The provisions of Order-II
Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 Explanation V of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that Explanation-V of the Civil Procedure Code explains the principle of res judicata stating that the relief which could have been or ought to have been prayed for, even if it was not prayed for, would operate as res judicata. Section 12 thereof bans filing of such a suit at instance of a person who is found to be otherwise bound by the decision of the earlier litigation and in a case where the principle of res judicata shall apply.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to judgement and order rendered by 3rd Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1985 whereby and whereunder judgement of dismissal of suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Newasa, came to be reversed. The trial Court decreed the suit whereas the first Appellate Court dismissed the same.
2. The litigation has a chequered history. The parties litigated in various proceedings and some of the suits and proceedings are still pending. The initial disputes sparked off in the early months of 1968. (3)
3. The following pedigree table is uncontroverted. Sitabai = Govind Appacharya Deogirikar = Yamunabai (Ist wife) (Died on 15-4-1966) (IInd wife) | (Adoptive mother)
| (Died on 6-1-1963)
|
--------------------------
| |
Ramchandra Purushottam = Yamunabai (Died in 1917) (Adopted on 8-4-1940 (wife of | (Died on 1-2-1976) Purushottam) | | (plaintiff No. 1) | |
| |
| -------------------------------- Mathurabai = Nilkanth | | | (Deft.No.1) (Deft.No.2) Chandrakant Sulbha Prakash (Wife of (Pltf.No.2) (Pltf.No.3) (Pltf.No.4) Deft.No.2)
4. The property in dispute comprises of three (3) agricultural lands bearing Gat No. 136, admeasuring 10 hectares 19 Ares, called `bandhani', Gat No. 138, admeasuring 3 hectares 24 Ares, called `belacha mala' and `pandhari' and Gat No. 139, admeasuring 1 hectare 17 Ares, called `kapili'. These lands are situated at village Najik-Chincholi under Newasa Tahsil, District Ahmednagar. The land Gat No. 138 is consolidated after amalgamation of old survey Nos. 51 and 50 called `belacha mala' and `pandhari', respectively. Land Gat No. 139 is consolidated from old survey No. 71 called (4)
`kapili' and land Gat No. 136 is consolidated from old survey No. 52/A called `bandhani'. These lands would be referred to hereinafter as the suit land No. I, II and III, respectively.
5. Indisputably, the suit lands were originally held by deceased Govindappacharya as his ancestral properties. The appellants are original plaintiffs of the suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978. They are the members of the branch of deceased Purushottam, who was adoptive son of Govindappacharya and Yamunabai. The members of branch of predeceased son of deceased Govindappacharya, namely, Ramchandra were the original defendants No. 1 and 2 in the suit. The remaining respondents are subsequent purchasers of some of the suit properties.
6. Briefly stated, the plaintiffs' case before the trial Court was that deceased Purushottam was the sole surviving coparcener of the Hindu joint family after demise of Govindappacharya. He acquired all the rights and became exclusive owner of the suit lands No. I to (5)
III. In his old age, deceased Govindappacharya was allured by the defendants No. 1 and 2 to stay with them. He was blind and feeble due to the oldage. The defendants No. 1 and 2 took undue advantage of the physical and mental disability of Govindappacharya and got the suit lands No. I to III transferred in name of Nilkanth i.e. Defendant No. 2. Somewhere after death of Govindappacharya, a notice was received by them (plaintiffs) on an application filed by the defendants No. 1 and 2 to obtain probate in respect of the suit lands No. I to III. Therefore, plaintiff Purushottam inquired as to how the transfer was effected. He noticed that by playing fraud, the defendants No. 1 and 2 had obtained a registered sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 from deceased Govindappacharya. That sale-deed was without consideration and purportedly in respect of land bearing survey No. 52A (Gat No. 136). He also learnt that another sale-deed dated 17-05-1959 was obtained in name of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth from deceased Yamunabai without payment of any consideration. The defendant No. 2 - Nilkanth lateron executed sale-deed dated 04-04-1960 in respect of a part of the suit land bearing Survey No. (6)
71 and Survey No. 52 i.e. Gat No. 139 and Gat No. 136 in favour of defendant No. 4. The predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs, namely, Purushottam had filed the suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) for injunction and recovery of the suit lands No. I to III. He claimed possession in respect of lands Gat Nos. 138 and 139 which were allegedly transferred.
7. The parties to the earlier suit bearing Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 litigated for quite a longer period. The Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Ahmednagar. An appeal was preferred by the deceased plaintiff of that suit (R.C.A. No. 87/1970). This Court dismissed the first appeal. In the meanwhile, said Purushottam died on 1st February, 1976 and his legal heirs were substituted as appellants. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on various grounds including the fact that sale transactions referred to in the plaint of the earlier suit were not specifically challenged and there was no prayer for cancellation of the said sale-deed or setting aside the sale transaction. After dismissal of the said appeal, on (7)
23-11-1977, by an elaborate judgement of this Court, the next suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) was filed by the plaintiffs/appellants herein.
8. Initially, the suit was filed only against original defendants No. 1 and 2. The plaintiffs sought specific declaration that the sale-deeds executed in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth were not binding on their rights and were outcome of fraud played on deceased Govindappacharya. They also claimed for possession of the suit lands No. I to III.
9. Original defendant No. 3 Maroti asserted that he had purchased a part of the suit land which originally bore survey No. 50 and survey No. 51 from defendant No.2 Nilkanth vide sale-deed dated 24th April, 1960. The defendant No. 8 Mahadu staked claim for land which he had purchased being a part of survey No. 51, from defendant No. 1 Yamunabai vide sale-deed dated 4th April, 1960. He submitted that he sold the said land to defendant No. 9 Smt. Vithabai. The plaint was amended on 1st November, 1983 with new prayers for declaration (8)
that the subsequent transfers were not binding on the (plaintiffs). The plaintiff further submitted that the sale-deeds executed in favour of defendant No.2 Nilkanth and others were against the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, "the BT&AL Act"). The plaintiffs, therefore, asserted that they were owners of the suit lands No. I to III and were entitled to receive the possession because the subsequent transfers also are invalid.
10. The defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted suit by their written statement (Exh-15). They denied that they allured deceased Govindappacharya to reside with them. They also denied that taking undue advantage of the mental and physical disability of Govindappacharya, his oldage and other circumstances, the sale-deeds were brought about by them. They submitted that deceased Govindappacharya had executed a will-deed on 30-06-1963 and also Yamunabai had executed a sale-deed on 19-10-1961 in their favour. They contended that the findings rendered by the Civil Court in previous suit viz. Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 are binding on the plaintiffs. (9)
They asserted that the suit is barred by principle of res judicata in as much as lis in the earlier suit and the present suit is the same, the parties are same and the earlier findings attained finality when this Court dismissed the first appeal. They also submitted that the suit lands No. I to III were in possession of defendant No.2 Nilkanth on basis of a lease-deed executed by deceased Govindappacharya. They further contended that the suit was barred under Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code because the claim for declaration was not put forth in the earlier suit though it could have been done. They further submitted that the suit is barred by limitation. According to the defendant No. 2 - Nilkanth, he was previously tenant of the deceased Govindappacharya in respect of the suit lands No. I to III. He also asserted that he became statutory owner in view of section 32-M of the BT&AL Act and, therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine validity of the tenancy rights and the sale- deeds. On such premises, they sought dismissal of the suit.
