Friday 18 January 2013

Appreciation of evidence in offence u/s 498A of IPC


 Applying this  principle, it  is clear that the earlier
law was not sufficient to check dowry deaths hence aforesaid
stringent  provisions  were  brought  in,  so  that  persons
committing such inhuman crimes on married women should not
escape, as  evidence of a  direct  nature  is not  readily
available except  of the  circumstantial kind. Hence it  is
that interpretation which suppresses the mischief, subserves
the objective  and  advances  the  remedy,  which  would  be
acceptable. Objective  is that men committing such  crimes
should not  escape punishment. Hence  stringent  provisions
were brought  in by  shifting the burden onto the accused by
bringing in  the deemed clause. As aforesaid, the definition
of `dowry' was amended with effect from 19th November, 1986,
to include a period even after the marriage.

The next  question is, whether there was any cruelty or
harassment by  the deceased's  husband or  any relative and
that too  it was  soon before her death. The argument put in
is that neither  there is  any  physical  injury  nor any
evidence of cruelty from any neighbours or other independent
persons; hence there is  no cruelty  or harassment.  In our
considered opinion,  cruelty  nor  harassment  need  not  be
physical. Even mental torture in a  given case  would be a
case of cruelty and harassment within the meaning of Section
304-B and 498-A IPC. Explanation (a) to Section 498-A itself
refers to  both mental and physical  cruelty. In  view  of
Explanation (a) the argument is, before it constitutes to be
a cruelty  there has  to be  wilful  conduct.  Again  wilful
conduct means, conduct wilfully  done may  be inferred  by
direct or  indirect evidence  which could be construed to be
such. We  find, in  the present case, on  account  of not
satisfying the demand of the aforesaid goods, right from the
next  day,   she  was  repeatedly  taunted,  maltreated and
mentally tortured by calling her ugly  etc. A girl dreams of
great days ahead with hope and aspiration when entering into
a   marriage, and  if from  the very  next day the  husband
starts taunting for not bringing dowry and calling her ugly,
there  cannot  be  greater  mental  torture,  harassment  or
cruelty for  any bride. There was a quarrel a day before her
death. This  by itself, in our considered  opinion,  would
constitute to  be a  wilful act to be a cruelty both within
the meaning of Section 498-A and Section 304-B IPC.

PETITIONER:
PAWAN KUMAR & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF HARYANA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/02/1998

1998 AIR  958, 1998( 1  )SCR 746, 1998( 3 ) SCALE486 , 1998( 1  )JT 565





     
     For more  than a  century, inspite of  tall  words  of
respect for  women, there  has been  an onslaught  on  their
liberties through  `bride burning'  and `dowry deaths'. This
has caused  anxiety to the legislators,  judiciary and law
enforcing agencies,  who have  attempted to  resurrect them
from  this   social  choke.   There  have   been  series  of
legislations in this regard,  without much effect. This led
to the passing of Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961. Inspite of
this, large  number of `brides burning'  and  dowry  deaths
continued. To  meet this, stringent measures were brought in
the  Indian   Penal  Code   and the  Evidence Act  through
amendments. It seems, sections of society are still boldly
pursuing this  chronic action to fulfil their greedy desire.
Inspite of  stringent legislations,  such persons  are still
indulging in  these unlawful  activities, not because of any
shortcomings in law but  under the  protective principle of
criminal jurisprudence of benefit of doubt. Often, innocent
persons are  also  trapped  or brought  in  with  ulterior
motives. This  places  an  arduous  duty  on  the  Court  to
separate such  individuals from the  offenders.  Hence the
Courts have  to deal  such cases  with circumvention, sift
through the   evidence  with caution,   scrutinise the
circumstances with  utmost care.  The present  matter is one
such where  similar questions  have been  raised,  including
question of interpretation of the stringent law.
     The three appellants were convicted for offence under
Sections 306,  498-A and  304-B IPC.  Appellant No. 1 is the
deceased's husband,  No. 2  the father-in-law, and No, 3 the
mother-in-law respectively.  The trial court convicted and
sentenced appellant No.1 for offence under section 304-B for
10 years  and a fine Rs. 500/, under section 306 for 7 years
and a  fine of Rs. 200/- and under section 498-A for 2 years
and a fne of Rs. 200/. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 were convicted
and sentenced under  section 304-B for 7 years with a fine
of Rs. 500/-, under  section 306 for 7 years with a fine of
Rs. 200/-  and under  section 498-A  IPC for  2 years with a
fine of Rs.  200/-.  The  sentences  were  ordered  to run
concurrently. The  High Court maintained the convictions but
reduced the  sentence form  10 years  to  7  years  so far
appellant No. 1 is concerned.
