I have gone through the original record of the case and from the record I do not find that the witness summons were issued. It is the duty of the Magistrate, as has been indicated in the decisions referred to above, to issue witness summonses when the prosecution applies for the same. In the present case the prosecution appears to have applied for issue of witness summons, but the summons were not issued to the witnesses and hence the case adjourned from 19th August, 1980 to 26th August, 1980. On 26th August, 1980 also there was nothing on record to show that summons were issued to the witnesses. The learned Magistrate should have been seen whether summons were issued to the witnesses and whether the witnesses were served with them before proceeding to pass an order of acquittal. The Court has to provide every assistance to the complainant or the prosecution for securing the presence of the witnesses. In case the Magistrate finds that though the witness summons are issued as per the request of the prosecution, the prosecution agency which serves summonses on the witnesses and due to the neglect of the prosecution the presence of the witnesses is not secured. The Magistrate would be perfectly justified in acquitting the accused for want of evidence. However, the Magistrate has first to do his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of issuing summonses to the witnesses, when requested by the prosecution, and if the assistance of the Court is required for securing their presence, to provide such assistance to the prosecution agency by issuing, if necessary, warrants against the witnesses. It is only when the Magistrate has done his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he finds that the prosecution agency is not co-operating in serving the summons on the witnesses and in securing their presence, the Magistrate may proceed to pronounce judgment on whatever evidence that has been adduced, without further adjourning the matter and thereby causing a lot of inconvenience and harassment to the accused. In order to avoid harassment to the accused the Magistrate would be perfectly justified in refusing the avoidable adjournment at the request of the prosecution, if he is satisfied that the prosecution agency is not doing is duty of either serving the witnesses with the summonses or securing their presence. Under such circumstances, the Magistrate can resort to the provisions of section 258 Cri.P.C. and stop further proceedings in the case or when some evidence is led and that evidence is not sufficient to prove the charge, can acquit the accused under section 255 Cri.P.C. In the present case the learned Judicial Magistrate, even without issuing summonses to the witnesses, recorded the order of acquittal on the charge-sheet. The procedure followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is clearly against the provisions of sections 254 and 255 Cri.P.C. and as such the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused is patently illegal and cannot be sustained.
2. Ichalkaranji Police-Station submitted charge-sheet against the respondent-accused on 2nd August, 1980 in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji, for the offence under section 12(a) of the Gambling Act. On the same day the learned Judicial Magistrate ordered issue of process against accused. On 7th August, 1980, Vakalatnama of Mr. R.S. Bichkar and Mr. J.A. Balugade on behalf of the accused was filed. Copies of police papers were supplied to the accused. The matter was adjourned for plea of the accused to 11th August, 1980. On 11th August, 1980 the accused pleaded not guilty and hence the case was adjourned to 19th August, 1980 for recording prosecution evidence. On 19th August, 1980 the case was adjourned to 26th August, 1980, as witness summonses were not issued and on that account no witness was present. On 26th August, 1980, the State was represented by the Public Prosecutor. The accused alongwith his Advocate Shri Bichkar was present. The learned Judicial Magistrate passed the order as follows :
"None of the witnesses is present. Hence, accused is acquitted. Cash and key be returned to the accused and rest of the property be destroyed."
The Roznama dated 26th August, 1980 does not indicate as to whether the witness summonses were issued and served.
3. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. M.D. Gangakhedkar submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate without issuing summonses to the witnesses and without giving opportunity to the prosecution to produce the witnesses should not have passed the order of acquittal of the respondent accused. He submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate has completely disregarded the provisions of trial of summons cases appearing in Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate was not justified, without issuing summonses to the witnesses and without allowing opportunity to the prosecution to reduce their evidence, in acquitting the accused and as such the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 26th August, 1980 acquitting the accused is liable to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the trial Court for retrial and decision according to law. The learned Counsel Mr. Ashok P. Mundargi appearing for the respondent submits that he does not justify the procedure followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. According to him, the learned Judicial Magistrate should have issued summonses to the witnesses and should have given opportunity to the prosecution to adduce evidence before passing the order of acquittal. At the same time he contends that the offence alleged against the respondent is a petty offence under section 12(a) of the Gambling Act for which the sentence provided is R.I. for three months and a fine of Rs. 300/- and that the respondent is under the shadow of prosecution since the present appeal has been admitted in the year 1980. According to the learned Counsel, though the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused may be bad in law, looking to the passage of a long period of eight years it would be a great torture to the accused in case he is ordered to face retrial.
