0580/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 2856 : (2001) 8 SCC 607 : 2002 SCC (Cri.) 39 : 2001 Cri. L.J. 4640 (SC) and of this Court in the case of Govindaraju v. State of Karnataka MANU/KA/0371/2008 : 2008 (6) Kar. L.J. 718: ILR 2008 Kar. 5160, this Court cannot stay the proceedings in all these cases in view of the clear bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act. Particular reference was made by the learned Counsel to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Satya Narayan Sharma, and it is argued that this Court, even under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., cannot interfere and stay the proceedings in respect of the offences under the P.C. Act. Therefore, the submission made is that, all these petitions be rejected. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha on the decisions in the cases of Govindaraju; Satya Narayan Sharma's case; Pastor P. Raju's case, Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., and Others v. Tapan Kr. Singh MANU/SC/0299/2003 : AIR 2003 SC 4140 : 2003 Cri. L.J. 2322 (SC) : (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri.) 1305 and an unreported order of this Court dated 17-6-2011 passed in Criminal Petition No. 5010 of 2010 and connected cases.
19. In the light of the aforesaid contentions put forward, whether the petitioners have made out a case for this Court to interfere under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is the point for consideration.
20. From the material that is placed at this juncture and the facts admitted by both sides, it is clear that in all these cases, there was no complaint lodged by any one with the police and secondly, the F.I.Rs. came to be registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of the seizure panchanamas drawn in each one of the cases. The further admitted fact is that, in all these cases, seizure panchanamas drawn make no mention whatsoever about the petitioners having either demanded or accepted the bribe amount. The amount said to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioners, who are the Sub-Registrars, also is not the bribe amount, even as per the seizure panchanamas and the said amount was returned to the petitioners as it was found to be there own personal amount. Another fact, which is not in dispute, is that, before conducting the seizure panchanamas, no case was registered by the police. In the face of such admitted facts, whether this Court can interfere under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be examined.
21. The Apex Court, in the case of Bhajan Lal, has listed the categories of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice have been laid down and they are as under:
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
22. Insofar as the petitioners' cases are concerned, the F.I.Rs. registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., except mentioning the Sections of the P.C. Act viz., Sections 8 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), do not mention anything about the petitioners nor is there anything in the F.I.Rs. indicating the necessary ingredients of the aforesaid sections and no allegations whatsoever are there in the F.I.R.
23. As far as complaints are concerned, though the F.I.Rs. have got the endorsement that they were received with the original complaints, no complaint whatsoever is annexed to the F.I.Rs. Even as per the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha, no information was received by the concerned Police Officer from any person nor was there any complaint lodged with the Police Officer and no complaint as such was also lodged by the officer concerned. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha that the panchanama itself is the complaint cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination.
24. In the absence of the F.I.Rs. mentioning any allegation whatsoever nor is there any material prima facie constituting any of the offences under the P.C. Act being made out from a bare reading of the F.I.Rs., category (1) mentioned in Bhajan Lal's case, therefore, gets attracted with all force.
25. Whether the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. has been satisfied in all these cases is the next point for consideration. A plain reading of Section 154(1)of the Cr, P.C. makes it clear that in respect of the information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, that information received orally requires to be reduced into writing and if the information is given in writing, then, the Police Officer in charge of the police station shall have to enter that in a book kept by such officer in such form and only thereafter, investigation can be taken up.
26. The Apex Court, in the aforementioned Bhajan Lal's case, has dealt in great detail about the requirement of a case being registered in respect of a cognizable offence and taking up the investigation thereon. The relevant paragraphs for our purpose are paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33, which are reproduced hereunder:
30. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1) is that every information relating to the commission of a "cognizable offence" (as defined under Section 2(c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to "an officer incharge of a police station" (within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called as "First Information Report" and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case.31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned Police Officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a Police Officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to Heal with those sections in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any Police Officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or 41(1)(g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1)unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and 41(1)(g) of the Code may be for the reason that the Police Officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words "reasonableness" or "credibility" of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that "every complaint or information" preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that "every complaint" preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing. The word "complaint" which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word "information" was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections154, 155, 157 and 190(1)(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
27. In the case of Ramesh Kumari, the Apex Court has held that the provision of Section 154 is mandatory and the Police Officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on receiving the information disclosing cognizable office and the Court went on to observe that the genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case and that can only be considered after registration of the case. After referring to the observations made in Bhajan Lal's case in paragraphs 31, 32 and 33, in the case under discussion, the Apex Court has observed at paragraph 4 that a Police Officer mandatorily has to register a case on a complaint of cognizable offence by the citizen under Section 154 of the Code and that position is no more res Integra. At paragraph 5, the Apex Court has gone on to observe thus:
5. The views expressed by this Court in paras 31, 32 and 33 as quoted above leave no manners of doubt that the provision of Section154 of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of such an information disclosing cognizable offence.