     The brief facts of the case are :
     Urmil (deceased)  and appellant  No.1 were married  on
29th May,  1985. Appellant  No.1 was  working at Lucknow and
had later  shifted to  Sonepat (Haryana).  According to the
prosecution case,  within a  few days  of the marriage Urmil
returned home  and complained regarding demands of dowry for
a refrigerator, scooter etc.  by appellants.  These demands
were reiterated on subsequent visits. On  account of non-
fulfilment of  these demands,  the  deceased  was  allegedly
tortured and  harassed. These alleged actions  ultimately
contributed towards  a suicidal death. It is not in dispute
that she died of burn injuries on 18th May, 1987.
     In April  1987,  Tara  Chand,  maternal  uncle  of the
deceased died. Urmil (deceased)  and Appellant No.1 went to
Shahdara (Delhi) to offer condolences. From there, Appellant
No.1 returned and Urmil went to her sister's place in Delhi.
On 17th May,  1987,  when  Appellant  No.  1  went  to the
deceased's sister's place to bring Urmil (the deceased) back
to  Sonepat,   some  quarrel   took  place   between   them.
Regardless, Appellant  No. 1  brought back  the deceased  to
Sonepat. The  very   next day  i.e. on the 18th  May, 1987,
according to  the appellants,  at 9.30 a.m.  Joginder Pal,
(neighbour of  the appellant)  came to appellant  No.2 and
informed him  that smoke was coming out from the room on the
first floor  of the  house. When  they reached there, they
found Urmil  lying dead on the floor with burn injuries. The
room was  full of  smoke. Later, the parents of the deceased
arrived and  a post  mortem examination was conducted on the
body of the deceased. The doctor  found that the cause of
death was  shock and  asphyxia as  a result of servere burns
which were  ante-mortem and  were sufficient to causes death
in the ordinary course of life.
     Learned counsel  for the  appellants vehemently  argued
with vehemence that even  if all the evidence on record was
taken into  consideration, no  offence could be made out. No
clear finding  of suicide  had been recorded and in any case
essential ingredients  of Section 304-B of IPC were lacking.
The evidence  against appellants  No.2&3 was  flimsy, and in
any case  their conviction  could not be sustained. Further,
there was  no evidence that  soon  before  her death, the
deceased was  subjected to  cruelty or harassment for or in
connection with any demand  of dowry. There was neither any
demand of  dowry nor  was there any agreement at the time of
marriage, which is an essential ingredient to constitute an
offence under  dowry death in terms of definition of `dowry'
as given  under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as `the 1961 Act'). Unless there is
an agreement  for dowry,  at the  time of  marriage  or  in
connection with marriage, it would not qualify to be a dowry
within such definition, hence no offence under Section 304-B
I.P.C. Merely  expressing the grouse of asking for fridge or
TV would  not by  itself constitute to be a dowry within the
said definition in the absence of  any agreement. Further,
before applying the demand  clause under  Section 304-B the
evidence  has to  be within the   scope   of   criminal
jurisprudence, i.e.  to prove  guilt beyond  all  reasonable
doubt. It  cannot be  based merely on suspicion, conjectures
and surmises.
     Let us see Section 304 I.P.C. The ingredients necessary
for the application of Section 304-B are :-
     [a]  When the  death of  a woman is caused by any burns
 or bodily injury, or
     [b]  occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances.
     [c]  and the aforesaid two facts springs within 7 years
 of girl's marriage.
     [d]  and soon  before her death, she  was subjected to
 cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband  or his
 relative.
     [e]  this is in connection with the demand of dowry.
     If these  conditions exist, it would constitute a dowry
death; and  the husband and/or his relatives shall be deemed
to have caused her death. In the present case, it is not in
dispute that  the deceased Urmil died of burn injuries, that
she died otherwise than under normal circumstances, and that
the death  was within  a period of 7 years of marriage. The
only consideration  has to be : whether she was subjected to
any cruelty  or harassment by the appellants soon before her
death, and  whether the same was  for or in connection with
any demand  of dowry.  In support  of prosecution case, Smt.