( 10 )
11. Original defendants No. 3 to 7, 10 and 12 did not participate in the suit proceedings. They were set exparte.
12. Original defendants No. 8, 9 and 11 filed filed their common written statement (Exh-53). They submitted that they are the bonafide purchasers. They submitted that they had no notice about the claim of the plaintiffs and, therefore, they are purchasers without notice. They further pleaded that they have carried out improvements in the purchased suit lands and for such purpose, have incurred expenses of Rs. Three (3) lacs. Consequently, they too sought dismissal of the suit.
13. The parties went to trial over the issues settled below Exh-21 by the trial Court. They adduced voluminous evidence in support of their contentions. The learned trial Judge held that Govindappacharya was blind and suffered from senility and, therefore, defendant No. 2 Nilkanth took undue advantage of the situation and got the sale-deeds executed in his favour. The learned trial Judge further held that the suit lands No. I to ( 11 )
III were not leased out to defendant No.2 Nilkanth by Govindappacharya and, therefore, he cannot claim statutory ownership rights under the provisions of the BT&AL Act. The learned trial Judge further held that the suit was not barred by principle of res judicata. Hence, the suit was decreed. The first Appellate Court, however, held that the suit was barred by principle of res judicata because the earlier suit filed by deceased Purushottam pertained to the same property and issues involved therein were identical to the lis in the present suit. The learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation. The findings rendered by the learned Additional District Judge led to the reversal of the decree passed by the trial Court.
14. Before I embark upon consideration of the rival submissions, let it be noted that this second appeal was admitted by the following single line order. "Admit on grounds 5 & 6."
( 12 )
The then Hon'ble Judge (Patil, J.) did not separately formulate the substantial questions of law. The substantial questions of law involved in this appeal may be re-drafted and stated as follows :
(i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while holding that the sale-deeds dated 07-05-1957, 04-04-1966, 20-08-1982 and 10-02-1983 were not illegal and void since they were not hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act ? (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while holding that the suit was barred by principle of `res judicata'? (iii) Whether the suit is untenable in view of Order- II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and could be dismissed without any specific pleadings raised by the respondents ?
(iv) Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? ( 13 )
It may be mentioned here that I have formulated some of the additional substantial questions of law in view of sub-section (5) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to curtail any further litigation on these questions.
15. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
16. The findings of facts rendered by the first Appellate Court need not be disturbed. There appears no perversity committed by the first Appellate Court while appreciating evidence of the parties. Some of the facts like ownership of deceased Govindappacharya, adoption of deceased Purushottam on 08-04-1940 by Govindappacharya and his wife Yamunabai, etc. are uncontroverted. It is explicit that after the death of Yamunabai in the year 1963 and death of Purushottam in the year 1966, Govindappacharya was survived by the plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 who are claiming through said Purushottam and the defendant No. 2 who is claiming through deceased Ramchandra, the natural predeceased son of deceased Govindappacharya.
( 14 )
17. Mr. Dhorde R.N. Would submit that the first Appellate Court did not frame any point regarding bar of the suit under Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, finding on this point is perverse. He would point out that no such issue was framed during the trial. Nor such an issue was raised before the first Appellate Court. He contended that deceased Purushottam was atleast entitled to claim half share in the joint Hindu family property and, therefore, the dismissal of the earlier suit filed by him (plaintiff) would not operate as res judicata when he subsequently staked the claim for possession. He contended that the suit ought to have been decreed atleast to the extent of half share of the plaintiffs and partition decree could have been granted. It is contended that limitation would be available in view of Article 109 of the Limitation Act. It is further submitted that the time spent in litigating the earlier suit upto the High Court could be exempted for operation of law of limitation. Reliance is placed on "Union of India and others v. West ( 15 )
Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and another (III)" 2004 (3) SCC
458. Mr. Dhorde would submit that the appeal deserves to be allowed with directions to atleast give partition decree to the extent of half share of deceased Purushottam in the suit lands No. I to III. He pointed out that the subsequently, purchasers entered into the transactions during pendency of the suit and as such, the inter vivos transfers amongst the defendants are not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. Mr. Dhorde, therefore, urged to allow the appeal. As against this, Mr. Shah P.M., learned Senior Counsel, supports the impugned judgement.
18. On perusal of the copy of plaint in the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968), it is amply clear that the sale-deeds executed by deceased Govindappacharya were challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence and his disability to effect the transfers. So also, a will-deed dated 20-05-1954 and subsequent will-deed dated 20-06-1963 executed by deceased Govindappacharya in favour of defendant No. 1 Mathurabai was challenged. ( 16 )
There was no prayer for setting aside the alienations effected by Govindappacharya and declaration that the will-deed dated 19-10-1961 was invalid. When the earlier suit was finally decided by this Court in first appeal No. 87 of 1970, the Hon'ble Division Bench rejected the contention that the suit was not maintainable due to absence of any prayer for setting aside the transactions. This Court observed that it was necessary for the deceased plaintiff - Purushottam to file suit for general partition. The simple suit for recovery of possession without any prayer for declaration of the nature of transaction was held to be improper. This Court observed :
"34. If a suit for partition was brought by the plaintiff the purchasers defendant Nos. 2 to 4 could have claimed equity in allotting the properties in their possession to the share of defendant No. 1 and they would be denied the equity in a simple suit for possession, which the plaintiff brought in this case. In these circumstances, it is not possible to allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint, so as to seek relief of partition and ( 17 )
possession also in respect thereof, which even Mr. Sathe has not asked before this Court.
35. The learned Judge has observed, rightly, in para 28 of his judgement, as follows :
"The plaintiff bases his claim on the footing that Govindacharya was a
coparcener of a joint family
consisting of himself and Govindacharya. According to the
plaintiff Govindcharya passed a sale
deed in respect of certain family lands in favour of Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 2 in turn executed
sale deeds in regard to those land in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4.
Even according to the allegations in
the plaint Govindacharya was not a stranger in respect of the family lands. He had an undivided share in
those lands. The plaintiff himself has averred in the plaint that the sale deeds are without consideration, hollow and not
binding upon him. It is to be noted
that plaintiff does not treat them as void documents right from their very inception. Under the circumstances, it was necessary for ( 18 )
the plaintiff to get the sale deeds
avoided before he would get the reliefs sought by him in the prayer
clause. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has in form framed the
suit as one for injunction in
respect of some of the lands and one
for possession in respect of other lands. But the suit is in substance
a suit to set aside the sale deeds in favour of Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and
4. The substance of the pleading will have to be looked into in coming to the conclusion whether the
plaintiff can bring this suit
without making a pryaer to set aside
the sale-deeds in favour of
defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4, which he
has himself referred in the plaint."
