Nagging means constant persuading or complaining to do something or refrain from doing something. If the wife was not ready to live and made her intention clear not to live with the petitioner, that could not amount to nagging as such. At the most, it could be said that when wife found that her husband was not ready to shift to Nagpur she made her intention clear that she did not want to stay at Bhandara with the petitioner. I do not think that this act on the part of the respondent/wife could be said to be nagging at all. Even assuming that there was some kind of nagging or persuasion to the husband to shift to Nagpur from Bhandara, such persuasion could not be treated as a cruelty. Something more is required to be proved to make out case of cruelty.
1. This is an appeal by original respondent against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge dissolving the marriage. The parties shall be referred to as the petitioner and the respondent.
2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows - Petitioner Deonath and the present appellant were married on 2/2/1987 at Nagpur. After the marriage, original respondent/wife Lalita started living in the matrimonial house 2
at Bhandara and lived for a period of two months. The petitioner's parents live at village Mundhari in Mohadi Tq. of Bhandara District. Petitioner's parents and sisters are agriculturist and are uneducated. They used to come occasionally to Bhandara at the house of the petitioner. His unmarried sister was also residing with the petitioner. After the marriage within three months, the respondent/wife started quarreling with the parents and sister of the petitioner. She used to make use of filthy language against them and insult them. The respondent also wanted that the petitioner should not financially help the parents. The petitioner, however, did not pay any heed to the request of the respondent that his parents should not come to her house. Due to this attitude of the respondent/wife, the petitioner lost the peace of mind. It is the contention of the petitioner that the respondent/wife without permission and knowledge of the petitioner left the house of the petitioner and went to Nagpur. The petitioner went there but was insulted. A month thereafter, the respondent came to the house of the petitioner herself. The respondent/wife was then taking education and she made a 3
request to the petitioner to allow her to complete her education and assured that after the education is over, she will come and stay permanently with the petitioner. The petitioner allowed the respondent to complete the eduction. The petitioner also wanted to open his own clinic at Bhandara under the name and style 'Nimje Clinic'. The said Clinic was opened on 6th September, 1987 in the presence of the respondent/wife. The petitioner always used to provide money to the respondent while she was living at Nagpur. She was advising the petitioner to close the Nimje Clinic and open a Clinic at Nagpur. The petitioner was reluctant to do so. Respondent later became pregnant and delivered of a female child on 7/3/1988 at Nagpur. The respondent unwillingly agreed to come to Bhandara for naming ceremony of child, which took place on 29/5/1988. She lived at Bhandara for 4-5 days and due to quarrelsome nature again started quarrelling with the petitioner and the servants in the Nursing Home. She again went back without letting the petitioner know. She was in the habit of coming to Bhandara once in a fortnight and leaving without the knowledge of the petitioner. Since 6th of 4
September, 1988, the respondent did not come back to the house of the petitioner, hence the petitioner filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights but later converted the petition to one for dissolution of the marriage.
3. The petition was resisted by the respondent/wife. She admitted the relationship. She denied that she had at any time quarrelled with the parents of the petitioner. She also denied that she used to frequently leave the house of the petitioner. It is her contention that it was the mother and brother of the petitioner who used to fight with the respondent on the ground of insufficient dowry. Even at the time of opening of the Nursing Home, a demand for more dowry was made. The respondent's mother was unable to fulfill the demand. She contends that she was ready to join the new venture of the petitioner of opening clinic but as she was taking education at that time, it was not possible for her to join the said venture as she was pregnant and she wanted to complete her education. It is the case of the respondent that it was the petitioner who has deserted her.
4. The learned Judge of the trial court framed issues and 5
found that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent had withdrawn from society without reasonable cause. He also found that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent treated him with cruelty. Holding so, he dismissed the petition. The appellate court, however, granted a decree for divorce holding that there was a proof of cruelty.
5. The appeal was admitted but without formulating a substantial question of law. Hence, the following substantial question of law is formulated.
"Whether the judgment passed by the lower appellate court on the basis of desertion amounting to denial of marital relationship is vitiated, in as much as the said desertion was alleged to be in September, 1988 and the suit having been filed in 1989 was liable to be dismissed as premature, as per Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act ?
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent.
7. The learned Judge of the trial court has dismissed the petition holding that the petitioner/husband had neither proved desertion nor proved the cruelty. The learned District 6
Judge , however, has considered the appeal only on the ground as envisaged by Section 13(1(i-a) i.e. of cruelty.
8. It seems from the tenor of the Judgment of the District Judge that he treats the desertion as cruelty. I would produce here relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the learned Judge.
22. ............. The decision taken by the wife Lalita in her mind from the beginning since her completing the education of M.D.S. at Nagpur to stay away from the husband permanently, had been disclosed in her reply Exhibit 34 by her to the notice of her husband, wherein she did not deny that, when the husband had come along with his friend Shri Rajiv Yelne to Nagpur, she did not permit Deonath to see his daughter even, and she refused to come with him.