28. Again, the very same principles were reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Lallan Chaudhary, wherein, after referring to the decision in Ramesh Kumari's case, it was held thus at paragraphs 8, 9 and 10:
8. Section 154 of the Code thus casts a statutory duty upon the Police Officer to register the case, as disclosed in the complaint, and then to proceed with the investigation. The mandate of Section 154 is manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station, such Police Officer has no other option except to register the case on the basis of such information.9. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), MANU/SC/8037/2006 : (2006) 2 SCC 677 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri.) 678, this Court has held that the provision of Section 154 is mandatory. Hence, the Police Officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the receiving information disclosing cognizable offence. Genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. That can only be considered after registration of the case.10. The mandate of Section 154 of the Code is that at the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence, the Police Officer concerned cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not relevant or credible. In other words, reliability, genuineness and credibility of the information are not the conditions precedent for registering a case under Section 154 of the Code.
29. In the case of Ashok Kumar Todi, the Apex Court has considered the definition of "investigation" as defined under Section 2(h) of the Code and went on to observe thus at paragraph 48:
48. Under the scheme of the Code, investigation commences with lodgment of information relating to the commission of an offence. If it is a cognizable offence, the offence in charge of the police station, to whom the information is supplied orally has a statutory duty to reduce it to writing and get the signature of the informant. He shall enter the substance of the information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, in a book prescribed by the State in that behalf. The officer-in-charge has no escape from doing so if the offence mentioned therein is a cognizable offence and whether or not such offence was committed within the limits of that police station. But when the offence is non-cognizable, the officer in charge of the police station has no obligation to record it if the offence was not committed within the limits of his police station. Investigation thereafter would commence and the Investigating Officer has to go step by step.
30. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court that in respect of a cognizable offence, the officer in charge is duty-bound to reduce the information received by him to writing and then has to register the case and thereafter can proceed with the investigation and he has no other option open to him. Therefore, the Police Officer in charge is duty-bound to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
31. In the cases of the present petitioners, there has been no such compliance of the mandatory provision of law as contained in Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., and the seizure panchanama cannot take the place of complaint or information. Thus, it is clear that the procedure followed by the Police Officer concerned is contrary to the mandatory provisions as contained in Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
32. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. also makes it clear that, Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. gives power to the Police Officer to take up investigation only after sending a report to the Magistrate, and power to take cognizance of such offence where the officer concerned, from the information received or otherwise, has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C., he shall follow the requirement of Section 157 before embarking upon the investigation. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid provisions of the Cr.P.C. that the Police Officer concerned cannot proceed with the investigation without first registering the case upon the information received by him.
33. This Court, in the case of Mahadevappa, has also taken the view that the Lokayuktha police have got suo motu power to initiate proceeding, but in view of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C., the Police Officer can press the law into motion not only on the basis of the information received by him but also otherwise.
34. In the light of the aforesaid position in the law laid down by the Apex Court in particular in the aforementioned cases, the entire proceeding leading to conducting the seizure panchanama even without registering the cases as required under Section 154 of the Cr, P.C. is illegal, contrary to law and is in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C., and the act on the part of the Police Officer concerned is nothing but an act which could be termed as abuse of the process of law.
35. Though on the aforesaid ground alone the proceedings against the petitioners are liable to be quashed, yet, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's case, I have also examined the material at least to satisfy as to whether there are prima facie allegations made out against the petitioners in respect of any one of the offences under the P.C. Act.
36. Section 8 of the P.C. Act refers to the situation where the person accepting or agreeing to accept or obtains or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification as motive or reward for inducing by corrupt or illegal means any public servant to do or forbear to do any official act or to show favour or disfavour to any person and in such an event, only Section 8 comes into play.