19. The Hon'ble Division Bench thus confirmed dismissal of the previous suit (SplC.S. No. 28/1968). While considering the question of limitation, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the cause of action to challenge the sale transactions or will-deed executed by Govindappacharya was available to deceased Purushottam ( 19 )
when the said documents were executed by deceased Govindappacharya. In the lifetime of Govindappacharya, deceased Purushottam did not raise any voice. The sale- deeds dated 07-05-1957 (Exh-97) and 07-05-1959 purport to show that original land survey Nos. 52A, 71 and 50 were transferred in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth by deceased Govindappacharya. It cannot be overlooked that defendant No.2 Nilkanth was the natural grandson of deceased Govindappacharya. It is but natural that deceased Govindappacharya was having love and affection towards the latter. The will-deed was said to have been executed on 20-05-1954 and subsequent will-deed was executed by Govindappacharya on 20-06-1963 in name of defendant No. 1 Mathurabai. Thus, the alleged invalidity of these documents was within knowledge of deceased Plaintiff Purushottam since atleast the year 1963 or at the most, somewhere immediately before filing of the earlier suit (Spl. C.S. No. 28/1968). The limitation period started running from date of the transactions. In other words, the suit ought to have been filed within period of twelve (12) years from date of the first transaction dated 07-05-1957 or for that matter, from ( 20 )
date of the will-deed which was executed on 20th June, 1963. This limitation period could be available only if Article 109 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act conjointly are held as applicable. Otherwise if Article 59 of the Limitation Act is to be applied, then the suit could not have been entertained because it was not filed within the stipulated time-frame.
20. Mr. Dhorde submits that when the present suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) was filed on 4th September, 1978, the period of limitation was available in view of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The previous suit was dismissed because no declaration was sought in respect of invalidity of the sale transactions or the will-deed, but subsequently, the defect is cured by filing the present suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1968). It is argued, therefore, that the period of litigation in the earlier suit is required to be excluded for the purpose of limitation in view of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Heavy reliance is placed on certain observations in "Union of India and others v. West Coast Paper Mills ( 21 )
Ltd. and another (III)" (2004) 3 SCC 458 and "India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh and another" AIR 1971 S.C. 2313.
21. In "India Electric Works Ltd.' (supra), it has been observed that the expression "or other cause of like nature" as used in section 14 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally. It has been held that where the second suit was filed for damages for period subsequent to the claim in the earlier suit, the period of pendency of the first suit could be excluded in view of section 14. The fact situation in the said case is on different footings from the fact situation obtained in the present case. In "Union of India and others" (supra), it has been observed that section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called, but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the ( 22 )
section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. These are general observations made by the Hon'ble Bench in the given case. It is true that liberal construction of the expression "other causes of like nature" is required to be made. The Apex Court in above referred dictum categorically observed that the expression is wide enough to cover not only jurisdictional defects of the earlier suit/proceedings, but also other defects which were "more or less neighbour to such deficiencies". This rider put by the Apex Court is significant. In my humble opinion, the expression "other cause of like nature" does imply that some semblance with the defect of jurisdiction or such technical defect must be shown. A Division Bench of the Apex Court in "Zafar Khan and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others" (AIR 1985 S.C. 39), observed :
"In order to attract the application of Sec. 14 (1), the parties seeking its benefit must satisfy the Court that : (1) that the party as ( 23 )
the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence; (ii) that the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and (iii) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It may be assumed that the earlier proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a civil proceeding for the purpose of Sec. 14. It may as well be assumed in favour of the appellants that they were prosecuting the same with due diligence and in good faith, as they relentlessly carried the proceeding up to the High Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. The first of the aforementioned three cumulative conditions can be said to have been satisfied."
22. Needless to say, the three (3) conditions which a party is required to satisfy would include belief of a party that the litigation in the Court which did not possess jurisdiction, was being prosecuted appropriately. The fact that the sale transactions and the will-deed was not challenged specifically by seeking ( 24 )
cancellation of the said documents in the earlier suit is not an act done in good faith. The deceased plaintiff Purushottam had knowledge that validity of the documents was required to be challenged and the transactions were required to be set aside. There is no scintilla of evidence to attribute good faith to deceased plaintiff Purushottam for his omission to pray for declaration about invalidity of the documents which he knew to be invalid as per his own contentions. The parties to the earlier litigation were same in the sense that the present plaintiffs (appellants) are claiming through deceased plaintiff Purushottam and that there was no defect of jurisdiction of the civil Court or like defect which would enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs so as to seek exclusion of the period spent in the earlier litigation. Mr. Shah invited my attention to observations in "Amitab Chaudhary v. District Judge, Allahabad and another" AIR 1985 Allahabad 7, wherein it is held that when the earlier proceedings were dismissed on merits, benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be given. It has been further observed that the ( 25 )
expression "or other cause of like nature" needs to be construed in ejusdem generis as the words which precede them. In this view of the matter, the declaration sought by the plaintiffs that the sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 executed by Govindappacharya and Yamunabai in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth and the other sale-deeds are illegal and void, would be clearly barred by limitation even though Article 109 of the Limitation Act is held applicable to the fact situation of the present case.
23. True, the defendants did not raise specific plea regarding bar of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and no such point was raised for consideration by the first Appellate Court. Still, however, it may be gathered that such a legal question is considered by the first Appellate Court and it has been held that omission of the plaintiffs to sue for setting aside of the sale transaction in the earlier suit would create legal embargo in the present suit. The bar of the second suit for the relief which was not sought in the previous suit and which could have been sought, is purely a legal question. Though no such point ( 26 )
was specifically raised by the first Appellate Court, yet, such question seems to have been argued and considered. It appears that such a legal question was taken into consideration while deciding the question pertaining to bar of res judicata.
24. In this context, it would not be out of place to refer the effect of sub-clause (3) of Rule 2 of Order-II of the Civil Procedure Code. It reads as follows :
"2. Suit to include the whole claim -
(1) *****
(2) *****
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs. - A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted." Explanation - For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed ( 27 )
respectively to constitute but one cause of action."
25. The omission to sue for one of the several reliefs, arising out of the same cause of action, would, therefore, create legal bar in filing second suit for the relief which was omitted in the earlier suit. If the plaintiff (Purushottam) had reserved his right to sue for declaratory relief or for relief of partition in the earlier suit, then his subsequent suit or the subsequent suit filed by the present plaintiffs could not be treated as barred. No leave was obtained in the earlier suit and, therefore, the subsequent suit cannot be entertained. In "Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair and others" (2004) 3 SCC 277, the Apex Court held that such bar would be attracted when the relief which ought to have been asked for in the earlier suit on the same cause of action, was not sought by the plaintiff and the second suit was filed for the same relief which was omitted earlier.
26. Mr. Dhorde invited my attention to "Dalip Singh ( 28 )
v. Mehar Singh Rathee and others" (2004) 7 SCC 650. The Apex Court, in the above matter, held that the Court has to ascertain whether cause of action of previous suit and subsequent suit was identical. It has been held that in absence of proof of identity of cause of action and pleadings, such plea cannot be permitted to be raised. In the context of present case, it may be said that the cause of action for the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968), as well as the cause of action for the present suit is identical and, therefore, the observations in above mentioned matter, with great respects, are not applicable to the fact situation of the present case.
27. In "Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas & another" 2008 AIR SCW 3324, the Apex Court considered the plea of res judicata and provisions of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Apex Court held that where suit for permanent injunction based on legal entitlement to `Gaddi' of Math was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by the Supreme ( 29 )
Court, mere observations that the plaintiff may sue for possession would not prevent the Court from dismissing the suit for possession as barred by res judicata. The Apex Court approved the view taken in "Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari" (2007) 8 SCC 600, wherein it was observed :
"21. If the respondent intended to claim damages and/or mesne profit, in view of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code itself, he could have done so, but he chose not to do so. For one reason or the other, he, therefore, had full knowledge about his right. Having omitted to make any claim for damages, in our opinion, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to get the same indirectly.
