When forgery was committed before the document was produced in a court the bar under S.195(1)(b) had no application.Offences covered by S.195 must involve acts affecting the administration of justice
PETITIONER:
SACHIDA NAND SINGH v STATE OF BIHAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1998
BENCH:
K.T. THOMAS, M. SRINIVASAN
CITATION;1998 (1)JT370
1998 AIR 1121, 1998( 1 )SCR 492, 1998( 2 )
J U D G M E N T
Thomas, J.
Can prosecution be maintained in respect of a forged
document produced in court unless complaint has been filed
by the court concerned in that behalf? In other words, the
question involved in this appeal is, whether the prohibition
contained in Section 1951(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short `the Code) would apply to such
prosecution. The aforesaid question, ticklish it may appear
to some extent, seemed to have received a quietus from this
Court with the pronouncement in Patel Laliibhai Somabha vs.
The State of Gujarat (AIR 1971 SC 1935) while considering
the scope of its corresponding provision in the old Code of
Criminal Procedure 1989. But a subsequent decision of this
Court in Gopalakrishna Menon & anr. vs. D.Raja Reddy & anr.,
[1983(4)SCC 240] which struck a different note thereon
seemed to have revived the issue and kept it buoying up in
the legal stream. That question, in this appeal, has arisen
from the following facts:
A complaint was filed by second respondent (Lal Narain
Singh) in the court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging
offences, inter alia, under Sections 468, 469 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code on the facts that appellants had forged a
document (certified copy of Jamabandi - Rent Roll) and
produced it in a court of Executive Magistrate which was
then dealing with proceedings under Section 145 of the Code.
Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the
police as provided in Section 156(3) of the Code. Police
registered an FIR on the basis of the said complaint and
after investigation laid a charge-sheet against appellants
for those offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance of those offences and issued process to the
accused. Appellants then moved Patna High Court under
Section 482 of the Code for quashing the prosecution on the
main ground that the Magistrate could not have taken
cognizance of the said offences in view of the bar contained
in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.
Before the High Court, appellants sited the decision of
the Court in Gopala Krishna Menon (supra) b ut a single
judge of the High Court dismissed the said petition filed
under Section 482 b y relying on a later decision of this
Court in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan and anr. vs. State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1994 SC 1549). Appellants therefore, filed
this appeal by special leave.
Shri K.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel contended that
though the decision in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai vs. The
State of Gujarat (supra) was rendered by a three judge Bench
of this Court it is no longer relevant as the said decision
was rendered under the corresponding provision of the old
Code which has a subtle difference from the new provision in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code and that difference makes
all the change. According to the learned senior counsel, the
ratio laid down by this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon would
hold the field since that decision was rendered under the
new Code.
Shri B.B.Singh, learned counsel for the first
respondent (State of Bihar), on the other hand, argued that
the slight change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code
vis-a-vis the corresponding provision in the old Code was
not for deviating from the legal position settled b y this
Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (supra). Learned counsel
has highlighted the consequences of adopting a wider
construction as to the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code. For deciding the issue it is appropriate to extract
here the material portion of the said clause here:
We Court shall take cognizance-
Even if the clause is capable of two interpretation we
are inclined to choose the narrower interpretation for
obvious reasons. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any
magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any
offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or
information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts
such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right
of a person to move the Court with a complaint is to that
extent curtailed. It is a well-recognised canon of
interpretation that provision curbing the general
jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict
interpretation unless the statute or the context requires
otherwise [Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani (1996 (3) SCR 617].
That apart it is difficult to interpret Section
195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a b ar against initiation of
prosecution proceedings merely because the document
concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery
was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any
such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences.
For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is
detected an the forgery is sure that he would imminently be
embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that
document produced in any long drawn litigation which was
either instituted by himself or some body else who can be
influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for
the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is
a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation
is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is
capable of causing mischievous consequences should be
averted. Quoting from Gill vs. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd.
(1963-1-W.L.R.929) Maxwell has stated in his treaties
(Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. Page 105) that "if
the language is capable of more than one interpretation we
ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to
unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which
leads to a reasonable practicable result". The clause which
we are now considering contains enough indication to show
that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour
of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid
observation is eminently applicable here.