4. The procedure for the trial of summons cases by the Magistrate is provided in Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 254 Cri.P.C. reads as follows :-
"254 (1) If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under section 252 of section 253, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence.
(2) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or other thing.
(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application, require that the reasonable expenses of the witness incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court."
Section 255 Cri.P.C., which provides for acquittal or conviction, reads thus :-
"255 (1) If the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in section 254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, finds the accused not guilty he shall record an order of acquittal.
(2) Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 325 or section 360, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.
(3) A Magistrate may, under section 252 or section 255, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter, which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused would be prejudiced thereby."
The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in The State v. Veerappan and others, , considered the provisions of sections 254 and 255 Cri.P.C. On considering a large number of authorities cited before them, their Lordships of the Madras High Court at page 267 of the report stated the law thus :-
"Thus there is a duty case on the Court on an application by the prosecution to issue summonses to the witnesses and secure the presence of witnesses by exercising all the powers conferred on it by the Code for that purpose and duty is also cast on the prosecution to produce all its evidence and to seek the assistance of the Court for so doing by applying to the Court for the issue of summonses to the witnesses. Therefore, in our view, an acquittal of the accused merely on the ground that the prosecution had not produced the witnesses would not be proper if the Court had not on an application by the prosecution discharged its duty of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses."
5. The Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. A. Devaiah and another, 1980 Cri.L.J. 49, considered the provisions of section 251(2) Cri.P.C. In that case the prosecution examined two prosecution witnesses and adjourned the case for further evidence and summonses were issued to other three witnesses to appear in the Court for giving evidence, but the summons were returned unserved and the learned Magistrate did not grant the request made by the prosecution for time to produce the witnesses. He treated the prosecution evidence as closed, then he examined the accused and acquitted them by his order dated 20th January, 1978. Their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court found the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate at legal. They held that the learned Magistrate ought to have taken steps to secure the presence not the witnesses instead of treating the prosecution case as closed and proceeding to judgment. Therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh disposal according to law, after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to adduce further evidence.
6. In The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Iswar Chandra Jana, 1971 Cri.L.J. 163. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court were dealing with a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in which the accused was acquitted by the trial Court without recording evidence. At page 164 of the report their lordships observed thus :-
"There is no doubt therefore that this order which tantamount to an order of acquittal is not only illegal and without jurisdiction, but also is one that has denied justice. We would have set aside this order unhesitatingly; but the feature of the case is that the offence alleged was an offence committed in 1961. The State appealed and although the appeal was ready for hearing in 1964 neither the State not the respondent, who was re-arrested and released on bail, took any step for early hearing of the appeal. The respondent also has not appeared through any lawyer appointed by him. These features taken alongwith the fact that more than seven years have elapsed from the date of occurrence lead us to the view that it will not be conductive to justice to order a re-trial of the case upon taking evidence which order in the circumstances of this case must have to be made if the order of the Magistrate is set aside."
Their Lordships condemned the order of the learned Magistrate as illegal and without jurisdiction and as there had been considerable delay from the date of occurrence (that is, 23rd December, 1961) till the hearing of the appeal (that is, 18th December, 1968), their Lordships did not describe the order of acquittal and dismissed the appeal.
7. The Karnataka High Court in S.M. Basappa v. B. Ananda Rao, 1978 Cri.L.J. 294, considered the provisions of sections 251, 254, 255 and 309 Cr.P.C. Their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court observed that it is rather temporary requirement for a Magistrate under section 255 Cri.P.C. to take evidence referred to in section 254 Cri.P.C. and such further evidence, if any, as he may, on his own motion, cause to be produced to find if the accused is not guilty upon such evidence and only thereafter he can record the order of an acquittal. If does not do so, he commits an error of law which need to be corrected by the Appellate Court.
