Appreciation of evidence in case of cruelty by wife to Husband

In the facts of the present case, the allegations 
of cruelty leveled by the appellant against the respondent 
are so vague, indefinite, unspecific and uncertain, not only
in the petition but in his evidence as well. Without spelling 
out any specific acts of cruelty either on the part of the 
respondent or her mother, it is difficult to assume as to 
under what circumstances the appellant left his own house 
on 15.02.1998. Merely to say that the appellant started 
cooking his own food and his mother-in-law used to create 
scenes in the house or the appellant felt neglected or 
depressed on account of behaviour of the respondent and 
her mother would not suffice to prove mental cruelty on 
the part of the respondent in the absence of any specific 
dates or the period when the alleged acts were committed. 
Similarly, vaguely the appellant has alleged that he was not 
allowed to meet his own children due to some instructions 
given by the respondent to the school authorities and he 
was insulted by the respondent and her mother when the 
appellant went to meet the respondent at her house in the 
housing society. The appellant has referred to some letters 
alleged to have been written by him to the respondent, but 
no such letters were proved on record by the appellant. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 
Judgment delivered on: 14.7.2010

SUBHASH CHANDER SHARMA ……Appellant

Versus
ANJALI SHARMA ……Respondent



1. By this appeal filed under Section 28 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the appellant seeks to challenge
the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.05.2003
passed by the learned ADJ, Delhi thereby dismissing the
divorce petition filed by the appellant under Section 13(1)
(ia) & (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act.MAT APP 44/2005 Page 2 of 23
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for deciding the
present appeal are that the marriage between the
appellant and the respondent was solemnized on
29.11.1984 at Mathura, U.P according to Hindu rites and
ceremonies. From this wedlock, two children were born i.e.
on 10.02.1988 and 12.09.1992. Both the parties lived
together as husband and wife for 14 years i.e. upto
15.02.1998. The acts of cruelty based on which the
appellant-husband has sought decree of divorce under
Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act mainly are
that after the death of the father of the appellant the
mother of the respondent started living with them and due
to her presence the atmosphere in the house got so
surcharged that even the children started avoiding the
appellant; the appellant though lived in the same house,
but had to cook his own food and do all his personal work
himself; he felt neglected and depressed on account of the
behaviour of the respondent and her mother and ultimately
on 15.02.1998 the appellant started living separately; the
appellant made all efforts for rapprochement but the MAT APP 44/2005 Page 3 of 23
respondent foiled all his attempts; the respondent gave
instructions to the school authorities that the appellant
should not be allowed to meet the children; the respondent
avoided to come to official telephone so as to talk with the
appellant; the appellant was insulted by the respondent
and her mother when he went to contact the respondent;
the appellant was not even allowed to enter in the house;
the respondent shifted her residence from housing society
to some other place and she had also given instructions to
her office not to disclose her new address to her husband;
the appellant also wrote various letters to the respondent,
but she did not respond to the same. The appellant has also
averred that he has not condoned the acts of cruelty
complained of against the respondent.
3. So far the ground of desertion is concerned, the
appellant averred that the respondent had deserted him
without any reasonable cause and against his wishes. The
appellant has also averred that there has not been any
willful neglect on his part and for no fault of the appellant
the respondent deserted him.MAT APP 44/2005 Page 4 of 23
4. The respondent did not choose to appear after
having been duly served with the notice. She, however,
sent reply by post, making certain allegations against the
appellant. Accordingly, the respondent was proceeded ex
parte by the Court vide orders dated 28.01.2003.
5. In the evidence, the appellant examined himself
as PW-1 and except his own evidence he did not adduce
any further evidence. In his evidence, the appellant
deposed that he got married to the respondent on
29.11.1984 at Mathura, U.P and since thereafter they were
living together as husband and wife. He also deposed that
out of the said wedlock, two children i.e. one daughter and
one son were born on 10.02.1988 and 12.09.1992
respectively. He further deposed that he was forced to
leave the house on 15.02.1998 due to the circumstances
created by the respondent and her mother, when she had
joined them after the death of the father of the appellant in
the year 1996. It would be relevant to reproduce the entire
evidence of the appellant as under:-MAT APP 44/2005 Page 5 of 23
“PW1 Subhash Chander Sharma, petitioner.