Misro Devi,  mother of the deceased,  PW-4  Trishala  Devi,
sister of  the deceased, PW-5 Prem Chand Jain, father of the
deceased, PW-6 Ram Gopal,  brother-in-law of  the deceased,
husband of  PW-5,PW-7  were  examined. On  perusal  of the
evidence of  PW-4 we  find that the mother  of the deceased
deposed that  within four  days following  the marriage, her
daughter deceased  Urmil came  back to her and told her that
her parents-in-law and husband were subjecting her to taunts
for not bringing a scooter and refrigerator as dowry at the
time of marriage. She somehow pacified  her daughter  to
return. Urmil  came back after two months and again told her
mother that  her husband  in-laws were continuously taunting
her daily,  maltreating her  and calling  her ugly  for not
bringing the  aforesaid goods  as dowry.  Admittedly,  these
taunts were  uttered in view of the lesser dowry brought by
her. Even  after giving birth to  a son, when she came back
she again  narrated the continued maltreatment poured on her
by the accused. She  also deposed  that  Urmil wrote some
letters from Sonepat to her at Calcutta and Hansi, but after
going through  them she tore  them  up.  Her  letters also
referred to  the same  maltreatment and torture. Similarly,
PW-6, the  father of  the  deceased  also  referred  to the
similar complaints  made to  him by  Urmil. He also deposed
that she  used to tell him that her husband and in-laws were
maltreating and harassing her on account of not meeting the
demand of    a scooter and  a fridge.  The  father  again
expressed his  inability to  meet  this demand.  Hence her
father sent  her back  after pacifying her. Similar  is the
deposition of PW-5, the sister of the deceased and PW-7, the
brother-in-law of the deceased.
     The  afore referred  to  evidence,  according  to the
learned counsel   for the  appellant, may  merely  be  an
expression of  the desire  to acquire a fridge, scooter etc.
and that by itself cannot be construed as an offence as this
would not  come within the  definition  of  `dowry'  under
Section 2  of the  Dowry Prohibition  Act,  1961  read with
Section 304-B  and 498 I.P.C. It  is necessary to refer the
afore referred provisions.
     Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition  Act, 1961 defines
`dowry' as under "-
     "Definition of  `dowry'- In this Act, `dowry' means any
     property or  valuable security  given or  agreed to  be
     given either directly or indirectly.
     [a]  by one  party to  a marriage to the other party to
 the marriage; or
     [b]  by the parents of either party to a marriage or by
 any other  person, to either party to the marriage
 or to any other  person, at or before or any time
 after the marriage in connection with the marriage
 of the said parties, but does not include dowry or
 mehr in  the case  of persons to whom  the Muslim
 Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Section 304-B(1) with Explanation of IPC is as also quoted.
     "304-B Dowry  death - (i) where the
     death of  a woman is caused by any
     burns or  bodily injury  or  occurs
     otherwise than under  normal
     circumstances within seven years of
     her marriage  and it  is shown that
     soon  before   her death she  was
     subjected to  cruelty or harassment
     by her  husband or any relative or
     her husband  for, or  in connection
     with, any demand for  dowry,  such
     death  shall   be called  "dowry
     death",   and   such   husband   or
     relative shall  be deemed to  have
     caused her death.
     Explanation -  For the  purposes of
     this  sub-section,  "dowry"  shall
     have the same meaning as in Section
     2 of  the Dowry  Prohibition  Act,
     1961 (18 of 1961).
Section 498-A is also quoted hereunder :
     "498-A    Husband or  relative  of
     husband of a woman  subjecting her
     to cruelty -  whoever,  being  the
     husband  or  the  relative of  the
     husband of a woman,  subjects such
     woman to  cruelty shall be punished
     with imprisonment for a term which
     may extend to three years and shall
     also be liable to fine.
     Explanation -  For the  purposes of
     this section, "cruelty" means-
     [a]  any wilful conduct which is of
 such a  nature as is likely to
 drive the   woman  to  commit
 suicide  or to  cause  grave
 injury or danger to life, limb
 or health  (whether mental  or
 physical) of the woman; or
     [b]  harassment of the woman where
 such harassment is with a view
 to coercing here or any person
 related to  her  to  meet  any
 unlawful   demand    for   any
 property or  valuable security
 or is on account of failure by
 her or  any person  related to
 her to meet such demand.
     The aforesaid  1961  Act  was  enacted  to provide  an
effective  check  to  dowry  deaths  which  were  continuing
despite the then prevailing laws. The object of the Bill was
to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry.