8. This Court in The State v. John Joseph D'Souza and another, , considered the provisions of section 247 and
423(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In that case two accused were charged before the learned trial judge with having committed an offence under section 65(b) read with section 81 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The offence was triable as a summons case. The proceedings before the learned Magistrate were commenced by a charge sheet filed by the Inspector of Police on 11th November, 1954. Thereafter the proceedings were adjourned from time to time and even on 11th April, 1955 the panchas were not present. The learned Magistrate issued summonses to the panchas and adjourned the proceedings to 22nd April, 1955. On that day also the panchas were not present because they were not served. The Sub-Inspector, was, however, present and the Police Prosecutor requested for time. The learned Magistrate rejected the application and proceeded to acquit the accused for want of evidence and cancelled the bail bonds of the accused. The State preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal to this Court. Their Lordships of this Court, on the above facts, observed at page 606 of the report thus :-
"In our view, the learned trial Magistrate's order is in law erroneous. The proceedings having been commenced by a charge-sheet, section 247, Criminal P.C. did not apply. Again the complainant was present in the Court. The learned trial Magistrate had, therefore, to record the appeal of the accused and thereafter to record evidence for the prosecution, if he was not minded to grant an adjournment in view of the long delay since the institution of the proceedings.
"But he could not proceed to acquit the accused forthwith without following the procedure prescribed for trial of summons cases. We have looked at the record of the learned Magistrate and there is nothing to show that the he recorded the appeal of the accused even. In our view, the learned trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to dispose of the case in the manner that he has done.
"As the procedure followed by the learned trial Magistrate is erroneous and even though the offence is triable as a summons case, the offence charged is a serious offence, we think are substantial and compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Magistrate."
The order of the learned Presidency Magistrate was set aside and the case was remanded for disposal according to law.
9. In the present case the plea of the respondent accused was recorded on 11th August, 1980. He pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned for prosecution evidence to 19th August, 1980. On that day the case was adjourned to 26th August, 1980 on the ground that the witness summonses were not issued. On 26th August, 1980 the Roznama shows that the witnesses were not present and hence the accused was acquitted. There is nothing to show that summonses were issued to the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet. I have gone through the original record of the case and from the record I do not find that the witness summons were issued. It is the duty of the Magistrate, as has been indicated in the decisions referred to above, to issue witness summonses when the prosecution applies for the same. In the present case the prosecution appears to have applied for issue of witness summons, but the summons were not issued to the witnesses and hence the case adjourned from 19th August, 1980 to 26th August, 1980. On 26th August, 1980 also there was nothing on record to show that summons were issued to the witnesses. The learned Magistrate should have been seen whether summons were issued to the witnesses and whether the witnesses were served with them before proceeding to pass an order of acquittal. The Court has to provide every assistance to the complainant or the prosecution for securing the presence of the witnesses. In case the Magistrate finds that though the witness summons are issued as per the request of the prosecution, the prosecution agency which serves summonses on the witnesses and due to the neglect of the prosecution the presence of the witnesses is not secured. The Magistrate would be perfectly justified in acquitting the accused for want of evidence. However, the Magistrate has first to do his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of issuing summonses to the witnesses, when requested by the prosecution, and if the assistance of the Court is required for securing their presence, to provide such assistance to the prosecution agency by issuing, if necessary, warrants against the witnesses. It is only when the Magistrate has done his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he finds that the prosecution agency is not co-operating in serving the summons on the witnesses and in securing their presence, the Magistrate may proceed to pronounce judgment on whatever evidence that has been adduced, without further adjourning the matter and thereby causing a lot of inconvenience and harassment to the accused. In order to avoid harassment to the accused the Magistrate would be perfectly justified in refusing the avoidable adjournment at the request of the prosecution, if he is satisfied that the prosecution agency is not doing is duty of either serving the witnesses with the summonses or securing their presence. Under such circumstances, the Magistrate can resort to the provisions of section 258 Cri.P.C. and stop further proceedings in the case or when some evidence is led and that evidence is not sufficient to prove the charge, can acquit the accused under section 255 Cri.P.C. In the present case the learned Judicial Magistrate, even without issuing summonses to the witnesses, recorded the order of acquittal on the charge-sheet. The procedure followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is clearly against the provisions of sections 254 and 255 Cri.P.C. and as such the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused is patently illegal and cannot be sustained.