As Section 340(1) of the Code has an inter-link with
Section 195(1)(b) it is necessary to refer to that sub-
section in the present context. The said sub-section reads
as follows:
"When upon an application made to
it in this behalf or otherwise, any
Court is of opinion that it is
expedient in the interest of
justice that an inquiry should be
made into any offence referred to
in clause (b) of sub-section(1) of
section 195, which appears to have
been committed in or in relation to
a proceeding in that Court or, as
the case may be, in respect of a
document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in that
Court, such Court may, after such
preliminary inquiry, if any, as it
thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that
effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in
writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the
first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for
the appearance of the accused
before such Magistrate, or if the
alleged offence is non-bailable and
the Court thinks it necessary so to
do, send the accused in custody to
such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear
and give evidence before such
Magistrate."
The sub-section puts the condition that before the
Court makes a complaint of "any offence referred to in
clause (b) of Section 195(1)" the Court has to follow the
procedure laid down in Section 340. In other words, no
complaint can be made by a court regarding any offence
falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code
without first adopting those procedural requirements. It h
as to be noted that Section 340 falls within Chapter XXVI of
the Code which contains a fasciculus of "Provisions as to
offences affecting the administration of justice" as the
title of the Chapter appellates. So the offences envisaged
in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code must involve acts which
would have affected the administration of justice.
The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in
Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any
offence affecting administration of justice ha been
committed in respect of a document produced in Court or
given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other
words, the offence should have been committed during the
time when the document was in custodia legis.
It would be a strained thinking that any offence
involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the
precincts of the Court and long before its production in the
Court, could also be treated as on affecting administration
of justice merely because that document later reached the
Court records.
The three Judges Bench of this Court in Patel Laljibhai
Somabhai's case (supra) has interpreted the corresponding
section in the old Code, [Section 195(1)(c)] in almost the
same manner as indicated above. It is advantageous in this
context to extract clause (c) of Section 195(1) of the old
Code.
"No Court shall take cognizance-
of any offence described in section
463 or punishable under section
471, section 475 or section 476 of
the same Coda, when each offence is
alleged to have been committed by a
party to any proceeding in any
Court in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in
such proceeding except on the
complain in writing of such Court,
or of some other Court to which
such Court is subordinate."
(underline supplied)
The issue involved in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai's case
related to the applicability of that sub-section to a case
where forged document was produced in a suit by a party
thereto, and subsequently a prosecution was launched against
him for offences under Section 467 and 471 of IPC through a
private complain. The ratio of the decision therein is the
following:
"The offences about which the court
alone, to the exclusion of the
aggrieve private parties, is
clothed with the right to complain
may, therefore, be appropriately
considered to be only those
offences committed by a party to a
proceeding in that court, the
commission of which has a
reasonable close nexus with the
proceedings in the court so that it
can, without embarking upon a
completely independent and fresh
inquiry, satisfactorily consider by
reference principally to its
records the expediency of
prosecuting the delinquent party.
It, therefore, appears to us to be
more appropriate to adopt the
strict construction of confining
the prohibition contained in s.
195(c) only to hose cases in which
the offences specified therein
committed by a party t the
proceeding in the character as such
party."
After stating so their Lordships proceeded to observe
that the legislature could not have intended to extend the
prohibition in the sub-section to offences committed by a
party to the proceedings prior to his becoming such a party.
According to their Lordships, any construction to the
contrary would unreasonably restrict the right of a person
which was recognized in Section 190 of the Code.
The aforesaid legal position was followed by this Court
in Raghunath & ors. vs. State of U.P & ors, 1973(1)SCC
564. Mohan Lal & ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan & ors.,
1974(3) SCC 628, and Legal Remembrance of Govt, of West
Bengal vs. Haridas Mundra, 1976(2) SCR 933.
But in Gopalakrishna Menon & ors. vs. D. Raja Reddy &
ors. (supra) Desai. J.and R.N.Misra, J.(as he than was) h
ave found that a persecution initiated on the basis of a
private complaint, in the absence of any complaint from the
appropriate civil court (before which the alleged forged
receipt was produced) was whether offences under section 461
and 471 of IPC are also offences described in Section 463 of
IPC falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code.
Of course in the end of that decision it was mentioned
that prosecution on the basis of a private complaint, in the
absence of a complaint from appropriate civil court, is not
sustainable. Learned Judge made reference to the decisions
in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (cited supra) and Goswami vs.
High Court of M.P., 1979(1) SCC 373, and observed that the
ratio in those decisions support the view taken b y them.
The forgery alleged in Goswami's case took place during the
period when the document in question was in the custody of
the court and in such a case t he bar under Section
195(1)(b)(ii) would certainly apply. But, with great
respect, we are unable to agree that the ratio in Laljibhai
Somabhai would support the conclusion reached in
Gopalakrishna Menon's case (supra).