37. In the case on hand, at the cost of repetition, it has to be mentioned that no complaint whatsoever is on record alleging the commission of the offence under Section 8 of the P.C. Act and none of the ingredients of Section 8 are to be found in the F.I.Rs. Therefore, mere mention of Section 8 in the F.I.Rs. without there being even the prima facie material to make out such an offence, therefore, cannot give rise to take the view that there is prima facie material to attract Section 8of the Act. When the F.I.Rs. are totally silent with regard to the allegations of the nature required by Section 8, the question of there being any allegations attracting the offence under Section 8, therefore, does not and cannot arise. For the very same reasons, there is no material at this stage to show that the complaint allegations or the F.I.R. allegations make out a case to attract Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. On the other hand, the seizure panchanamas indicate that the respective Sub-Registrars were found in possession of their personal money and the said amount was returned to them. There is also no material placed to show that the respective petitioners received any illegal gratification either for themselves or for any other person.
38. Thus, the F.I.Rs. and the panchanamas taken together do not make out any of the allegations to bring the cases within the ambit of Sections 8 and 13(1)(d)read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. Added to this, the F.I.Rs. as well as the seizure panchanamas do not mention anywhere that the petitioners had demanded any bribe amount from any person nor is there any mention that the petitioners had received or accepted the bribe amounts and that the said bribe amounts were recovered from their possession. Therefore, when there is no allegation of either demand of bribe amount or acceptance of the same by the respective petitioners from any person, the question of any of the offences under the P.C. Act getting attracted, therefore, does not arise.
39. Now, coming to the bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act, the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha is right in submitting that the proceedings under the P.C. Act cannot be stayed by any Court. The Apex Court has also laid down the law in the case of Satya Narayan Sharma, that there can be no stay of trial of public servant of corruption charges and this would also be applicable to the High Court where it exercises jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same principle is also laid down by this Court in the case of Govindaraju as well as in Criminal Petition No. 5010 of 2010 and batch of cases.
40. The aforesaid decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Lokayuktha have no application to the cases on hand as the allegations in the F.I.Rs. do not make out any offence whatsoever under the P.C. Act. None of the ingredients of Sections 8 and 13(1)(d) are to be found in the F.I.Rs. since the seizure panchanamas were drawn even prior to the cases being registered and the said proceedings are illegal and cannot be looked into.
41. At the same time, it has to be mentioned that the Apex Court has observed in the case of Satya Narayan Sharma, referred to earlier, that while in cases under the P.C. Act there could be no stay of trial, the Court went on to further make out clear at paragraph-26 thus:
26.... We clarify that we are not saying that the proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases, the proceedings under Section 482 can be adapted...
42. The present cases are the ones which fall under appropriate cases for the reasons mentioned earlier. This Court, in the case of Thottkat Kunjiram Madhav, has held that where the search conducted is an abuse of the process of law, it is one such rarest of rare cases which warrants interference by the Court in view of the Apex Court's observations in Bhajan Lal's case. In the case under consideration, this Court has held that the illegal act of the Police Officer in attempting to enter the premises of the petitioner without an order of the Court has caused damage to the reputation of the petitioner and the Court then went on to impose cost on the third respondent before it.
43. The cases on hand are also clear examples or illustrations of the abuse of the process of law and the Police Officer concerned has totally disregarded the mandatory provisions of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., and before registering the cases has proceeded to the spot, conducted personal check of the petitioners and the petitioners were then arrested and brought to the police station and after all these events, cases were registered.
44. Though it was brought to the notice of this Court a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Daljit Singh Grewal v. Ramesh Inder SinghMANU/SC/0157/2012 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri.) 2, to point out that the question as to whether registration of the F.I.R. is mandatory or not and whether the police has discretion to conduct preliminary enquiry before registering the F.I.R. has been referred by the Apex Court for clear enunciation of law and adjudication by a Larger Bench, as of now, the settled position in law is registering the case upon the information received is sine qua non before proceeding to take up the investigation.
45. Thus, the entire procedure followed by the concerned Police Officer is an abuse of the process of law and, therefore, I have no hesitation in agreeing with the contentions put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that these cases are fit enough to be brought within the rarest of rare cases and in order to prevent abuse of the process of law and to meet the ends of justice, exercise of inherent power conferred under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., therefore, becomes imperative and inevitable. For the aforesaid reasons, as the entire proceedings stand vitiated on account of non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of Section154 of the Cr.P.C., it is unnecessary to go into the contents of the seizure panchanamas except to the extend already referred to by me and hence, I proceed to pass the following order:
All the Criminal Petitions are allowed. The F.I.Rs. that are registered against the respective petitioners and the consequent proceedings against them stand quashed to meet the ends of justice.The petitioners are given liberty to take necessary course of action as is open to them in law in respect of they being subjected to humiliation and being taken to custody even without a case being registered against them at the first instance. In the event of the petitioners taking any such steps, the Court concerned shall have to consider the case in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations made herein above.
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