On S.A.:-
I got married on 22nd of Nov. 1985 with the respondent. Marriage
took place at Mathura, U.P. Reception was held in Delhi. Since
then we were living together as husband and wife upto 15th
February, 1998. On 15.02.1998 I was forced to leave the house
due to the circumstances created by respondent and her mother
who joined us on the death of my father in 1996. The relation was
unbearable facing lot of depression and continuous failure in life. I
faced lot of embarrassment in the relations. I faced mental agony
by continuing in the circumstances.
Out of the wedlock we had two children, daughter named
Anupriya date of birth 10/2/88, son Chinmay Sharma date of birth
12 Sept. 1992. After the separation she issued instructions to the
school authorities not to allow me to meet the children. My every
effort for reapproachment was foiled by her. She did not attend
even the phone calls I made at her official telephone. Even my
letters which were of personal nature were not responded at all.
My friends and relatives whosoever tried for the reapproachment
faced humiliation and insult which closed the door at me for
reapproachment.
The respondent deserted me without any major cause and
reasonable cause. I have not condoned the acts of cruelties and the
petition has not been filed in collusion with the respondent. My
petition is correct.
sd/-
RO& AC ADJ/Delhi
6/3/2003”
6. The appellant was not cross-examined by the
respondent as she was proceeded ex parte by the Court.
Based on the case set up by the appellant in his divorce
petition and the said ex parte evidence adduced by him, the
learned trial court came to the conclusion that the MAT APP 44/2005 Page 6 of 23
allegations of cruelty leveled by the appellant do not
constitute cruelty as envisaged under Section 13(1) (ia) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. So far as the ground of
desertion is concerned, the learned trial court found that it
is the appellant himself who left the matrimonial home on
15.02.1998, therefore, no evidence on record has been
adduced by the appellant to prove that the respondent had
any intention to bring the cohabitation permanently to an
end. The learned trial court thus found that the appellant
failed to establish any „animus deserendi‟ on the part of the
respondent and in the absence of the same, the ground of
desertion was also found to be not available to the
appellant.
7. Assailing the said judgment and decree of the
learned trial court, the appellant preferred the present
appeal. Counsel appearing for the appellant strongly
contended that the respondent has neither contested the
petition before the learned trial court nor she is contesting
the present appeal and, therefore, such conduct on the part
of the respondent would be manifest of the fact that the MAT APP 44/2005 Page 7 of 23
marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken
down. Counsel thus submitted that this Court may direct
dissolution of the marriage of the parties on the said
ground itself. Counsel for the appellant further contended
that the appellant fully established both the grounds of
divorce i.e. cruelty as well as desertion beyond any shadow
of doubt, but still the learned trial court dismissed the
petition filed by the appellant. Counsel further contended
that the learned trial court committed grave error by not
appreciating the fact that the divorce proceedings were not
contested by the respondent and, therefore, the evidence of
the appellant remained unrebutted.
8. In support of his arguments, counsel for the
appellant placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Naveen Kohli Vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC
558 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Gauri
Shankar Dhanwaria Vs. Maya Devi, 2003(107) DLT
583.MAT APP 44/2005 Page 8 of 23
9. I have heard counsel for the appellant at
considerable length and have given my anxious
consideration to the pleas raised by him.
10. By way of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act,
1976, cruelty was introduced as a ground of divorce as
prior thereto the same was only a ground for claiming a
decree of judicial separation under Section 10(1) (b) of the
Hindu Marriage Act. The ground of cruelty was added with
the omission of the expression “as to cause a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be
harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other
party” from Section 10 (1) (b). After the 1976 amendment,
now Section 13(1) (ia) entitles the petitioner to claim
decree of divorce, if after the solemnization of the
marriage, he has been treated by the spouse with cruelty.