10. It takes me to consider the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent accused that in case the respondent is ordered to stand his trial, he would be put to great inconvenience and harassment. The incident wherein the accused is alleged to have indulged in gaming by accepting matka bets took place on 22nd February, 1980. The accused was arrested on the same day. He was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 23rd February, 1980 at 5 p.m. and was remanded to magisterial custody till 1st March, 1980. Thereafter, he was released on bail. On receiving summons he appeared before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 7th August, 1980 and on that day he received copies of police papers. On 11th August, 1980 his plea of not guilty was recorded. He was also present in the Court on subsequent dates, that is, on 19th August, 1980 and 26th August, 1980. The impugned order of acquittal was passed on 26th August, 1980. Seven years have passed after the acquittal of the accused. The appeal against acquittal was admitted on 24th February, 1981 and since then he has been under the shadow of prosecution. In the circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the pre-trial detention for some period and sub-sequent attendance of the criminal case for some hearings till he was acquitted, I think that it will not be proper to order retrial of the respondent, though I have found the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate patently illegal.
11. Consequently, with the above observations, the appeal is dismissed.
12. A copy of the judgement shall be sent to Mr. A.D. Deshpande, who was then the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji.
Print Page
Bombay High Court
State Of Maharashtra vs Maruti Dadu Kamble on 1 December, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1988 (1) BomCR 620, (1988) 90 BOMLR 4
1. The State has preferred this appeal against the acquittal of the respondent-accused by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji (Mr. A.D. Deshpande), of the offence under section 12(a) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as "the Gambling Act").2. Ichalkaranji Police-Station submitted charge-sheet against the respondent-accused on 2nd August, 1980 in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji, for the offence under section 12(a) of the Gambling Act. On the same day the learned Judicial Magistrate ordered issue of process against accused. On 7th August, 1980, Vakalatnama of Mr. R.S. Bichkar and Mr. J.A. Balugade on behalf of the accused was filed. Copies of police papers were supplied to the accused. The matter was adjourned for plea of the accused to 11th August, 1980. On 11th August, 1980 the accused pleaded not guilty and hence the case was adjourned to 19th August, 1980 for recording prosecution evidence. On 19th August, 1980 the case was adjourned to 26th August, 1980, as witness summonses were not issued and on that account no witness was present. On 26th August, 1980, the State was represented by the Public Prosecutor. The accused alongwith his Advocate Shri Bichkar was present. The learned Judicial Magistrate passed the order as follows :
"None of the witnesses is present. Hence, accused is acquitted. Cash and key be returned to the accused and rest of the property be destroyed."
The Roznama dated 26th August, 1980 does not indicate as to whether the witness summonses were issued and served.
3. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. M.D. Gangakhedkar submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate without issuing summonses to the witnesses and without giving opportunity to the prosecution to produce the witnesses should not have passed the order of acquittal of the respondent accused. He submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate has completely disregarded the provisions of trial of summons cases appearing in Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He submits that the learned Judicial Magistrate was not justified, without issuing summonses to the witnesses and without allowing opportunity to the prosecution to reduce their evidence, in acquitting the accused and as such the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 26th August, 1980 acquitting the accused is liable to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the trial Court for retrial and decision according to law. The learned Counsel Mr. Ashok P. Mundargi appearing for the respondent submits that he does not justify the procedure followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. According to him, the learned Judicial Magistrate should have issued summonses to the witnesses and should have given opportunity to the prosecution to adduce evidence before passing the order of acquittal. At the same time he contends that the offence alleged against the respondent is a petty offence under section 12(a) of the Gambling Act for which the sentence provided is R.I. for three months and a fine of Rs. 300/- and that the respondent is under the shadow of prosecution since the present appeal has been admitted in the year 1980. According to the learned Counsel, though the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused may be bad in law, looking to the passage of a long period of eight years it would be a great torture to the accused in case he is ordered to face retrial.
4. The procedure for the trial of summons cases by the Magistrate is provided in Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 254 Cri.P.C. reads as follows :-
"254 (1) If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under section 252 of section 253, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence.
(2) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or other thing.
(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application, require that the reasonable expenses of the witness incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court."
Section 255 Cri.P.C., which provides for acquittal or conviction, reads thus :-
"255 (1) If the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in section 254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, finds the accused not guilty he shall record an order of acquittal.
(2) Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 325 or section 360, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.
(3) A Magistrate may, under section 252 or section 255, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter, which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused would be prejudiced thereby."