This objective was not achieved hence drastic  amendments
were brought  in by  amending various provisions of the said
Act and the related  provisions under the Indian Penal Code
and the Evidence Act. Earlier, the  definition of  `dowry'
which was  limited to the time at or before the marriage was
extended to  the period even after the marriage by means of
Act 43 of 1986 w.e.f. November 19,1986. Similarly, Section
304-B was  introduced by  means of the same amending Act and
Section 498-A was  introduced  by  Criminal Law  (Second
Amendment)  Act,  1983 (Act  46  of  1983).  Various  other
amendments  were   brought  in bringing   more   stringent
provisions in  the aforesaid  1961 Act in order to stem the
onslaught on the life of a married woman.
     It is  true, as  argued  by  learned  counsel  for the
appellants, that in  criminal jurisprudence benefit of doubt
is extendable  to the  accused. But  that benefit  of  doubt
would arise  in the context of the application of penal law,
and in the facts and circumstances of a case. The concept of
benefit of  doubt has  an important  role to play but within
the confines  of the  stringency of laws. Since the cause of
death to  a  married  woman  was  to  occur  not  in  normal
circumstances but as a `dowry death', for which the evidence
was not to easily  available, as  it is  mostly confined to
within four  walls of a house, namely husband's house, where
all likely  accused reside.  Hence the aforesaid amendments
brought in  the concept of  deemed  `dowry  death'  by the
husband or  the relatives,  as the case may be. This deeming
clause has  a role  to play  and cannot be taken lightly and
ignored to  shield an accused, otherwise the very purpose of
the amendment  will be lost. Of course, the prosecution has
to prove  the  ultimate essential  ingredients beyond all
reasonable doubt  after raising the initial  presumption of
`deemed dowry death'.
     Explanation to section 304-B refers to dowry "as having
the same  meaning as  in Section  2 of the 1961  Act", the
question is  - what is the periphery of the dowry as defined
therein? The  argument is,  there has  to be an agreement at
the time  of the marriage in view of the words `agreed to be
given' occurring  therein, and in the absence of  any such
evidence it  would not constitute to  be  a  dowry.  It  is
noticeable, as this definition by amendment  includes not
only the period before and at the marriage but also a period
subsequent to the marriage.
     When words in statute  are referable  to more than one
meaning, the  established rule of construction is found in
Heydon's case (1584) 76 E.R. 639 also approved by this Court
in Bengal  Immunity Co. Ltd. V.  State of Bihar & Ors., AIR
1955 SC 661 (674).  The rule  is to  consider four  aspects
while construing an Act :
     [a]  when was  the law prior to the law which is sought
 to be interpreted;
     [b]  when was  the mischief or defect for which new law
 is made;
     [c]  what is the remedy the law now provides; and
     [d]  what is the reason of the remedy.
     The  Court  must adopt that   construction   which,
"suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy."
     Applying this  principle, it  is clear that the earlier
law was not sufficient to check dowry deaths hence aforesaid
stringent  provisions  were  brought  in,  so  that  persons
committing such inhuman crimes on married women should not
escape, as  evidence of a  direct  nature  is not  readily
available except  of the  circumstantial kind. Hence it  is
that interpretation which suppresses the mischief, subserves
the objective  and  advances  the  remedy,  which  would  be
acceptable. Objective  is that men committing such  crimes
should not  escape punishment. Hence  stringent  provisions
were brought  in by  shifting the burden onto the accused by
bringing in  the deemed clause. As aforesaid, the definition
of `dowry' was amended with effect from 19th November, 1986,
to include a period even after the marriage.
     The offence alleged against appellants is under Section
304-B IPC  which makes `demand of dowry' itself punishable.
Demand neither  conceives  nor   would  conceive   of any
agreement. If  for convicting  any offender,  agreement for
dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under
the clutches of law. When Section 304-B refers to `Demand of
dowry', it  refers to  the demand  of property or  valuable
security as  referred to  in the definition of `dowry' under
1961 Act.  It was  argued on  behalf of the  appellants that
mere demand  of scooter or fridge would not be a demand for
dowry. We find from the evidence on record that within a few
days  after   the  marriage,   the  deceased  was  tortured,
maltreated and harassed  for  not  bringing  the  aforesaid
articles in marriage. Hence the demand is in connection with
marriage. The  argument that  here is no demand of dowry, in
the present case, has no force. In cases of dowry deaths and
suicides, circumstantial  evidence plays  an important role
and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence.