The term cruelty has not been defined in the Hindu
Marriage Act and the legislature has left it to the courts to
determine in the facts and circumstances of each case
whether the conduct amounts to cruelty or not. In a
plethora of judgments, the Apex Court and various High MAT APP 44/2005 Page 9 of 23
Courts of the country have discussed the scope of the
concept of cruelty.
11. In the case of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar
Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105, the Apex Court with regard to
cruelty observed as under:
“The word 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act.
It has been used in Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act in the context of
human conduct or behavior in relation to or in respect of
matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one
which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental
or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a
question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin
as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of
such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused
reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to
live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn
by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on
the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the
conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse
need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty
will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The
absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if
by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could
otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary
element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the
ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.
It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked
changed in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and
responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of
varying degrees from house to house or person to person.
Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of
cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not
search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in
one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may
largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to
or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon
their culture and human values to which they attach importance.
We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own
notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be
a generation gap between us and the parties. It would be better if MAT APP 44/2005 Page 10 of 23
we keep aside our customs and manners. It would be also better if
we less depend upon precedents.
Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] 2 All E.R. 257
(CA) 'the categories of cruelty are not closed'. Each case may be
different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are no
generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the
kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty
may crop up in any case depending upon the human behavior,
capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such
is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.
12. In the case of V.Bhagat v. D.Bhagat (1994) 1
SCC 337, the Apex Court while explaining the concept of
mental cruelty, observed as under:-
“16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as
that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain
and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live
with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a
nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live
together. The situation must be such that the wronged party
cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove
that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of
the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be
had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the
society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties
ever living together in case they are already living apart and all
other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible
nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case
may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be
decided in each case having regard to the facts and
circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and
allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they
were made.
13. The Apex Court in the case of Naveen Kohli v.
Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558 relied on the case of MAT APP 44/2005 Page 11 of 23
A.Jayachandra Vs. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22 where
it was observed that :-
“55. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human
conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct in relation to or in
respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course
or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The
cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If
it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It
is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem
presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the
nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in
the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable
apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the
other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by
taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the
complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the
conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse
need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the
cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or
admitted.
56. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be
"grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion that the
petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the
other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary
wear and tear of married life". The conduct taking into
consideration the circumstances and background has to be
examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct
complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law.
Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background
of several factors such as social status of parties, their education,
physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is
difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive
description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty.
It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court
that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to
such extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would
be impossible for them to live together without mental agony,
torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure
divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute
cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting
immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute
cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental
cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy MAT APP 44/2005 Page 12 of 23
and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental
peace of the other party.
57. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground
of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are
those of human beings and the psychological changes in a
spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of
the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such
conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the
conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of
severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen
whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would
tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant
should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life.
Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the
other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may
also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of
unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be
words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.”
14. As would be evident from the aforesaid
observations of the Apex Court, it is not the ordinary wear
and tear of the married life which would cause any sort of
mental pain or cruelty to the petitioner. The conduct
complained of must be proved to be grave and weighty due
to which the petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to
live with his spouse. The Apex Court has also held that it is
difficult to lay down any precise definition or to give
exhaustive description of the circumstances which would
constitute cruelty. Therefore, in the facts of each case the
conscience of the Court should be satisfied that the MAT APP 44/2005 Page 13 of 23
relationship between the parties had reached to such an
extent that it has become impossible or unbearable for
them to stay together. Under the Rules of Hindu Marriage
Act, framed by this Court, the petitioner approaching the
Court is required to plead specific acts of cruelty and the
occasions when and where such acts were committed by
the other spouse.
15. Rule 7(g) (iv) of the Hindu Marriage Rules, 1979
of this court states as under:-
“R.7. Contents of petition.-In addition to the particulars
required to be given under Order VII, Rule 1 of the Code and
Section 20(1) of the Act, all petitions under Sections 9 to 13
shall state:
……………………………
(g) the matrimonial offence or offences alleged or other
grounds, upon which the relief is sought, setting out with
sufficient particularity the time and places of the acts alleged
and other facts relied upon, but not the evidence by which they
are intended to be proved, e.g.:……………………………..