22. Law in this behalf is absolutely clear. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
28. The dictum in "Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust)" (supra) may be usefully referred while considering the plea of res judicata. The Apex Court seems to have intertwined the provisions of Order-II ( 30 )
Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 Explanation V of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that Explanation-V of the Civil Procedure Code explains the principle of res judicata stating that the relief which could have been or ought to have been prayed for, even if it was not prayed for, would operate as res judicata. Section 12 thereof bans filing of such a suit at instance of a person who is found to be otherwise bound by the decision of the earlier litigation and in a case where the principle of res judicata shall apply.
29. Some times, the doctrine of "res judicata" is considered as a branch of law of estoppel. There is distinction between doctrine of `res judicata', principle of `issue estoppel' and `rule of estoppel' under section 115 of the Evidence Act. Doctrine of res judicata creates legal embargo on hands of the Court to a judicial determination of deciding the same question over again even though the earlier determination may be demonstratedly erroneous. When the proceedings between the same parties have attained finality, they are bound ( 31 )
by the judgement and cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same lis. The determination of the issue in the same set of facts in the previous lis between the parties would give rise to an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties. The doctrine of res judicata is based on rule of procedure. However, the doctrine of mere estoppel is based on rule of evidence. In case of estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act, there is embargo on the party to plead or prove a particular fact whereas in case of res judicata, the prohibition is operative against the Court to deal with the same kind of issue again and again.
30. It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata would be attracted when following ingredients are fulfilled :
(i) Matter in issue must be directly and substantially in issue in the form of issue; (ii) Parties must be same or they must be litigating for the same title;
( 32 )
(iii) The Court must be competent to try such subsequent suits; and
(iv) The earlier suit must be heard and finally decided.
31. In "Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and another" 2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 839, the Apex Court considered the distinction between "issue estoppel" and "res judicata". It is held :
"29. There is a distinction between "issue estoppel" and "res judicata". (See Thoday vs. Thoday. (1964) 1 All ER 341).
30. Res judicata debars a Court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party. If such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceeding. The doctrine of res judicata creates a different kind of estoppel viz. Estoppel by accord.
31. In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of "issue estoppel" as also "cause of ( 33 )
action estoppel" may arise. In Thoday (supra) Lord Diplock held :
"....`cause of action estoppel', is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in previous
litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist i.e. Judgement was given on it, it is said to bemerged in the judgement....If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam.
32. The said dicta was followed in Barber vs. Staffordshire County Council, (1996) 2 All ER 748 (CA). A cause of action estoppel arises where in two different proceedings identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt with similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. In such an event the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided save and except allegation of fraud and collusion. (See C. (A Minor) vs. Hackney London Borough Council, (1996) 1 All ER 973." ( 34 )
33. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that in the earlier suit, deceased Purushottam, through whom the present plaintiffs/appellants have been claiming their rights, had set up claim in respect of the same properties involved in the present suit. He had sought possession of the lands bearing Gat No. 138 and Gat No.
139. He had referred to fraud played on deceased Govindappacharya in respect of the documents viz. sale- deeds and the will-deed, etc. He challenged the sale- deeds dated 07-05-1957 executed by deceased Govindappacharya and also the sale-deed dated 07-05-1959 executed by Yamunabai in favour of Nilkanth, who is defendant No. 2 herein. His earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) was dismissed on merits and the first appeal was also dismissed by this Court. Needless to say, he cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issues again and again. The same issues could not be tried by the Court in the subsequent round of litigation. Therefore, the suit is barred by principle of `res judicata' and the first Appellate Court was right in giving such a ( 35 )
finding.
34. Similarly, the failure of the appellants to seek declaration that the sale-deeds were invalid in the context of the earlier suit, would bar them in raising such plea. They omitted to seek relief for setting aside the sale transactions. They omitted to specifically seek alternative relief of partition. The object of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code is to prevent a plaintiff from vexing the defendant again and again in multiple proceedings on basis of assumptive division of a cause of action. It also prohibits the plaintiff from suing separately for each relief arising out of the same cause of action. The intention of the legislature is to discourage multiplicity of litigation on basis of same cause of action. Thus, it is explicit that same cause of action cannot be permitted to be minced and multiple suits cannot be allowed when the identity of the cause of action is same. The omission of deceased plaintiff Purushottam to seek above referred reliefs in the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) would, therefore, operate as `bar' as enumerated under ( 36 )
Order-II Rule-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
35. So far as the challenge to the sale-deeds is concerned, even assuming that the issue could be re- agitated by the plaintiffs (appellants), then also it is difficult to hold that the transactions are proved to be outcome of fraud or the same are against public policy or otherwise tainted with illegality. The contention of the plaintiffs is that deceased Govindappacharya was allured by the defendants to reside with them. There is nothing on record to show that he resided with the defendants No. 1 and 2 and was under their influence. It is an admitted fact that deceased Govindappacharya executed the registered sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 in respect of agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 52-A, 71 and 50 vide Exh-97 in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth. The plaintiffs did not set out details of alleged fraud and undue influence exercised by the defendants No. 1 and 2 on deceased Govindappacharya. The plea of fraud cannot be allowed to be raised on basis of vague allegations. The averment that Govindappacharya was helpless and was leaning towards senility are not ( 37 )
duly proved. This Court in "Kisan s/o Ramji Khandare vs. Kausalyabai w/o Gangaram Korde and others" 2007 (4) Mh.L.J. 43, held that mere sweeping allegations regarding the fraud are of no avail to the plaintiffs. This Court emphasized that the fraud is an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another person to rely upon it in order to part with some valuable thing. So, in view of Order-VI Rule-4 of the Civil Procedure Code, the necessary particulars of alleged "fraud" must be spelt out in the pleadings.
36. There is hardly any evidence to infer that deceased Govindappacharya was unable to understand purport of his act of executing the sale-deed. The thumb impression of Govindappacharya was obtained on the sale- deed (Exh-97) for the reason that his vision was impaired at the material time. The Sub-Registrar's endorsement on the sale-deed has presumptive value because such part is deemed as part of the public record. The Sub-Registrar has endorsed the sale-deed to the effect that the executant admitted execution of the ( 38 )
sale-deed. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the allegations of fraud and undue influence have been carved out many years after the execution of the sale- deeds. The findings of the first Appellate Court, in this behalf, upholding the correctness and validity of the sale-deeds, cannot be interfered with in the instant appeal.
37. It need not be reiterated that the transfers have not been challenged within the period of limitation in view of Article 109 of the Limitation Act. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the sale-deed executed in favour of the defendant No. 2 is vitiated by fraud. Assuming that the suit is covered by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, then also, it is barred by limitation. In "Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others" 2006 (5) Mh.L.J. 441, the Apex Court held that Article 59 of the Limitation Act encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation in as much as the setting aside the ( 39 )
sale transactions is sought after period of three (3) years from date of the transaction and that the relief of possession is claimed after twelve (12) years of the delivery of possession to the contesting defendants in respect of the suit lands.
38. In my opinion, the first Appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation, barred by principle of `res judicata' and also in view of omission to seek the same reliefs under Order-II Rule-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the earlier round of litigation. The first Appellate Court rightly held that the transactions are not proved to be invalid. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
[ V.R. KINGAONKAR ]
JUDGE
NPJ/SA142-89
Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 Explanation V of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that Explanation-V of the Civil Procedure Code explains the principle of res judicata stating that the relief which could have been or ought to have been prayed for, even if it was not prayed for, would operate as res judicata. Section 12 thereof bans filing of such a suit at instance of a person who is found to be otherwise bound by the decision of the earlier litigation and in a case where the principle of res judicata shall apply.