The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in The State v. Veerappan and others, , considered the provisions of sections 254 and 255 Cri.P.C. On considering a large number of authorities cited before them, their Lordships of the Madras High Court at page 267 of the report stated the law thus :-
"Thus there is a duty case on the Court on an application by the prosecution to issue summonses to the witnesses and secure the presence of witnesses by exercising all the powers conferred on it by the Code for that purpose and duty is also cast on the prosecution to produce all its evidence and to seek the assistance of the Court for so doing by applying to the Court for the issue of summonses to the witnesses. Therefore, in our view, an acquittal of the accused merely on the ground that the prosecution had not produced the witnesses would not be proper if the Court had not on an application by the prosecution discharged its duty of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses."
5. The Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. A. Devaiah and another, 1980 Cri.L.J. 49, considered the provisions of section 251(2) Cri.P.C. In that case the prosecution examined two prosecution witnesses and adjourned the case for further evidence and summonses were issued to other three witnesses to appear in the Court for giving evidence, but the summons were returned unserved and the learned Magistrate did not grant the request made by the prosecution for time to produce the witnesses. He treated the prosecution evidence as closed, then he examined the accused and acquitted them by his order dated 20th January, 1978. Their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court found the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate at legal. They held that the learned Magistrate ought to have taken steps to secure the presence not the witnesses instead of treating the prosecution case as closed and proceeding to judgment. Therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh disposal according to law, after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to adduce further evidence.
6. In The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Iswar Chandra Jana, 1971 Cri.L.J. 163. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court were dealing with a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in which the accused was acquitted by the trial Court without recording evidence. At page 164 of the report their lordships observed thus :-
"There is no doubt therefore that this order which tantamount to an order of acquittal is not only illegal and without jurisdiction, but also is one that has denied justice. We would have set aside this order unhesitatingly; but the feature of the case is that the offence alleged was an offence committed in 1961. The State appealed and although the appeal was ready for hearing in 1964 neither the State not the respondent, who was re-arrested and released on bail, took any step for early hearing of the appeal. The respondent also has not appeared through any lawyer appointed by him. These features taken alongwith the fact that more than seven years have elapsed from the date of occurrence lead us to the view that it will not be conductive to justice to order a re-trial of the case upon taking evidence which order in the circumstances of this case must have to be made if the order of the Magistrate is set aside."
Their Lordships condemned the order of the learned Magistrate as illegal and without jurisdiction and as there had been considerable delay from the date of occurrence (that is, 23rd December, 1961) till the hearing of the appeal (that is, 18th December, 1968), their Lordships did not describe the order of acquittal and dismissed the appeal.
7. The Karnataka High Court in S.M. Basappa v. B. Ananda Rao, 1978 Cri.L.J. 294, considered the provisions of sections 251, 254, 255 and 309 Cr.P.C. Their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court observed that it is rather temporary requirement for a Magistrate under section 255 Cri.P.C. to take evidence referred to in section 254 Cri.P.C. and such further evidence, if any, as he may, on his own motion, cause to be produced to find if the accused is not guilty upon such evidence and only thereafter he can record the order of an acquittal. If does not do so, he commits an error of law which need to be corrected by the Appellate Court.
8. This Court in The State v. John Joseph D'Souza and another, , considered the provisions of section 247 and
423(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In that case two accused were charged before the learned trial judge with having committed an offence under section 65(b) read with section 81 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The offence was triable as a summons case. The proceedings before the learned Magistrate were commenced by a charge sheet filed by the Inspector of Police on 11th November, 1954. Thereafter the proceedings were adjourned from time to time and even on 11th April, 1955 the panchas were not present. The learned Magistrate issued summonses to the panchas and adjourned the proceedings to 22nd April, 1955. On that day also the panchas were not present because they were not served. The Sub-Inspector, was, however, present and the Police Prosecutor requested for time. The learned Magistrate rejected the application and proceeded to acquit the accused for want of evidence and cancelled the bail bonds of the accused. The State preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal to this Court. Their Lordships of this Court, on the above facts, observed at page 606 of the report thus :-
"In our view, the learned trial Magistrate's order is in law erroneous. The proceedings having been commenced by a charge-sheet, section 247, Criminal P.C. did not apply. Again the complainant was present in the Court. The learned trial Magistrate had, therefore, to record the appeal of the accused and thereafter to record evidence for the prosecution, if he was not minded to grant an adjournment in view of the long delay since the institution of the proceedings.