23. The attitude of the nagging caused by Lalita to her husband Deonath indirectly amounts to denial of sex by Lalita to Deonath which positively amounts to causing of a mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 7
This has been so laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1990, Supreme Court, 594, (Sanatkumar Agrawal vs. Nandini Agrawal). The same view has been confirmed earlier by the Apex Court in (1988)-I Supreme Court Cases-105, (Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi).27. In the present appeal also without any lawful excuse the respondent-wife Lalita had kept herself away from the matrimonial house even after having entered Bhandara city and without joining the appellant in the matrimonial house to fulfill her marital obligations, she had left Bhandara immediately along with her daughter after collecting her original residentials. This, to my mind, amounted to an attitude of nagging of the husband by willful denial of allowing the husband of enjoyment of sex with her indirectly. It is on this count also that, the decree of divorce ought to have been granted in favour of the appellant.
8
9. He has found that withdrawal by wife from the society and taking decision not to stay with the husband amounts to nagging. Perhaps, the learned District Judge has not properly appreciated the meaning of the word nagging. Nagging means constant persuading or complaining to do something or refrain from doing something. If the wife was not ready to live and made her intention clear not to live with the petitioner, that could not amount to nagging as such. At the most, it could be said that when wife found that her husband was not ready to shift to Nagpur she made her intention clear that she did not want to stay at Bhandara with the petitioner. I do not think that this act on the part of the respondent/wife could be said to be nagging at all. Even assuming that there was some kind of nagging or persuasion to the husband to shift to Nagpur from Bhandara, such persuasion could not be treated as a cruelty. Something more is required to be proved to make out case of cruelty.
10. Learned Judge in para no.23 observes clearly that nagging caused by wife Lalita to husband Deonath indirectly amounts to denial of sex by wife which positively amounts to 9
mental cruelty. Thus, in fact, the learned Judge clearly holds that by deserting the husband, the wife has caused cruelty to him. Denial of sex by a spouse may certainly amount to cruelty when both spouses are sharing the bed room. Shri Bhattad, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the Supreme court has held in the decision reported in 2009(1) SCC 422 (Suman Kapur ..vs.. Sudhir Kapur) that denial of sex by wife may amount to cruelty. The Supreme court in this decision has quoted the decision in the case of Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007)4 SCC 511. As stated, the decision cannot have bearing on the case at hand because the wife was living at Nagpur and husband was living at Bhandara. If, in fact the wife had deserted the husband, it could not be said that she was wrongly refusing to have sex with the husband. As stated earlier, had the wife been living with the husband sharing the same bed and had she then refused to have sex with her husband, then perhaps it could have been said that the intention of wife was to treat the husband with cruelty. But where the wife is living far away from husband, it could not be said that she was refusing to have an intercourse she with a 10
view to treat the husband with cruelty as such. Further, to my mind, where wife is leaving away from the husband and therefore, the husband is unable to have sex with wife, it could not be said that the wife was treating the husband with cruelty. The reason is; the Legislature makes available, desertion as a separate ground for divorce. If Legislature intended that desertion should or could be treated as cruelty there was no need to add desertion as one of the separate grounds for divorce. Both grounds are, therefore, separate and independent. At the costs of repetition, it must be said that if wife lives separately from husband that will not amount to cruelty as such, on any count. For this simple reason the decree passed by the appellate court needs to be set aside.
11. I may add here that the petitioner has failed to prove the ground of desertion also which would make him entitled to have a decree under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 13(1)(i-b) says that the spouse must have deserted the other one for a continuous period of two years preceding the petition. The date of marriage is 2/2/1987. From the contents of the petition, it appears that the respondent/wife had come 11
for naming ceremony of the child on 29/5/1988 and stayed for some days. It seems that the wife had last left house of the petitioner in September, 1988. The petition is filed on 3/7/1989. Thus, it is clear that there was no desertion for a continuous period of two years preceding the filing of the petition. Therefore, ground of desertion was also not available to the petitioner. The learned District Judge has patently gone wrong in passing the decree. It seems, the marriage has irretrievably failed because all attempts on the part of all the judges have failed. However, this court cannot confirm the decree on that ground, in as much as, such power vests the Supreme Court alone under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Shri Bhattad, the learned counsel for the respondent, had relied on the following decisions to which I do not propose to deal with, since none of them covers the controversy in question.
In the circumstances, the appeal must succeed. The appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court restored. No order as to costs.
JUDGE.
chute
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Bombay High Court
Dr.Lalita Deonath Nimje vs Deonath Nimje on 15 April, 2010
Bench: C. L. Pangarkar
1. This is an appeal by original respondent against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge dissolving the marriage. The parties shall be referred to as the petitioner and the respondent.