Bombay High Court
Yamunabai Purushottam ... vs Mathurabai Nilkanth Choudhari on 3 July, 2009
1. Challenge in this appeal is to judgement and order rendered by 3rd Additional District Judge, Ahmednagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1985 whereby and whereunder judgement of dismissal of suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Newasa, came to be reversed. The trial Court decreed the suit whereas the first Appellate Court dismissed the same.
2. The litigation has a chequered history. The parties litigated in various proceedings and some of the suits and proceedings are still pending. The initial disputes sparked off in the early months of 1968. (3)
3. The following pedigree table is uncontroverted. Sitabai = Govind Appacharya Deogirikar = Yamunabai (Ist wife) (Died on 15-4-1966) (IInd wife) | (Adoptive mother)
| (Died on 6-1-1963)
|
--------------------------
| |
Ramchandra Purushottam = Yamunabai (Died in 1917) (Adopted on 8-4-1940 (wife of | (Died on 1-2-1976) Purushottam) | | (plaintiff No. 1) | |
| |
| -------------------------------- Mathurabai = Nilkanth | | | (Deft.No.1) (Deft.No.2) Chandrakant Sulbha Prakash (Wife of (Pltf.No.2) (Pltf.No.3) (Pltf.No.4) Deft.No.2)
4. The property in dispute comprises of three (3) agricultural lands bearing Gat No. 136, admeasuring 10 hectares 19 Ares, called `bandhani', Gat No. 138, admeasuring 3 hectares 24 Ares, called `belacha mala' and `pandhari' and Gat No. 139, admeasuring 1 hectare 17 Ares, called `kapili'. These lands are situated at village Najik-Chincholi under Newasa Tahsil, District Ahmednagar. The land Gat No. 138 is consolidated after amalgamation of old survey Nos. 51 and 50 called `belacha mala' and `pandhari', respectively. Land Gat No. 139 is consolidated from old survey No. 71 called (4)
`kapili' and land Gat No. 136 is consolidated from old survey No. 52/A called `bandhani'. These lands would be referred to hereinafter as the suit land No. I, II and III, respectively.
5. Indisputably, the suit lands were originally held by deceased Govindappacharya as his ancestral properties. The appellants are original plaintiffs of the suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978. They are the members of the branch of deceased Purushottam, who was adoptive son of Govindappacharya and Yamunabai. The members of branch of predeceased son of deceased Govindappacharya, namely, Ramchandra were the original defendants No. 1 and 2 in the suit. The remaining respondents are subsequent purchasers of some of the suit properties.
6. Briefly stated, the plaintiffs' case before the trial Court was that deceased Purushottam was the sole surviving coparcener of the Hindu joint family after demise of Govindappacharya. He acquired all the rights and became exclusive owner of the suit lands No. I to (5)
III. In his old age, deceased Govindappacharya was allured by the defendants No. 1 and 2 to stay with them. He was blind and feeble due to the oldage. The defendants No. 1 and 2 took undue advantage of the physical and mental disability of Govindappacharya and got the suit lands No. I to III transferred in name of Nilkanth i.e. Defendant No. 2. Somewhere after death of Govindappacharya, a notice was received by them (plaintiffs) on an application filed by the defendants No. 1 and 2 to obtain probate in respect of the suit lands No. I to III. Therefore, plaintiff Purushottam inquired as to how the transfer was effected. He noticed that by playing fraud, the defendants No. 1 and 2 had obtained a registered sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 from deceased Govindappacharya. That sale-deed was without consideration and purportedly in respect of land bearing survey No. 52A (Gat No. 136). He also learnt that another sale-deed dated 17-05-1959 was obtained in name of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth from deceased Yamunabai without payment of any consideration. The defendant No. 2 - Nilkanth lateron executed sale-deed dated 04-04-1960 in respect of a part of the suit land bearing Survey No. (6)
71 and Survey No. 52 i.e. Gat No. 139 and Gat No. 136 in favour of defendant No. 4. The predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs, namely, Purushottam had filed the suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) for injunction and recovery of the suit lands No. I to III. He claimed possession in respect of lands Gat Nos. 138 and 139 which were allegedly transferred.
7. The parties to the earlier suit bearing Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 litigated for quite a longer period. The Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Ahmednagar. An appeal was preferred by the deceased plaintiff of that suit (R.C.A. No. 87/1970). This Court dismissed the first appeal. In the meanwhile, said Purushottam died on 1st February, 1976 and his legal heirs were substituted as appellants. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on various grounds including the fact that sale transactions referred to in the plaint of the earlier suit were not specifically challenged and there was no prayer for cancellation of the said sale-deed or setting aside the sale transaction. After dismissal of the said appeal, on (7)
23-11-1977, by an elaborate judgement of this Court, the next suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) was filed by the plaintiffs/appellants herein.
8. Initially, the suit was filed only against original defendants No. 1 and 2. The plaintiffs sought specific declaration that the sale-deeds executed in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth were not binding on their rights and were outcome of fraud played on deceased Govindappacharya. They also claimed for possession of the suit lands No. I to III.
9. Original defendant No. 3 Maroti asserted that he had purchased a part of the suit land which originally bore survey No. 50 and survey No. 51 from defendant No.2 Nilkanth vide sale-deed dated 24th April, 1960. The defendant No. 8 Mahadu staked claim for land which he had purchased being a part of survey No. 51, from defendant No. 1 Yamunabai vide sale-deed dated 4th April, 1960. He submitted that he sold the said land to defendant No. 9 Smt. Vithabai. The plaint was amended on 1st November, 1983 with new prayers for declaration (8)
that the subsequent transfers were not binding on the (plaintiffs). The plaintiff further submitted that the sale-deeds executed in favour of defendant No.2 Nilkanth and others were against the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short, "the BT&AL Act"). The plaintiffs, therefore, asserted that they were owners of the suit lands No. I to III and were entitled to receive the possession because the subsequent transfers also are invalid.
10. The defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted suit by their written statement (Exh-15). They denied that they allured deceased Govindappacharya to reside with them. They also denied that taking undue advantage of the mental and physical disability of Govindappacharya, his oldage and other circumstances, the sale-deeds were brought about by them. They submitted that deceased Govindappacharya had executed a will-deed on 30-06-1963 and also Yamunabai had executed a sale-deed on 19-10-1961 in their favour. They contended that the findings rendered by the Civil Court in previous suit viz. Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968 are binding on the plaintiffs. (9)
They asserted that the suit is barred by principle of res judicata in as much as lis in the earlier suit and the present suit is the same, the parties are same and the earlier findings attained finality when this Court dismissed the first appeal. They also submitted that the suit lands No. I to III were in possession of defendant No.2 Nilkanth on basis of a lease-deed executed by deceased Govindappacharya. They further contended that the suit was barred under Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code because the claim for declaration was not put forth in the earlier suit though it could have been done. They further submitted that the suit is barred by limitation. According to the defendant No. 2 - Nilkanth, he was previously tenant of the deceased Govindappacharya in respect of the suit lands No. I to III. He also asserted that he became statutory owner in view of section 32-M of the BT&AL Act and, therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine validity of the tenancy rights and the sale- deeds. On such premises, they sought dismissal of the suit.