"But he could not proceed to acquit the accused forthwith without following the procedure prescribed for trial of summons cases. We have looked at the record of the learned Magistrate and there is nothing to show that the he recorded the appeal of the accused even. In our view, the learned trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to dispose of the case in the manner that he has done.
"As the procedure followed by the learned trial Magistrate is erroneous and even though the offence is triable as a summons case, the offence charged is a serious offence, we think are substantial and compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Magistrate."
The order of the learned Presidency Magistrate was set aside and the case was remanded for disposal according to law.
9. In the present case the plea of the respondent accused was recorded on 11th August, 1980. He pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned for prosecution evidence to 19th August, 1980. On that day the case was adjourned to 26th August, 1980 on the ground that the witness summonses were not issued. On 26th August, 1980 the Roznama shows that the witnesses were not present and hence the accused was acquitted. There is nothing to show that summonses were issued to the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet. I have gone through the original record of the case and from the record I do not find that the witness summons were issued. It is the duty of the Magistrate, as has been indicated in the decisions referred to above, to issue witness summonses when the prosecution applies for the same. In the present case the prosecution appears to have applied for issue of witness summons, but the summons were not issued to the witnesses and hence the case adjourned from 19th August, 1980 to 26th August, 1980. On 26th August, 1980 also there was nothing on record to show that summons were issued to the witnesses. The learned Magistrate should have been seen whether summons were issued to the witnesses and whether the witnesses were served with them before proceeding to pass an order of acquittal. The Court has to provide every assistance to the complainant or the prosecution for securing the presence of the witnesses. In case the Magistrate finds that though the witness summons are issued as per the request of the prosecution, the prosecution agency which serves summonses on the witnesses and due to the neglect of the prosecution the presence of the witnesses is not secured. The Magistrate would be perfectly justified in acquitting the accused for want of evidence. However, the Magistrate has first to do his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of issuing summonses to the witnesses, when requested by the prosecution, and if the assistance of the Court is required for securing their presence, to provide such assistance to the prosecution agency by issuing, if necessary, warrants against the witnesses. It is only when the Magistrate has done his duty under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he finds that the prosecution agency is not co-operating in serving the summons on the witnesses and in securing their presence, the Magistrate may proceed to pronounce judgment on whatever evidence that has been adduced, without further adjourning the matter and thereby causing a lot of inconvenience and harassment to the accused. In order to avoid harassment to the accused the Magistrate would be perfectly justified in refusing the avoidable adjournment at the request of the prosecution, if he is satisfied that the prosecution agency is not doing is duty of either serving the witnesses with the summonses or securing their presence. Under such circumstances, the Magistrate can resort to the provisions of section 258 Cri.P.C. and stop further proceedings in the case or when some evidence is led and that evidence is not sufficient to prove the charge, can acquit the accused under section 255 Cri.P.C. In the present case the learned Judicial Magistrate, even without issuing summonses to the witnesses, recorded the order of acquittal on the charge-sheet. The procedure followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is clearly against the provisions of sections 254 and 255 Cri.P.C. and as such the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused is patently illegal and cannot be sustained.
10. It takes me to consider the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent accused that in case the respondent is ordered to stand his trial, he would be put to great inconvenience and harassment. The incident wherein the accused is alleged to have indulged in gaming by accepting matka bets took place on 22nd February, 1980. The accused was arrested on the same day. He was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 23rd February, 1980 at 5 p.m. and was remanded to magisterial custody till 1st March, 1980. Thereafter, he was released on bail. On receiving summons he appeared before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 7th August, 1980 and on that day he received copies of police papers. On 11th August, 1980 his plea of not guilty was recorded. He was also present in the Court on subsequent dates, that is, on 19th August, 1980 and 26th August, 1980. The impugned order of acquittal was passed on 26th August, 1980. Seven years have passed after the acquittal of the accused. The appeal against acquittal was admitted on 24th February, 1981 and since then he has been under the shadow of prosecution. In the circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the pre-trial detention for some period and sub-sequent attendance of the criminal case for some hearings till he was acquitted, I think that it will not be proper to order retrial of the respondent, though I have found the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate patently illegal.
11. Consequently, with the above observations, the appeal is dismissed.
12. A copy of the judgement shall be sent to Mr. A.D. Deshpande, who was then the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ichalkaranji.
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