Shri K.B. Sinha learned senor counsel contended that
the position which held the field pursuant to Patel
Laljibhai Somabhai's case decision has since been changed
with the enactment of the new Code because of absence of the
words ("by a party to any proceeding in an y court") in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. On the other hand learned
counsel for the respondents contended that the only object
for deletion of those words was to advance the protection of
the section to other persons as well who might not have been
parties to the litigation.
A scrutiny of the sub clause in juxtaposition with the
corresponding provision in old Code dissuades us from
attaching any significance to the deletion of the words ("by
a party to any proceeding in any court") except to the
extent that the deletion was intended to stretch the
advantage to non-parties to the proceedings as well.
The Law Commission in its 41st Report has observed in
paragraph 15.93 as follows:
"15.39 The purpose of the section
is to b ar private prosecutions
where the course of justice is
sought to be perverted leaving to
the court itself to uphold its
dignity and prestige. On principle
there is no reason why the
safeguard in clause (c) should not
apply to offences committed by
witnesses also. Witnesses need as
much protection against vexatious
prosecutions as parties and the
court should have as much control
over the acts of witnesses that
enter as a component of a judicial
proceeding, as over the acts of
parties. If, therefore, the
provisions of clause (c) are
extended to witnesses, the
extension would be in conformity
with the broad principle which
forms the basis of S. 195."
The above reasons of the Law Commission which
eventually led to the parliamentary exercise in deleting the
words referred to earlier would unmistakably point to the
legislative object in doing so.
The same issue came up before a Full Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, particularly in the light of
change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis
the corresponding provision in the old Code. In Harbans
Singh and others vs. State of Punjab - [AIR 1987 Punjab &
Haryana 19], the Full Bench observed that deletion of those
words would not help to take a wider view as the restrictive
view is more in consonance with the scheme of the Code. We
have notice that Karnataka High Court in Govindaraju vs.
State of Karnataka [1995 Crl.L.J.1491] and the Bombay High
Court in Alka Bhagwant Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra [ILR
1986 (Bombay) 64] have also adopted the same view.
The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar
contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not
applicable to case where forgery of the document was
committed before the document was produced in a Court.
Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
Print Page
PETITIONER:
SACHIDA NAND SINGH v STATE OF BIHAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1998
BENCH:
K.T. THOMAS, M. SRINIVASAN
CITATION;1998 (1)JT370
1998 AIR 1121, 1998( 1 )SCR 492, 1998( 2 )
J U D G M E N T
Thomas, J.
Can prosecution be maintained in respect of a forged
document produced in court unless complaint has been filed
by the court concerned in that behalf? In other words, the
question involved in this appeal is, whether the prohibition
contained in Section 1951(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short `the Code) would apply to such
prosecution. The aforesaid question, ticklish it may appear
to some extent, seemed to have received a quietus from this
Court with the pronouncement in Patel Laliibhai Somabha vs.
The State of Gujarat (AIR 1971 SC 1935) while considering
the scope of its corresponding provision in the old Code of
Criminal Procedure 1989. But a subsequent decision of this
Court in Gopalakrishna Menon & anr. vs. D.Raja Reddy & anr.,
[1983(4)SCC 240] which struck a different note thereon
seemed to have revived the issue and kept it buoying up in
the legal stream. That question, in this appeal, has arisen
from the following facts:
A complaint was filed by second respondent (Lal Narain
Singh) in the court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging
offences, inter alia, under Sections 468, 469 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code on the facts that appellants had forged a
document (certified copy of Jamabandi - Rent Roll) and
produced it in a court of Executive Magistrate which was
then dealing with proceedings under Section 145 of the Code.
Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the
police as provided in Section 156(3) of the Code. Police
registered an FIR on the basis of the said complaint and
after investigation laid a charge-sheet against appellants
for those offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance of those offences and issued process to the
accused. Appellants then moved Patna High Court under
Section 482 of the Code for quashing the prosecution on the
main ground that the Magistrate could not have taken
cognizance of the said offences in view of the bar contained
in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.
Before the High Court, appellants sited the decision of
the Court in Gopala Krishna Menon (supra) b ut a single
judge of the High Court dismissed the said petition filed
under Section 482 b y relying on a later decision of this
Court in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan and anr. vs. State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1994 SC 1549). Appellants therefore, filed
this appeal by special leave.