That could  be either  direct of indirect. It is significant
that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was also amended by means of
Act 63 of 1984, under which it is an offence to demand dowry
directly or   indirectly from the parents or other relatives
or guardian  of a bride. The word `agreement' referred to in
Section 2  has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The  Interpretation that the appellant seeks,
that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry,
is misconceived.  This would  be contrary to the mandate and
object of  the Act.  "Dowry" definition is to be interpreted
with the  other provisions  of the  Act including Section 3,
which refers   to  giving or  taking dowry  and Section 4 -
Penalty for  demanding dowry,  under the  1961 Act   and the
Indian Penal  Code. This  makes it clear that even demand of
dowry on  other ingredients  being satisfied  is punishable.
This leads  to the inference, when persistent demands for TV
and scooter  are made  from the bride after marriage or from
her parents,  it would constitute to  be in connection with
the marriage  and it  would be a case of demand  of  dowry
within the  meaning of Section 304-B  IPC. It is not always
necessary that there be any agreement for dowry.
     Reverting to  the present case, the  evidences of the
aforesaid  PWs are  very  clear.  After  few  days  of the
marriage, there was demand of scooter and fridge, which when
not being  met lead  to repetitive  taunts and maltreatment.
Such demands cannot be said to be not in connection with the
marriage. Hence the evidence  qualifies to  be demand for
dowry  in   connection with   the  marriage   and  in the
circumstances of  the case  constitutes to be a case falling
within the definition of `dowry' under Section 2 of 1961 Act
and Section 304-B IPC.
     The next  question is, whether there was any cruelty or
harassment by  the deceased's  husband or  any relative and
that too  it was  soon before her death. The argument put in
is that neither  there is  any  physical  injury  nor any
evidence of cruelty from any neighbours or other independent
persons; hence there is  no cruelty  or harassment.  In our
considered opinion,  cruelty  nor  harassment  need  not  be
physical. Even mental torture in a  given case  would be a
case of cruelty and harassment within the meaning of Section
304-B and 498-A IPC. Explanation (a) to Section 498-A itself
refers to  both mental and physical  cruelty. In  view  of
Explanation (a) the argument is, before it constitutes to be
a cruelty  there has  to be  wilful  conduct.  Again  wilful
conduct means, conduct wilfully  done may  be inferred  by
direct or  indirect evidence  which could be construed to be
such. We  find, in  the present case, on  account  of not
satisfying the demand of the aforesaid goods, right from the
next  day,   she  was  repeatedly  taunted,  maltreated and
mentally tortured by calling her ugly  etc. A girl dreams of
great days ahead with hope and aspiration when entering into
a   marriage, and  if from  the very  next day the  husband
starts taunting for not bringing dowry and calling her ugly,
there  cannot  be  greater  mental  torture,  harassment  or
cruelty for  any bride. There was a quarrel a day before her
death. This  by itself, in our considered  opinion,  would
constitute to  be a  wilful act to be a cruelty both within
the meaning of Section 498-A and Section 304-B IPC.
     The argument,  that There is no evidence of any cruelty
or harassment  soon before   her death, is also not correct.
We find both from the evidence of her sister, Trachala Devi
PW-5 and  her  brother-in-law, Ram  Gopal  PW-7,  that the
deceased on 14th May, 1987 came to Shahdara (Delhi) to mourn
the death  of her  maternal uncle and by evening on the same
day instead  of returning to her husband's place came to her
sister's house. She  remained there  for  few days. Both
deposed that  she told them that her husband was maltreating
her in view of dowry demand, and that not being satisfied
was harassing her. When on 17th May, 1987 the husband came
to take  her  back, she  was reluctant but  Trishala Devi
brought her  down and  sent her with her husband. Though she
went with  the husband but with the last painful words that
"it would  be difficult now to see her face in the future".
On the very next day, on 19th May, one day after she arrived
at her husband's place, the unfortunate death of Urmil took
place. She  died admittedly  on account of total burn of her
body. Admittedly the incident of quarrel as deposed was only
a day  before her  death. There is direct  evidence that on
17th May  itself, there was quarrel  at the  house  of her
sister with  the  deceased  and her  husband. The  quarrel
between the  deceased  and  her husband  was  tried  to  be
explained as  some other quarrel which should not constitute
to be  a quarrel  in connection with the  marriage. We find
that Section  8-A of  the aforesaid 1961 Act which came into
force w.e.f.  2nd October,  1985 for  taking or abetting any
dowry, the  burden to  explain is  placed  on such  person
against whom  the allegation  of committing  an offence  is
made. Similarly,  under Explanation  to Section 113-B of the
Indian Evidence Act, which  was  also brought in  by the
aforesaid Act No. 43 of 1986, there is presumption that such
death is  on account  of dowry death. Thus the burden, if at
all, was on the accused to prove otherwise.