“(iv) in the case of alleged desertion, the date and the
circumstances in which it began; in the case of cruelty the
specific acts of cruelty and the occasion when and the place
where such acts were committed”.
16. In the facts of the present case, the allegations
of cruelty leveled by the appellant against the respondent
are so vague, indefinite, unspecific and uncertain, not only MAT APP 44/2005 Page 14 of 23
in the petition but in his evidence as well. Without spelling
out any specific acts of cruelty either on the part of the
respondent or her mother, it is difficult to assume as to
under what circumstances the appellant left his own house
on 15.02.1998. Merely to say that the appellant started
cooking his own food and his mother-in-law used to create
scenes in the house or the appellant felt neglected or
depressed on account of behaviour of the respondent and
her mother would not suffice to prove mental cruelty on
the part of the respondent in the absence of any specific
dates or the period when the alleged acts were committed.
Similarly, vaguely the appellant has alleged that he was not
allowed to meet his own children due to some instructions
given by the respondent to the school authorities and he
was insulted by the respondent and her mother when the
appellant went to meet the respondent at her house in the
housing society. The appellant has referred to some letters
alleged to have been written by him to the respondent, but
no such letters were proved on record by the appellant. MAT APP 44/2005 Page 15 of 23
17. The appellant has also failed to establish the
ground of desertion, as it is the own case of the appellant
that he himself left the matrimonial house. A bare perusal
of the lone deposition of the appellant, as already
reproduced above, would show that the appellant failed to
establish either of the grounds.
18. It is a settled legal position that even in an ex
parte case, the petitioner is required to lead cogent and
convincing evidence to prove and substantiate the
averments made in the petition and the petitioner cannot
derive any special advantage just on account of the fact
that the respondent did not choose to contest the case or
the testimony of the appellant remained unchallenged or
unrebutted.
19. In the present case, the appellant has failed to
establish with specific details any act or acts, whether
mental or physical, due to which it became impossible or
unbearable for him to live with the respondent. Similarly in
the evidence as well, the appellant (PW1), in his sole MAT APP 44/2005 Page 16 of 23
testimony does not succeed to establish either the ground
of cruelty or desertion on the part of the respondent.
20. The counsel for the appellant also submitted that this
court should dissolve the marriage of the appellant on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. It would be
important to bring forth that the High Court in the exercise
of it inherent powers cannot grant divorce on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as it is yet not a
ground of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. Here, it
would be pertinent to refer to the recent judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju
Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379 where it was held that :
“On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act,
reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no
such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage is provided by the legislature for
granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot
add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as
that would be amending the Act, which is a
function of the legislature.
12. Learned Counsel for the appellant has
stated that this Court in some cases has
dissolved a marriage on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown. In our opinion, those
cases have not taken into consideration the
legal position which we have mentioned above,
and hence they are not precedents .A mere
direction of the Court without considering the
legal position is not a precedent. If we grant
divorce on the ground of irretrievable MAT APP 44/2005 Page 17 of 23
breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be
adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the
effect that irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our
opinion, this can only be done by the legislature
and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to
enact or amend the law and not for the Courts.
Hence, we do not find force in the submission
of the learned Counsel for the appellant”.
Also recently, the Apex Court in the case of Neelam
Kumar vs. Dayarani, Civil Appeal No. 1957/2006
placed reliance on the judgment of Vishnu Dutt Sharma
(supra) and reiterated the same view and held that
irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for
divorce as it is not contemplated under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act.
21. However, it would be befitting to mention here
that the Apex Court in the case of Naveen Kohli vs.
Neelu Kohli (supra) recommended to the legislature to
make „irretrievable breakdown of marriage‟ as a ground for
divorce. The Apex Court in the said judgment was
confronted with a situation where the parties were living
separately for a period of more than 10 years. Based on
the said recommendation made by the Apex Court in the MAT APP 44/2005 Page 18 of 23
said case, as also in various earlier decisions, the Law
Commission of India in its 217th report has recently again
recommended to the Parliament to introduce an
amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the
Special Marriage Act 1954 to include “irretrievable
breakdown of marriage as another ground for divorce”.