Shri K.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel contended that
though the decision in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai vs. The
State of Gujarat (supra) was rendered by a three judge Bench
of this Court it is no longer relevant as the said decision
was rendered under the corresponding provision of the old
Code which has a subtle difference from the new provision in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code and that difference makes
all the change. According to the learned senior counsel, the
ratio laid down by this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon would
hold the field since that decision was rendered under the
new Code.
Shri B.B.Singh, learned counsel for the first
respondent (State of Bihar), on the other hand, argued that
the slight change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code
vis-a-vis the corresponding provision in the old Code was
not for deviating from the legal position settled b y this
Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (supra). Learned counsel
has highlighted the consequences of adopting a wider
construction as to the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code. For deciding the issue it is appropriate to extract
here the material portion of the said clause here:
We Court shall take cognizance-
Even if the clause is capable of two interpretation we
are inclined to choose the narrower interpretation for
obvious reasons. Section 190 of the Code empowers "any
magistrate of the first class" to take cognizance of "any
offence" upon receiving a complaint, or police report or
information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts
such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right
of a person to move the Court with a complaint is to that
extent curtailed. It is a well-recognised canon of
interpretation that provision curbing the general
jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict
interpretation unless the statute or the context requires
otherwise [Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani (1996 (3) SCR 617].
That apart it is difficult to interpret Section
195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a b ar against initiation of
prosecution proceedings merely because the document
concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery
was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any
such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences.
For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is
detected an the forgery is sure that he would imminently be
embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that
document produced in any long drawn litigation which was
either instituted by himself or some body else who can be
influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for
the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is
a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation
is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is
capable of causing mischievous consequences should be
averted. Quoting from Gill vs. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd.
(1963-1-W.L.R.929) Maxwell has stated in his treaties
(Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. Page 105) that "if
the language is capable of more than one interpretation we
ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to
unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which
leads to a reasonable practicable result". The clause which
we are now considering contains enough indication to show
that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour
of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid
observation is eminently applicable here.
As Section 340(1) of the Code has an inter-link with
Section 195(1)(b) it is necessary to refer to that sub-
section in the present context. The said sub-section reads
as follows:
"When upon an application made to
it in this behalf or otherwise, any
Court is of opinion that it is
expedient in the interest of
justice that an inquiry should be
made into any offence referred to
in clause (b) of sub-section(1) of
section 195, which appears to have
been committed in or in relation to
a proceeding in that Court or, as
the case may be, in respect of a
document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in that
Court, such Court may, after such
preliminary inquiry, if any, as it
thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that
effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in
writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the
first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for
the appearance of the accused
before such Magistrate, or if the
alleged offence is non-bailable and
the Court thinks it necessary so to
do, send the accused in custody to
such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear
and give evidence before such
Magistrate."
The sub-section puts the condition that before the
Court makes a complaint of "any offence referred to in
clause (b) of Section 195(1)" the Court has to follow the
procedure laid down in Section 340. In other words, no
complaint can be made by a court regarding any offence
falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code
without first adopting those procedural requirements. It h
as to be noted that Section 340 falls within Chapter XXVI of
the Code which contains a fasciculus of "Provisions as to
offences affecting the administration of justice" as the
title of the Chapter appellates. So the offences envisaged
in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code must involve acts which
would have affected the administration of justice.
The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in
Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any
offence affecting administration of justice ha been
committed in respect of a document produced in Court or
given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other
words, the offence should have been committed during the
time when the document was in custodia legis.
It would be a strained thinking that any offence
involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the
precincts of the Court and long before its production in the
Court, could also be treated as on affecting administration
of justice merely because that document later reached the
Court records.
The three Judges Bench of this Court in Patel Laljibhai
Somabhai's case (supra) has interpreted the corresponding
section in the old Code, [Section 195(1)(c)] in almost the
same manner as indicated above. It is advantageous in this
context to extract clause (c) of Section 195(1) of the old
Code.
"No Court shall take cognizance-
of any offence described in section
463 or punishable under section
471, section 475 or section 476 of
the same Coda, when each offence is
alleged to have been committed by a
party to any proceeding in any
Court in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in
such proceeding except on the
complain in writing of such Court,
or of some other Court to which
such Court is subordinate."
