Grant of interim maintenance by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C is no bar for granting monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act by way of further maintenance amount over and above granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Section 20(1)(d) of the Act provides for granting relief of maintenance to the aggrieved person in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force. So, it has to be seen whether there is any justification for grant of the above maintenance by the Courts below under Section 20 of the Act. As per Section20(2) of the Act, monetary relief granted thereunder should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. The 2nd respondent is widow of founder of Coromaandel Cements Limited company and she was also an Additional Director in that company when her husband was alive and thereafter until, according to her, she was deprived of that position by obtaining her signatures on several documents. The documents executed by the 2nd respondent are subject-matter of civil suits and the litigation went upto the Supreme Court. There is no dispute that the petitioners 1 to 3 as Chairman, full time Director and Managing Director of CKoromaandel Cements Limited are drawing salaries or emoluments from the company to the extent of Rs.8,00,000/- per month each. Having regard to status of the parties and need of the petitioner who is aged about 80 years and her health condition and medical needs, it cannot be said that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per month (including interim maintenance granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C) is in no way excessive or unreasonable and unjust.
:ORDER:
1. The sons/petitioners 1 to 3 question judgment dated 18.05.2010 passed by the III Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.7 of 2007 by which the lower appellate court confirmed order dated 20.10.2009 passed by the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in D.V.C.No.17 of 2007 granting maintenance of Rs.75,000/- per month at the rate of Rs.25,000/- by each of the sons and compensation of Rs.50,000/- from each of the sons to the 1st respondent/mother.
2. The 1st respondent has got three sons (who are the petitioners 1 to 3) and five married daughters. The 1st respondent was aged 76 years by the time she filed Domestic Violence Case before the Magistrate. Her husband Subbarao died in the year 1994. Originally, the parties belonged to Singarayakonda of Prakasam District. Now the 1st respondent is residing at Hyderabad along with her third daughter. It is alleged that the 1st respondent is suffering from several ailments and that her health condition is deteriorating day-by-day. Originally late Subba Rao established Coromandel Cements Limited in which the first respondent was also an Additional Director. Now the petitioners changed the company into Ckoromaandel Cements Limited. Under will dated 10.03.1991 of her husband, the 1st respondent got several properties to the extent of 1/4th share in the estate left by him. It is alleged that the petitioners obtained several signatures of the 1st respondent on several documents on the pretext of managing affairs of the company and also on several blank papers and empty stamp papers. It is also further alleged that the 1st respondent was deprived by the petitioners of her immovable property, cash deposits, shares, 100 tolas of gold jewellery and 10 kgs. of silver. Originally the 1st respondent was residing with the 2nd petitioner at Vijaywada. There is no dispute that in or about May, 2006, the 1st respondent left the 2nd petitioner's house due to alleged ill-treatment, cruelty, negligence etc. and began residing with one or the other daughters.
3. Having regard to date of separate living of the 1st respondent since May, 2006, it is contended by the Senior Counsel for the petitioners that since cause of action took place prior to the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, the Act) coming into force, D.V.C.No.17 of 2007 does not lie and that the Act is prospective in its operation and not retrospective in operation. Though the Act was passed in the year 2005, it came into force on 26.10.2006 after the rules were framed thereunder.
4. It is well settled principle of law that any substantive enactment is prospective in nature unless specifically stated otherwise. There is no indication in the Act to hold that the Act is not prospective but retrospective in operation. But, simply because the Act is found to be prospective in operation, it cannot be said that provisions under the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. It has to be seen whether the cause of action arose or cause of action continued to exist even after the Act coming into force.
Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence as follows: "3. Definition of domestic violence:-
For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it :- (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injuries or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I:-For the purposes of this section, -
(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes :- (a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) "economic abuse" includes :-
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II:- For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration."
The above definition includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and also economic abuse within the meaning of domestic violence. When there was separation between the parties prior to the Act came into force, there may not be possibility of physical abuse; but, there may be possibility of verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse. As per Clause(iv) of Explanation-I to Section 3 of the Act, economic abuse includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom, and requires out of necessity. Even though separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force, still economic abuse by way of deprivation of the aggrieved person of right to residence and right to maintenance etc., would continue both before and after the Act coming into force. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the mother/1st respondent has no cause of action to maintain domestic violence case against the petitioners after the Act coming into force.