( 10 )
11. Original defendants No. 3 to 7, 10 and 12 did not participate in the suit proceedings. They were set exparte.
12. Original defendants No. 8, 9 and 11 filed filed their common written statement (Exh-53). They submitted that they are the bonafide purchasers. They submitted that they had no notice about the claim of the plaintiffs and, therefore, they are purchasers without notice. They further pleaded that they have carried out improvements in the purchased suit lands and for such purpose, have incurred expenses of Rs. Three (3) lacs. Consequently, they too sought dismissal of the suit.
13. The parties went to trial over the issues settled below Exh-21 by the trial Court. They adduced voluminous evidence in support of their contentions. The learned trial Judge held that Govindappacharya was blind and suffered from senility and, therefore, defendant No. 2 Nilkanth took undue advantage of the situation and got the sale-deeds executed in his favour. The learned trial Judge further held that the suit lands No. I to ( 11 )
III were not leased out to defendant No.2 Nilkanth by Govindappacharya and, therefore, he cannot claim statutory ownership rights under the provisions of the BT&AL Act. The learned trial Judge further held that the suit was not barred by principle of res judicata. Hence, the suit was decreed. The first Appellate Court, however, held that the suit was barred by principle of res judicata because the earlier suit filed by deceased Purushottam pertained to the same property and issues involved therein were identical to the lis in the present suit. The learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation. The findings rendered by the learned Additional District Judge led to the reversal of the decree passed by the trial Court.
14. Before I embark upon consideration of the rival submissions, let it be noted that this second appeal was admitted by the following single line order. "Admit on grounds 5 & 6."
( 12 )
The then Hon'ble Judge (Patil, J.) did not separately formulate the substantial questions of law. The substantial questions of law involved in this appeal may be re-drafted and stated as follows :
(i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while holding that the sale-deeds dated 07-05-1957, 04-04-1966, 20-08-1982 and 10-02-1983 were not illegal and void since they were not hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act ? (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while holding that the suit was barred by principle of `res judicata'? (iii) Whether the suit is untenable in view of Order- II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and could be dismissed without any specific pleadings raised by the respondents ?
(iv) Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? ( 13 )
It may be mentioned here that I have formulated some of the additional substantial questions of law in view of sub-section (5) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to curtail any further litigation on these questions.
15. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
16. The findings of facts rendered by the first Appellate Court need not be disturbed. There appears no perversity committed by the first Appellate Court while appreciating evidence of the parties. Some of the facts like ownership of deceased Govindappacharya, adoption of deceased Purushottam on 08-04-1940 by Govindappacharya and his wife Yamunabai, etc. are uncontroverted. It is explicit that after the death of Yamunabai in the year 1963 and death of Purushottam in the year 1966, Govindappacharya was survived by the plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 who are claiming through said Purushottam and the defendant No. 2 who is claiming through deceased Ramchandra, the natural predeceased son of deceased Govindappacharya.
( 14 )
17. Mr. Dhorde R.N. Would submit that the first Appellate Court did not frame any point regarding bar of the suit under Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, finding on this point is perverse. He would point out that no such issue was framed during the trial. Nor such an issue was raised before the first Appellate Court. He contended that deceased Purushottam was atleast entitled to claim half share in the joint Hindu family property and, therefore, the dismissal of the earlier suit filed by him (plaintiff) would not operate as res judicata when he subsequently staked the claim for possession. He contended that the suit ought to have been decreed atleast to the extent of half share of the plaintiffs and partition decree could have been granted. It is contended that limitation would be available in view of Article 109 of the Limitation Act. It is further submitted that the time spent in litigating the earlier suit upto the High Court could be exempted for operation of law of limitation. Reliance is placed on "Union of India and others v. West ( 15 )
Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and another (III)" 2004 (3) SCC
458. Mr. Dhorde would submit that the appeal deserves to be allowed with directions to atleast give partition decree to the extent of half share of deceased Purushottam in the suit lands No. I to III. He pointed out that the subsequently, purchasers entered into the transactions during pendency of the suit and as such, the inter vivos transfers amongst the defendants are not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. Mr. Dhorde, therefore, urged to allow the appeal. As against this, Mr. Shah P.M., learned Senior Counsel, supports the impugned judgement.
18. On perusal of the copy of plaint in the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968), it is amply clear that the sale-deeds executed by deceased Govindappacharya were challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence and his disability to effect the transfers. So also, a will-deed dated 20-05-1954 and subsequent will-deed dated 20-06-1963 executed by deceased Govindappacharya in favour of defendant No. 1 Mathurabai was challenged. ( 16 )
There was no prayer for setting aside the alienations effected by Govindappacharya and declaration that the will-deed dated 19-10-1961 was invalid. When the earlier suit was finally decided by this Court in first appeal No. 87 of 1970, the Hon'ble Division Bench rejected the contention that the suit was not maintainable due to absence of any prayer for setting aside the transactions. This Court observed that it was necessary for the deceased plaintiff - Purushottam to file suit for general partition. The simple suit for recovery of possession without any prayer for declaration of the nature of transaction was held to be improper. This Court observed :
"34. If a suit for partition was brought by the plaintiff the purchasers defendant Nos. 2 to 4 could have claimed equity in allotting the properties in their possession to the share of defendant No. 1 and they would be denied the equity in a simple suit for possession, which the plaintiff brought in this case. In these circumstances, it is not possible to allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint, so as to seek relief of partition and ( 17 )
possession also in respect thereof, which even Mr. Sathe has not asked before this Court.
35. The learned Judge has observed, rightly, in para 28 of his judgement, as follows :
"The plaintiff bases his claim on the footing that Govindacharya was a
coparcener of a joint family
consisting of himself and Govindacharya. According to the
plaintiff Govindcharya passed a sale
deed in respect of certain family lands in favour of Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 2 in turn executed
sale deeds in regard to those land in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4.
Even according to the allegations in
the plaint Govindacharya was not a stranger in respect of the family lands. He had an undivided share in
those lands. The plaintiff himself has averred in the plaint that the sale deeds are without consideration, hollow and not
binding upon him. It is to be noted
that plaintiff does not treat them as void documents right from their very inception. Under the circumstances, it was necessary for ( 18 )
the plaintiff to get the sale deeds
avoided before he would get the reliefs sought by him in the prayer
clause. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has in form framed the
suit as one for injunction in
respect of some of the lands and one
for possession in respect of other lands. But the suit is in substance
a suit to set aside the sale deeds in favour of Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and
4. The substance of the pleading will have to be looked into in coming to the conclusion whether the
plaintiff can bring this suit
without making a pryaer to set aside
the sale-deeds in favour of
defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4, which he
has himself referred in the plaint."