     The  aforesaid   evidence would, on  the  facts and
circumstances  of   the case, bring to   an inescapable
conclusion that the aforesaid quarrel referred to by PWs 5 &
7 a  day before actual death  of the deceased, cumulatively
with other  evidence constitute to be cruelty and harassment
in connection with marriage and that too at her own sister's
place  which  has  direct  co-relation with  the  preceding
evidence of  repeated demand  of dowry, to be a case covered
both under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC. However, it was open
to the accused to  prove otherwise  or dispel by means  of
evidence to  destroy that deeming clause. But we find he has
not been able to do so. Such burden is placed on the accused
with a purpose. Evidence  also concludes  harassment to the
deceased within the meaning  of Section  498-A Explanation
(b), as she was  repeatedly coerced  for  not meeting the
demands leading to  her  mental  torture  and agony  which
ultimately led her to commit suicide.
     In the present case, we find that both the courts below
found that  inspite of thorough cross-examination, there is
no deviation on this issue. In fact, it has been pointed out
by the learned counsel for  the  respondent  that  on the
question  of   cruelty and  torture,  there  is  no  cross-
examination though there is some on other points. The courts
below have  rightly believed  the testimonies of the PWs and
we do not find that there is anything for us to deviate from
the same.  On the other hand, the evidence of the defence is
of perfunctory nature, not enough to dispel the burden cast.
     A faint submission was also made that it would not be a
case of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Reference
to Section  107 IPC was also made where abetment should fall
under any  of the  three heads. Reliance is  placed on the
first head. We find that the first head provides "instigates
any person  to do  that thing". There is  no doubt  in the
present case  there is repeated demand from the  husband's
side from  the girl and her parents for the various articles
as aforesaid and on failure, the girl was tortured, harassed
by words  and deeds,  amounting to  cruelty. As we have held
above and  one day  before  the fateful  day, the  husband
saturated the  mental agony  and cruelty by quarrelling with
the wife  (deceased) even  at her sister's place, leaving no
option which led the deceased to commit suicide. This mental
state is  further clear by the following words  which she
spoke to  her sister,  "it would be difficult now to see her
face  in   the future".  In  our  opinion  all this  would
constitute to  be an  act which would be an abetment for the
commission of  the suicide  by the girl. The husband, in the
present case, has not led any cogent evidence or brought any
circumstance to dislodge the aforesaid inference. Of course
benefit of  doubt to the accused would be available provided
there is  supportive evidence  on  the record. Hence, for
creating doubt or granting  benefit of doubt, the evidence
was to be such which may lead to such doubt. We do not find
that present is a case where any benefit of doubt results at
least against  the husband.  There is  direct  evidence,  as
stated by the aforesaid witnesses PWs 5 & 7 that soon before
her death  she was  subjected to  cruelty  by  the  husband.
However, we  find in so far appellant Nos. 2 & 3, father-in-
law and the mother-in-law, are concerned, the evidence is of
a general  nature. No  convincing evidence has been led that
the deceased  was subjected  to cruelty by appellant Nos.2 &
3. Before  holding that appellant Nos. 2 & 3 had committed
the offence,  it had  to be  found that they are responsible
for subjecting her to cruelty or harassment, soon before her
death. We find in this case evidence is only confined to the
husband and  not against  appellant Nos. 2 & 3. Hence on the
evidence on  record, so far as appellant Nos. 2 &  3 are
concerned, we extend to them the benefit of doubt and acquit
them.
     Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, we partly allow the
appeal. Convictions  and sentences  of appellant  No.1 are
maintained  but  the  convictions   and  sentences  of the
appellant Nos. 2 &  3 are set aside. Accordingly, appellant
No.1, namely  Pawan Kumar  is sentenced to 7 years' rigorous
imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment
of fine for further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months under
Sec tion  304-B IPC,  4 years' rigorous imprisonment and to
pay a  fine of Rs 200/-, in default payment of fine further
rigorous imprisonment  for 3  months, under Section 306 IPC,
and sentence  for 2  years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay
fine for Rs.200/-, and in default of payment of fine further
rigorous imprisonment  for three months, under Section 498-A
IPC. All  the sentences would run  concurrently. The  other
appellants,  namely   appellants  Nos. 2  &  3 are  hereby
acquitted. They are on bail. They  need not  surrender  to
their bail bonds. Their bail bonds are hereby discharged.
     The appeal is allowed in part.





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