5. The 1st respondent previously filed maintenance case in OP No.202 of 2007 before the Judge, Family Court, Visakhapatnam and obtained order of interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C against the petitioners 1 to 3 to an extent of Rs.25,000/- per month. Apart from the said interim maintenance of Rs.25,000/- per month, both the courts below granted Rs.75,000/- per month from the petitioners 1 to 3 at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month each. Grant of interim maintenance by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C is no bar for granting monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act by way of further maintenance amount over and above granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Section 20(1)(d) of the Act provides for granting relief of maintenance to the aggrieved person in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force. So, it has to be seen whether there is any justification for grant of the above maintenance by the Courts below under Section 20 of the Act. As per Section20(2) of the Act, monetary relief granted thereunder should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. The 2nd respondent is widow of founder of Coromaandel Cements Limited company and she was also an Additional Director in that company when her husband was alive and thereafter until, according to her, she was deprived of that position by obtaining her signatures on several documents. The documents executed by the 2nd respondent are subject-matter of civil suits and the litigation went upto the Supreme Court. There is no dispute that the petitioners 1 to 3 as Chairman, full time Director and Managing Director of CKoromaandel Cements Limited are drawing salaries or emoluments from the company to the extent of Rs.8,00,000/- per month each. Having regard to status of the parties and need of the petitioner who is aged about 80 years and her health condition and medical needs, it cannot be said that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per month (including interim maintenance granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C) is in no way excessive or unreasonable and unjust. It is contended by the Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the 2nd respondent can have monetary compensation of Rs.50,000/- from each of the petitioners as per orders of the courts below and that the 1st respondent wanted to extract money at the rate of Rs.1,00,000/- per month from the petitioners 1 to 3 with a view to give the same to her daughters. Naturally, when the 1st respondent is taking shelter in daughter's house and is taking food and getting assistance to her in daughter's house, the 1st respondent may part with some of the cash to her daughter or daughters who attend on her and provide her personal and medical needs. Having regard to status of the parties, in case of any hospitalisation, the 1st respondent may not go to a Government hospital or a third rate private hospital, but she may prefer to go and take treatment from Corporate hospitals having super speciality facilities, which may charge even more than Rs.5,000/- per day. Having regard to background of family of the parties and requirements of the 2nd respondent, this Court is of the opinion that amount of maintenance awarded by the courts below at Rs.25,000/- per month from each of the petitioners is highly reasonable.
6. It is contended by the Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the 2nd respondent as P.W.1 in cross-examination deposed that it was only the 2nd petitioner who committed domestic violence against her and not the petitioners 1 and 3. One cannot expect the 2nd respondent to know definition of domestic violence with all its explanations contained in Section 3 of the Act. What P.W.1 stated was physical abuse and mental abuse when she referred to domestic violence. But, as per law, domestic violence includes economic abuse also, which further includes deprivation of any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 in her cross-examination cannot have any bearing in determining existence of domestic violence in this case as per law and as per definition contained under Section3 of the Act. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners 1 to 3 are guilty of domestic violence against the 1st respondent and that the courts below rightly granted monetary relief by way of maintenance and also compensation in favour of the 1st respondent against the petitioners 1 to 3.
7. In the result, the revision case is dismissed.
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Andhra High Court
Sikakollu Chandramohan And 2 ... vs Sikakollu Saraswathi Devi And ... on 6 July, 2010
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU:ORDER:
1. The sons/petitioners 1 to 3 question judgment dated 18.05.2010 passed by the III Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.7 of 2007 by which the lower appellate court confirmed order dated 20.10.2009 passed by the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in D.V.C.No.17 of 2007 granting maintenance of Rs.75,000/- per month at the rate of Rs.25,000/- by each of the sons and compensation of Rs.50,000/- from each of the sons to the 1st respondent/mother.
2. The 1st respondent has got three sons (who are the petitioners 1 to 3) and five married daughters. The 1st respondent was aged 76 years by the time she filed Domestic Violence Case before the Magistrate. Her husband Subbarao died in the year 1994. Originally, the parties belonged to Singarayakonda of Prakasam District. Now the 1st respondent is residing at Hyderabad along with her third daughter. It is alleged that the 1st respondent is suffering from several ailments and that her health condition is deteriorating day-by-day. Originally late Subba Rao established Coromandel Cements Limited in which the first respondent was also an Additional Director. Now the petitioners changed the company into Ckoromaandel Cements Limited. Under will dated 10.03.1991 of her husband, the 1st respondent got several properties to the extent of 1/4th share in the estate left by him. It is alleged that the petitioners obtained several signatures of the 1st respondent on several documents on the pretext of managing affairs of the company and also on several blank papers and empty stamp papers. It is also further alleged that the 1st respondent was deprived by the petitioners of her immovable property, cash deposits, shares, 100 tolas of gold jewellery and 10 kgs. of silver. Originally the 1st respondent was residing with the 2nd petitioner at Vijaywada. There is no dispute that in or about May, 2006, the 1st respondent left the 2nd petitioner's house due to alleged ill-treatment, cruelty, negligence etc. and began residing with one or the other daughters.