19. The Hon'ble Division Bench thus confirmed dismissal of the previous suit (SplC.S. No. 28/1968). While considering the question of limitation, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the cause of action to challenge the sale transactions or will-deed executed by Govindappacharya was available to deceased Purushottam ( 19 )
when the said documents were executed by deceased Govindappacharya. In the lifetime of Govindappacharya, deceased Purushottam did not raise any voice. The sale- deeds dated 07-05-1957 (Exh-97) and 07-05-1959 purport to show that original land survey Nos. 52A, 71 and 50 were transferred in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth by deceased Govindappacharya. It cannot be overlooked that defendant No.2 Nilkanth was the natural grandson of deceased Govindappacharya. It is but natural that deceased Govindappacharya was having love and affection towards the latter. The will-deed was said to have been executed on 20-05-1954 and subsequent will-deed was executed by Govindappacharya on 20-06-1963 in name of defendant No. 1 Mathurabai. Thus, the alleged invalidity of these documents was within knowledge of deceased Plaintiff Purushottam since atleast the year 1963 or at the most, somewhere immediately before filing of the earlier suit (Spl. C.S. No. 28/1968). The limitation period started running from date of the transactions. In other words, the suit ought to have been filed within period of twelve (12) years from date of the first transaction dated 07-05-1957 or for that matter, from ( 20 )
date of the will-deed which was executed on 20th June, 1963. This limitation period could be available only if Article 109 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act conjointly are held as applicable. Otherwise if Article 59 of the Limitation Act is to be applied, then the suit could not have been entertained because it was not filed within the stipulated time-frame.
20. Mr. Dhorde submits that when the present suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1978) was filed on 4th September, 1978, the period of limitation was available in view of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The previous suit was dismissed because no declaration was sought in respect of invalidity of the sale transactions or the will-deed, but subsequently, the defect is cured by filing the present suit (R.C.S. No. 270/1968). It is argued, therefore, that the period of litigation in the earlier suit is required to be excluded for the purpose of limitation in view of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Heavy reliance is placed on certain observations in "Union of India and others v. West Coast Paper Mills ( 21 )
Ltd. and another (III)" (2004) 3 SCC 458 and "India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh and another" AIR 1971 S.C. 2313.
21. In "India Electric Works Ltd.' (supra), it has been observed that the expression "or other cause of like nature" as used in section 14 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally. It has been held that where the second suit was filed for damages for period subsequent to the claim in the earlier suit, the period of pendency of the first suit could be excluded in view of section 14. The fact situation in the said case is on different footings from the fact situation obtained in the present case. In "Union of India and others" (supra), it has been observed that section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called, but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the ( 22 )
section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. These are general observations made by the Hon'ble Bench in the given case. It is true that liberal construction of the expression "other causes of like nature" is required to be made. The Apex Court in above referred dictum categorically observed that the expression is wide enough to cover not only jurisdictional defects of the earlier suit/proceedings, but also other defects which were "more or less neighbour to such deficiencies". This rider put by the Apex Court is significant. In my humble opinion, the expression "other cause of like nature" does imply that some semblance with the defect of jurisdiction or such technical defect must be shown. A Division Bench of the Apex Court in "Zafar Khan and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others" (AIR 1985 S.C. 39), observed :
"In order to attract the application of Sec. 14 (1), the parties seeking its benefit must satisfy the Court that : (1) that the party as ( 23 )
the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence; (ii) that the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and (iii) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It may be assumed that the earlier proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a civil proceeding for the purpose of Sec. 14. It may as well be assumed in favour of the appellants that they were prosecuting the same with due diligence and in good faith, as they relentlessly carried the proceeding up to the High Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. The first of the aforementioned three cumulative conditions can be said to have been satisfied."
22. Needless to say, the three (3) conditions which a party is required to satisfy would include belief of a party that the litigation in the Court which did not possess jurisdiction, was being prosecuted appropriately. The fact that the sale transactions and the will-deed was not challenged specifically by seeking ( 24 )
cancellation of the said documents in the earlier suit is not an act done in good faith. The deceased plaintiff Purushottam had knowledge that validity of the documents was required to be challenged and the transactions were required to be set aside. There is no scintilla of evidence to attribute good faith to deceased plaintiff Purushottam for his omission to pray for declaration about invalidity of the documents which he knew to be invalid as per his own contentions. The parties to the earlier litigation were same in the sense that the present plaintiffs (appellants) are claiming through deceased plaintiff Purushottam and that there was no defect of jurisdiction of the civil Court or like defect which would enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs so as to seek exclusion of the period spent in the earlier litigation. Mr. Shah invited my attention to observations in "Amitab Chaudhary v. District Judge, Allahabad and another" AIR 1985 Allahabad 7, wherein it is held that when the earlier proceedings were dismissed on merits, benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be given. It has been further observed that the ( 25 )
expression "or other cause of like nature" needs to be construed in ejusdem generis as the words which precede them. In this view of the matter, the declaration sought by the plaintiffs that the sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 executed by Govindappacharya and Yamunabai in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth and the other sale-deeds are illegal and void, would be clearly barred by limitation even though Article 109 of the Limitation Act is held applicable to the fact situation of the present case.
23. True, the defendants did not raise specific plea regarding bar of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and no such point was raised for consideration by the first Appellate Court. Still, however, it may be gathered that such a legal question is considered by the first Appellate Court and it has been held that omission of the plaintiffs to sue for setting aside of the sale transaction in the earlier suit would create legal embargo in the present suit. The bar of the second suit for the relief which was not sought in the previous suit and which could have been sought, is purely a legal question. Though no such point ( 26 )
was specifically raised by the first Appellate Court, yet, such question seems to have been argued and considered. It appears that such a legal question was taken into consideration while deciding the question pertaining to bar of res judicata.
24. In this context, it would not be out of place to refer the effect of sub-clause (3) of Rule 2 of Order-II of the Civil Procedure Code. It reads as follows :
"2. Suit to include the whole claim -
(1) *****
(2) *****
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs. - A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted." Explanation - For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed ( 27 )
respectively to constitute but one cause of action."
25. The omission to sue for one of the several reliefs, arising out of the same cause of action, would, therefore, create legal bar in filing second suit for the relief which was omitted in the earlier suit. If the plaintiff (Purushottam) had reserved his right to sue for declaratory relief or for relief of partition in the earlier suit, then his subsequent suit or the subsequent suit filed by the present plaintiffs could not be treated as barred. No leave was obtained in the earlier suit and, therefore, the subsequent suit cannot be entertained. In "Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair and others" (2004) 3 SCC 277, the Apex Court held that such bar would be attracted when the relief which ought to have been asked for in the earlier suit on the same cause of action, was not sought by the plaintiff and the second suit was filed for the same relief which was omitted earlier.
26. Mr. Dhorde invited my attention to "Dalip Singh ( 28 )
v. Mehar Singh Rathee and others" (2004) 7 SCC 650. The Apex Court, in the above matter, held that the Court has to ascertain whether cause of action of previous suit and subsequent suit was identical. It has been held that in absence of proof of identity of cause of action and pleadings, such plea cannot be permitted to be raised. In the context of present case, it may be said that the cause of action for the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968), as well as the cause of action for the present suit is identical and, therefore, the observations in above mentioned matter, with great respects, are not applicable to the fact situation of the present case.
27. In "Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas & another" 2008 AIR SCW 3324, the Apex Court considered the plea of res judicata and provisions of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Apex Court held that where suit for permanent injunction based on legal entitlement to `Gaddi' of Math was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by the Supreme ( 29 )
Court, mere observations that the plaintiff may sue for possession would not prevent the Court from dismissing the suit for possession as barred by res judicata. The Apex Court approved the view taken in "Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari" (2007) 8 SCC 600, wherein it was observed :
"21. If the respondent intended to claim damages and/or mesne profit, in view of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code itself, he could have done so, but he chose not to do so. For one reason or the other, he, therefore, had full knowledge about his right. Having omitted to make any claim for damages, in our opinion, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to get the same indirectly.