(underline supplied)
The issue involved in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai's case
related to the applicability of that sub-section to a case
where forged document was produced in a suit by a party
thereto, and subsequently a prosecution was launched against
him for offences under Section 467 and 471 of IPC through a
private complain. The ratio of the decision therein is the
following:
"The offences about which the court
alone, to the exclusion of the
aggrieve private parties, is
clothed with the right to complain
may, therefore, be appropriately
considered to be only those
offences committed by a party to a
proceeding in that court, the
commission of which has a
reasonable close nexus with the
proceedings in the court so that it
can, without embarking upon a
completely independent and fresh
inquiry, satisfactorily consider by
reference principally to its
records the expediency of
prosecuting the delinquent party.
It, therefore, appears to us to be
more appropriate to adopt the
strict construction of confining
the prohibition contained in s.
195(c) only to hose cases in which
the offences specified therein
committed by a party t the
proceeding in the character as such
party."
After stating so their Lordships proceeded to observe
that the legislature could not have intended to extend the
prohibition in the sub-section to offences committed by a
party to the proceedings prior to his becoming such a party.
According to their Lordships, any construction to the
contrary would unreasonably restrict the right of a person
which was recognized in Section 190 of the Code.
The aforesaid legal position was followed by this Court
in Raghunath & ors. vs. State of U.P & ors, 1973(1)SCC
564. Mohan Lal & ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan & ors.,
1974(3) SCC 628, and Legal Remembrance of Govt, of West
Bengal vs. Haridas Mundra, 1976(2) SCR 933.
But in Gopalakrishna Menon & ors. vs. D. Raja Reddy &
ors. (supra) Desai. J.and R.N.Misra, J.(as he than was) h
ave found that a persecution initiated on the basis of a
private complaint, in the absence of any complaint from the
appropriate civil court (before which the alleged forged
receipt was produced) was whether offences under section 461
and 471 of IPC are also offences described in Section 463 of
IPC falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code.
Of course in the end of that decision it was mentioned
that prosecution on the basis of a private complaint, in the
absence of a complaint from appropriate civil court, is not
sustainable. Learned Judge made reference to the decisions
in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (cited supra) and Goswami vs.
High Court of M.P., 1979(1) SCC 373, and observed that the
ratio in those decisions support the view taken b y them.
The forgery alleged in Goswami's case took place during the
period when the document in question was in the custody of
the court and in such a case t he bar under Section
195(1)(b)(ii) would certainly apply. But, with great
respect, we are unable to agree that the ratio in Laljibhai
Somabhai would support the conclusion reached in
Gopalakrishna Menon's case (supra).
Shri K.B. Sinha learned senor counsel contended that
the position which held the field pursuant to Patel
Laljibhai Somabhai's case decision has since been changed
with the enactment of the new Code because of absence of the
words ("by a party to any proceeding in an y court") in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. On the other hand learned
counsel for the respondents contended that the only object
for deletion of those words was to advance the protection of
the section to other persons as well who might not have been
parties to the litigation.
A scrutiny of the sub clause in juxtaposition with the
corresponding provision in old Code dissuades us from
attaching any significance to the deletion of the words ("by
a party to any proceeding in any court") except to the
extent that the deletion was intended to stretch the
advantage to non-parties to the proceedings as well.
The Law Commission in its 41st Report has observed in
paragraph 15.93 as follows:
"15.39 The purpose of the section
is to b ar private prosecutions
where the course of justice is
sought to be perverted leaving to
the court itself to uphold its
dignity and prestige. On principle
there is no reason why the
safeguard in clause (c) should not
apply to offences committed by
witnesses also. Witnesses need as
much protection against vexatious
prosecutions as parties and the
court should have as much control
over the acts of witnesses that
enter as a component of a judicial
proceeding, as over the acts of
parties. If, therefore, the
provisions of clause (c) are
extended to witnesses, the
extension would be in conformity
with the broad principle which
forms the basis of S. 195."
The above reasons of the Law Commission which
eventually led to the parliamentary exercise in deleting the
words referred to earlier would unmistakably point to the
legislative object in doing so.
The same issue came up before a Full Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, particularly in the light of
change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis
the corresponding provision in the old Code. In Harbans
Singh and others vs. State of Punjab - [AIR 1987 Punjab &
Haryana 19], the Full Bench observed that deletion of those
words would not help to take a wider view as the restrictive
view is more in consonance with the scheme of the Code. We
have notice that Karnataka High Court in Govindaraju vs.
State of Karnataka [1995 Crl.L.J.1491] and the Bombay High
Court in Alka Bhagwant Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra [ILR
1986 (Bombay) 64] have also adopted the same view.
The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar
contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not
applicable to case where forgery of the document was
committed before the document was produced in a Court.
Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
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