3. Having regard to date of separate living of the 1st respondent since May, 2006, it is contended by the Senior Counsel for the petitioners that since cause of action took place prior to the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, the Act) coming into force, D.V.C.No.17 of 2007 does not lie and that the Act is prospective in its operation and not retrospective in operation. Though the Act was passed in the year 2005, it came into force on 26.10.2006 after the rules were framed thereunder.
4. It is well settled principle of law that any substantive enactment is prospective in nature unless specifically stated otherwise. There is no indication in the Act to hold that the Act is not prospective but retrospective in operation. But, simply because the Act is found to be prospective in operation, it cannot be said that provisions under the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. It has to be seen whether the cause of action arose or cause of action continued to exist even after the Act coming into force.
Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence as follows: "3. Definition of domestic violence:-
For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it :- (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injuries or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I:-For the purposes of this section, -
(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes :- (a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) "economic abuse" includes :-
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II:- For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration."
The above definition includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and also economic abuse within the meaning of domestic violence. When there was separation between the parties prior to the Act came into force, there may not be possibility of physical abuse; but, there may be possibility of verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse. As per Clause(iv) of Explanation-I to Section 3 of the Act, economic abuse includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom, and requires out of necessity. Even though separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force, still economic abuse by way of deprivation of the aggrieved person of right to residence and right to maintenance etc., would continue both before and after the Act coming into force. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the mother/1st respondent has no cause of action to maintain domestic violence case against the petitioners after the Act coming into force.
5. The 1st respondent previously filed maintenance case in OP No.202 of 2007 before the Judge, Family Court, Visakhapatnam and obtained order of interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C against the petitioners 1 to 3 to an extent of Rs.25,000/- per month. Apart from the said interim maintenance of Rs.25,000/- per month, both the courts below granted Rs.75,000/- per month from the petitioners 1 to 3 at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month each. Grant of interim maintenance by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C is no bar for granting monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act by way of further maintenance amount over and above granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Section 20(1)(d) of the Act provides for granting relief of maintenance to the aggrieved person in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force. So, it has to be seen whether there is any justification for grant of the above maintenance by the Courts below under Section 20 of the Act. As per Section20(2) of the Act, monetary relief granted thereunder should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. The 2nd respondent is widow of founder of Coromaandel Cements Limited company and she was also an Additional Director in that company when her husband was alive and thereafter until, according to her, she was deprived of that position by obtaining her signatures on several documents. The documents executed by the 2nd respondent are subject-matter of civil suits and the litigation went upto the Supreme Court. There is no dispute that the petitioners 1 to 3 as Chairman, full time Director and Managing Director of CKoromaandel Cements Limited are drawing salaries or emoluments from the company to the extent of Rs.8,00,000/- per month each. Having regard to status of the parties and need of the petitioner who is aged about 80 years and her health condition and medical needs, it cannot be said that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per month (including interim maintenance granted by the Family Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C) is in no way excessive or unreasonable and unjust. It is contended by the Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the 2nd respondent can have monetary compensation of Rs.50,000/- from each of the petitioners as per orders of the courts below and that the 1st respondent wanted to extract money at the rate of Rs.1,00,000/- per month from the petitioners 1 to 3 with a view to give the same to her daughters. Naturally, when the 1st respondent is taking shelter in daughter's house and is taking food and getting assistance to her in daughter's house, the 1st respondent may part with some of the cash to her daughter or daughters who attend on her and provide her personal and medical needs. Having regard to status of the parties, in case of any hospitalisation, the 1st respondent may not go to a Government hospital or a third rate private hospital, but she may prefer to go and take treatment from Corporate hospitals having super speciality facilities, which may charge even more than Rs.5,000/- per day. Having regard to background of family of the parties and requirements of the 2nd respondent, this Court is of the opinion that amount of maintenance awarded by the courts below at Rs.25,000/- per month from each of the petitioners is highly reasonable.
6. It is contended by the Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the 2nd respondent as P.W.1 in cross-examination deposed that it was only the 2nd petitioner who committed domestic violence against her and not the petitioners 1 and 3. One cannot expect the 2nd respondent to know definition of domestic violence with all its explanations contained in Section 3 of the Act. What P.W.1 stated was physical abuse and mental abuse when she referred to domestic violence. But, as per law, domestic violence includes economic abuse also, which further includes deprivation of any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 in her cross-examination cannot have any bearing in determining existence of domestic violence in this case as per law and as per definition contained under Section3 of the Act. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners 1 to 3 are guilty of domestic violence against the 1st respondent and that the courts below rightly granted monetary relief by way of maintenance and also compensation in favour of the 1st respondent against the petitioners 1 to 3.
7. In the result, the revision case is dismissed.
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