22. Law in this behalf is absolutely clear. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
28. The dictum in "Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust)" (supra) may be usefully referred while considering the plea of res judicata. The Apex Court seems to have intertwined the provisions of Order-II ( 30 )
Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 11 Explanation V of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that Explanation-V of the Civil Procedure Code explains the principle of res judicata stating that the relief which could have been or ought to have been prayed for, even if it was not prayed for, would operate as res judicata. Section 12 thereof bans filing of such a suit at instance of a person who is found to be otherwise bound by the decision of the earlier litigation and in a case where the principle of res judicata shall apply.
29. Some times, the doctrine of "res judicata" is considered as a branch of law of estoppel. There is distinction between doctrine of `res judicata', principle of `issue estoppel' and `rule of estoppel' under section 115 of the Evidence Act. Doctrine of res judicata creates legal embargo on hands of the Court to a judicial determination of deciding the same question over again even though the earlier determination may be demonstratedly erroneous. When the proceedings between the same parties have attained finality, they are bound ( 31 )
by the judgement and cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same lis. The determination of the issue in the same set of facts in the previous lis between the parties would give rise to an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties. The doctrine of res judicata is based on rule of procedure. However, the doctrine of mere estoppel is based on rule of evidence. In case of estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act, there is embargo on the party to plead or prove a particular fact whereas in case of res judicata, the prohibition is operative against the Court to deal with the same kind of issue again and again.
30. It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata would be attracted when following ingredients are fulfilled :
(i) Matter in issue must be directly and substantially in issue in the form of issue; (ii) Parties must be same or they must be litigating for the same title;
( 32 )
(iii) The Court must be competent to try such subsequent suits; and
(iv) The earlier suit must be heard and finally decided.
31. In "Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and another" 2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 839, the Apex Court considered the distinction between "issue estoppel" and "res judicata". It is held :
"29. There is a distinction between "issue estoppel" and "res judicata". (See Thoday vs. Thoday. (1964) 1 All ER 341).
30. Res judicata debars a Court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party. If such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceeding. The doctrine of res judicata creates a different kind of estoppel viz. Estoppel by accord.
31. In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of "issue estoppel" as also "cause of ( 33 )
action estoppel" may arise. In Thoday (supra) Lord Diplock held :
"....`cause of action estoppel', is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in previous
litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist i.e. Judgement was given on it, it is said to bemerged in the judgement....If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam.
32. The said dicta was followed in Barber vs. Staffordshire County Council, (1996) 2 All ER 748 (CA). A cause of action estoppel arises where in two different proceedings identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt with similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. In such an event the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided save and except allegation of fraud and collusion. (See C. (A Minor) vs. Hackney London Borough Council, (1996) 1 All ER 973." ( 34 )
33. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that in the earlier suit, deceased Purushottam, through whom the present plaintiffs/appellants have been claiming their rights, had set up claim in respect of the same properties involved in the present suit. He had sought possession of the lands bearing Gat No. 138 and Gat No.
139. He had referred to fraud played on deceased Govindappacharya in respect of the documents viz. sale- deeds and the will-deed, etc. He challenged the sale- deeds dated 07-05-1957 executed by deceased Govindappacharya and also the sale-deed dated 07-05-1959 executed by Yamunabai in favour of Nilkanth, who is defendant No. 2 herein. His earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) was dismissed on merits and the first appeal was also dismissed by this Court. Needless to say, he cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same issues again and again. The same issues could not be tried by the Court in the subsequent round of litigation. Therefore, the suit is barred by principle of `res judicata' and the first Appellate Court was right in giving such a ( 35 )
finding.
34. Similarly, the failure of the appellants to seek declaration that the sale-deeds were invalid in the context of the earlier suit, would bar them in raising such plea. They omitted to seek relief for setting aside the sale transactions. They omitted to specifically seek alternative relief of partition. The object of Order-II Rule-2 of the Civil Procedure Code is to prevent a plaintiff from vexing the defendant again and again in multiple proceedings on basis of assumptive division of a cause of action. It also prohibits the plaintiff from suing separately for each relief arising out of the same cause of action. The intention of the legislature is to discourage multiplicity of litigation on basis of same cause of action. Thus, it is explicit that same cause of action cannot be permitted to be minced and multiple suits cannot be allowed when the identity of the cause of action is same. The omission of deceased plaintiff Purushottam to seek above referred reliefs in the earlier suit (Spl.C.S. No. 28/1968) would, therefore, operate as `bar' as enumerated under ( 36 )
Order-II Rule-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
35. So far as the challenge to the sale-deeds is concerned, even assuming that the issue could be re- agitated by the plaintiffs (appellants), then also it is difficult to hold that the transactions are proved to be outcome of fraud or the same are against public policy or otherwise tainted with illegality. The contention of the plaintiffs is that deceased Govindappacharya was allured by the defendants to reside with them. There is nothing on record to show that he resided with the defendants No. 1 and 2 and was under their influence. It is an admitted fact that deceased Govindappacharya executed the registered sale-deed dated 07-05-1957 in respect of agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 52-A, 71 and 50 vide Exh-97 in favour of defendant No. 2 Nilkanth. The plaintiffs did not set out details of alleged fraud and undue influence exercised by the defendants No. 1 and 2 on deceased Govindappacharya. The plea of fraud cannot be allowed to be raised on basis of vague allegations. The averment that Govindappacharya was helpless and was leaning towards senility are not ( 37 )
duly proved. This Court in "Kisan s/o Ramji Khandare vs. Kausalyabai w/o Gangaram Korde and others" 2007 (4) Mh.L.J. 43, held that mere sweeping allegations regarding the fraud are of no avail to the plaintiffs. This Court emphasized that the fraud is an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another person to rely upon it in order to part with some valuable thing. So, in view of Order-VI Rule-4 of the Civil Procedure Code, the necessary particulars of alleged "fraud" must be spelt out in the pleadings.
36. There is hardly any evidence to infer that deceased Govindappacharya was unable to understand purport of his act of executing the sale-deed. The thumb impression of Govindappacharya was obtained on the sale- deed (Exh-97) for the reason that his vision was impaired at the material time. The Sub-Registrar's endorsement on the sale-deed has presumptive value because such part is deemed as part of the public record. The Sub-Registrar has endorsed the sale-deed to the effect that the executant admitted execution of the ( 38 )
sale-deed. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the allegations of fraud and undue influence have been carved out many years after the execution of the sale- deeds. The findings of the first Appellate Court, in this behalf, upholding the correctness and validity of the sale-deeds, cannot be interfered with in the instant appeal.
37. It need not be reiterated that the transfers have not been challenged within the period of limitation in view of Article 109 of the Limitation Act. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the sale-deed executed in favour of the defendant No. 2 is vitiated by fraud. Assuming that the suit is covered by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, then also, it is barred by limitation. In "Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others" 2006 (5) Mh.L.J. 441, the Apex Court held that Article 59 of the Limitation Act encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation in as much as the setting aside the ( 39 )
sale transactions is sought after period of three (3) years from date of the transaction and that the relief of possession is claimed after twelve (12) years of the delivery of possession to the contesting defendants in respect of the suit lands.
38. In my opinion, the first Appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation, barred by principle of `res judicata' and also in view of omission to seek the same reliefs under Order-II Rule-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the earlier round of litigation. The first Appellate Court rightly held that the transactions are not proved to be invalid. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
[ V.R. KINGAONKAR ]
JUDGE
NPJ/SA142-89
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