23. The relationship between husband and wife is one of
the most delicate emotional bonds and needs constant
nurturing, tolerance and understanding. This relationship
once which was of love and mutual trust when starts to
leave a bitter aftertaste bedeviling this bond that it is no
more bearable to stay under one roof is when they seek to
legally put an end to such a marriage. Divorce on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage might be
contrary to common perception and the idea of marriage
being a holy union for seven births, but in the bid to
preserve the unworkable marriage which has long ceased
to be alive is abound to be a source of greater misery for
the parties than the divorce itself.MAT APP 44/2005 Page 19 of 23
24. However it is a catch 22 situation as this ground
can ease the way for many who are under the burden of a
doomed relationship to a breather but at the same time it
may give an opportunity to the ones trying to maneuver the
alleys of law for their self conceited motives.
25. There has been a lot of brainstorming with
regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground
would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the
recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the
Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage
Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that
watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the
message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.
26. Henceforth, there are some key areas that need
to be pondered upon. The ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage cannot be resorted to as a strait
jacket formula leading to the institution of marriage
becoming so fragile that the wrong doer abuses it for his
selfish ends leaving the other party in lurch. But it is only MAT APP 44/2005 Page 20 of 23
when the court is satisfied that the marriage has been
wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and there is no chance
of their coming together should the court open the
deadlock of wedlock.
27. It is an open secret that getting a decree of
divorce takes an invariably long time and with the existing
grounds available, it leads the parties to level acrimonious
allegations antagonizing each other. Consequently, when
the decree of divorce is granted then the other party
appeals to the High Court, and if unsuccessful, reaches the
Supreme Court in the hope for relief, therefore prolonging
the already gruesome legal battle. It happens in a lot of
cases that in the end during this vicious legal voyage,
whatever little hope there is of reconciliation is anyway
diminished leading the parties pitiful and penniless.
28. Adding to the woes, if there are children born
out of the wedlock, then they suffer immensely;
emotionally, psychologically and even financially, depriving
them of proper upbringing and education due to meager
means of one of the spouses. A divorce from a spouse is MAT APP 44/2005 Page 21 of 23
not a divorce from the children and they should not be
punished for the act of their parents. Hence if this ground
is added it has to be taken care of that the children do not
bear the brunt between two warring adults and that a
proper mechanism is in place for taking care of all their
needs. The child‟s well being, who is but a mute spectator
and officially not a party to the lawsuit, should be the eye
of the resolution.
29. Also in cases where the wife is the respondent,
and the husband orchestrates a breakdown and unilaterally
wants to terminate the marriage on this ground, it has to
be taken care of that to achieve his ulterior motive the
husband on the premise of a deadlock does not leave the
wife impoverished or at the mercy of her parents.
30. Hence, succinctly, this court is of the opinion
that there should be adequate provisions with regard to the
following:
 There should be a minimum period before which this
ground cannot be invoked as a ground for divorce.MAT APP 44/2005 Page 22 of 23
 In the case where this ground has been invoked by
the husband, then the grant of divorce should only be
subject to the provision of adequate financial
provisions for the wife
 In case where there are children born out of the
wedlock then adequate provision for the grant of
maintenance, education and upbringing of the
children should be in place before grant of divorce
 The issue of custody of the children and visitation
rights should also be decided at the very stage of
divorce itself
 This ground should be an independent provision and
not a complimentary or supplementary provision
along with any other ground under section 13 of the
Act
The goal in the end to add this ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage should be with aim of providing a
solution to a lethal problem and not to defame the Hindu
Marriage Act for breaking more families than it has united. MAT APP 44/2005 Page 23 of 23
31. However, in view of the aforesaid observations,
the contention of the appellant that this Court should grant
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage does not hold good.
32. Hence in the light of the above discussion this
Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the
impugned judgment and decree dated 12.05.2003 passed
by the learned trial court.
32. There is no merit in the present appeal and the
same is accordingly dismissed.
July 14, 2010 KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
dc