Under the Code there is no provision for filing an application for granting interim maintenance during the pendency of main application under Section 125 of the Code after the Supreme Court judgment holding the right of the petitioner under Section 125 of the Code to get interim maintenance. Almost in all cases applications for interim relief are being made. This application for interim maintenance is by itself separate matter and . it has to be disposed of separately much earlier than the final order in the main case. By an order of interim maintenance, the rights of the parties are affected and decided finally in respect of that subject matter and by no stretch of imagination such an order can be called an interlocutory order. In Madhu Limaye V. State of Mahrashtra, , it was laid down as under :
Ordinarily and generally, the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order.' In Volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606:
....a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.
In para 1607 it is said :
In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed "final".
Sumer Chand Alias Sumer Nath vs Sandhuran Rani And Anr. on 11 May, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1987 CriLJ 1396
1. The petitioner has filed Criminal Revision No. 410 of 1987 and Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2500-M of 1987 and both these petitions are being disposed of in this order.
2. Sandhuran Rani, wife of Sumer Chand and Anju Bala, his daughter, the present respondents filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of maintenance allowance against Sumer Chand, the present petitioner. During the pendency of that petition, an application was made on behalf of the respondents for interim maintenance and after the whole matter was gone into by the trial Court, Sandhuran Rani, respondent was held to be not entitled to any interim maintenance and so far as her application was concerned, it was declined. The trial Court, however, allowed interim maintenance to Anju Bala, respondent No. 2 at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month, Sandhuran Rani, respondent No. 1 filed a revision petition before the Sessions Court which came up for hearing before the Additional Sessions Judge. The present petitioner also went in revision against the order of the trial Court granting interim maintenance to respondent No. 2 and both those revision petitions were heard finally by the Additional Sessions Judge.
3. Both the aforesaid revision petitions were decided by a single order dated 31st January, 1987, The revision petition filed by the present petitioner Sumer Chand was dismissed and in the revision petition filed by Sandhuran Rani, respondent No. 1, the Additional Sessions Judge remanded the case back to the trial Court after holding that Sandhuran Rani, respondent No. 1 was also entitled to interim maintenance and the trial Court was also directed to re-consider the quantum of interim maintenance granted to Anju Bala and also adjust equities between the parties while ordering interim maintenance to Sandhuran Rani.
4. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order passed by the trial Court granting interim maintenance was an interlocutory order and, therefore, according to the provisions of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974) (for short 'the Code'), powers of revision are not to be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings and, therefore, the revision filed by respondent No. 1 before the Sessions Court was not competent. He has relied upon a judgment reported in Moolji Jaitha and Co. v. The Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1950 FC 83 which was a case under the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the issuance of certificate by the High Court and it lays down that order of the High Court was not final order and no appeal lays before the Federal Court under the provisions of that Code. He has laid stress that the revision could lie only against a final order and this order granting interim maintenance being an interlocutory order, no revision was competent.
5. After considering the whole matter, I am of the view that the argument has no force. Under the Code there is no provision for filing an application for granting interim maintenance during the pendency of main application under Section 125 of the Code after the Supreme Court judgment holding the right of the petitioner under Section 125 of the Code to get interim maintenance. Almost in all cases applications for interim relief are being made. This application for interim maintenance is by itself separate matter and . it has to be disposed of separately much earlier than the final order in the main case. By an order of interim maintenance, the rights of the parties are affected and decided finally in respect of that subject matter and by no stretch of imagination such an order can be called an interlocutory order. In Madhu Limaye V. State of Mahrashtra, , it was laid down as under :
Ordinarily and generally, the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order.' In Volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606:
....a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.
In para 1607 it is said :
In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed "final".
In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words :
An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed "interlocutory". An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.
It was further laid down:
The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words "interlocutory order" occurring in Section 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If, it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chap. XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide, for example, The River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson. 0876-77) 2 AC 743 andR.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, that
although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case, AIR 1949 FC 1 : (1950-49 Cri LJ 625) (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.
In this view of the matter the impugned order cannot be treated as interlocutory order and, therefore, the revision before the Sessions Court was competent.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has used the following words in his order dated 31st January, 1987.
The trial Court would be at liberty to reconsider the quantum of interim maintenance allowed to Anju Bala also and adjust equities between the parties while ordering interim maintenance to Sandhuran Rani.
This direction, he submits, if allowed to stand, the trial Court may not reconsider the quantum of interim maintenance allowed to Anju Bala respondent No. 2 because the trial Court has been given absolute liberty in that respect. The argument is without merit. The trial Court will adjust the equities between the parties while ordering interim maintenance to Sandhuran Rani. The word "parties" includes Anju Bala also. In any case the direction given in the above observations will certainly be interpreted by the trial Court which will refix the interim maintenance to be allowed to both the respondents Sandhuran Rani and Anju Bala irrespective of the fact that in his earlier order a sum of Rs. 200/-p.m. was granted to Anju Bala. While adjusting equities between the parties, interim maintenance of Rs. 200/- granted to Anju Bala can certainly be modified.
7. With these observations and modifications these petitions stand disposed of accordingly. Parties have been directed to appear before the trial Court on 12th May, 1987, the date already fixed in that Court.
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