2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows - Petitioner Deonath and the present appellant were married on 2/2/1987 at Nagpur. After the marriage, original respondent/wife Lalita started living in the matrimonial house 2
at Bhandara and lived for a period of two months. The petitioner's parents live at village Mundhari in Mohadi Tq. of Bhandara District. Petitioner's parents and sisters are agriculturist and are uneducated. They used to come occasionally to Bhandara at the house of the petitioner. His unmarried sister was also residing with the petitioner. After the marriage within three months, the respondent/wife started quarreling with the parents and sister of the petitioner. She used to make use of filthy language against them and insult them. The respondent also wanted that the petitioner should not financially help the parents. The petitioner, however, did not pay any heed to the request of the respondent that his parents should not come to her house. Due to this attitude of the respondent/wife, the petitioner lost the peace of mind. It is the contention of the petitioner that the respondent/wife without permission and knowledge of the petitioner left the house of the petitioner and went to Nagpur. The petitioner went there but was insulted. A month thereafter, the respondent came to the house of the petitioner herself. The respondent/wife was then taking education and she made a 3
request to the petitioner to allow her to complete her education and assured that after the education is over, she will come and stay permanently with the petitioner. The petitioner allowed the respondent to complete the eduction. The petitioner also wanted to open his own clinic at Bhandara under the name and style 'Nimje Clinic'. The said Clinic was opened on 6th September, 1987 in the presence of the respondent/wife. The petitioner always used to provide money to the respondent while she was living at Nagpur. She was advising the petitioner to close the Nimje Clinic and open a Clinic at Nagpur. The petitioner was reluctant to do so. Respondent later became pregnant and delivered of a female child on 7/3/1988 at Nagpur. The respondent unwillingly agreed to come to Bhandara for naming ceremony of child, which took place on 29/5/1988. She lived at Bhandara for 4-5 days and due to quarrelsome nature again started quarrelling with the petitioner and the servants in the Nursing Home. She again went back without letting the petitioner know. She was in the habit of coming to Bhandara once in a fortnight and leaving without the knowledge of the petitioner. Since 6th of 4
September, 1988, the respondent did not come back to the house of the petitioner, hence the petitioner filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights but later converted the petition to one for dissolution of the marriage.
3. The petition was resisted by the respondent/wife. She admitted the relationship. She denied that she had at any time quarrelled with the parents of the petitioner. She also denied that she used to frequently leave the house of the petitioner. It is her contention that it was the mother and brother of the petitioner who used to fight with the respondent on the ground of insufficient dowry. Even at the time of opening of the Nursing Home, a demand for more dowry was made. The respondent's mother was unable to fulfill the demand. She contends that she was ready to join the new venture of the petitioner of opening clinic but as she was taking education at that time, it was not possible for her to join the said venture as she was pregnant and she wanted to complete her education. It is the case of the respondent that it was the petitioner who has deserted her.
4. The learned Judge of the trial court framed issues and 5
found that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent had withdrawn from society without reasonable cause. He also found that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent treated him with cruelty. Holding so, he dismissed the petition. The appellate court, however, granted a decree for divorce holding that there was a proof of cruelty.
5. The appeal was admitted but without formulating a substantial question of law. Hence, the following substantial question of law is formulated.
"Whether the judgment passed by the lower appellate court on the basis of desertion amounting to denial of marital relationship is vitiated, in as much as the said desertion was alleged to be in September, 1988 and the suit having been filed in 1989 was liable to be dismissed as premature, as per Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act ?
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent.
7. The learned Judge of the trial court has dismissed the petition holding that the petitioner/husband had neither proved desertion nor proved the cruelty. The learned District 6
Judge , however, has considered the appeal only on the ground as envisaged by Section 13(1(i-a) i.e. of cruelty.
8. It seems from the tenor of the Judgment of the District Judge that he treats the desertion as cruelty. I would produce here relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the learned Judge.
22. ............. The decision taken by the wife Lalita in her mind from the beginning since her completing the education of M.D.S. at Nagpur to stay away from the husband permanently, had been disclosed in her reply Exhibit 34 by her to the notice of her husband, wherein she did not deny that, when the husband had come along with his friend Shri Rajiv Yelne to Nagpur, she did not permit Deonath to see his daughter even, and she refused to come with him.
23. The attitude of the nagging caused by Lalita to her husband Deonath indirectly amounts to denial of sex by Lalita to Deonath which positively amounts to causing of a mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 7
This has been so laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1990, Supreme Court, 594, (Sanatkumar Agrawal vs. Nandini Agrawal). The same view has been confirmed earlier by the Apex Court in (1988)-I Supreme Court Cases-105, (Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi).27. In the present appeal also without any lawful excuse the respondent-wife Lalita had kept herself away from the matrimonial house even after having entered Bhandara city and without joining the appellant in the matrimonial house to fulfill her marital obligations, she had left Bhandara immediately along with her daughter after collecting her original residentials. This, to my mind, amounted to an attitude of nagging of the husband by willful denial of allowing the husband of enjoyment of sex with her indirectly. It is on this count also that, the decree of divorce ought to have been granted in favour of the appellant.
8
9. He has found that withdrawal by wife from the society and taking decision not to stay with the husband amounts to nagging. Perhaps, the learned District Judge has not properly appreciated the meaning of the word nagging. Nagging means constant persuading or complaining to do something or refrain from doing something. If the wife was not ready to live and made her intention clear not to live with the petitioner, that could not amount to nagging as such. At the most, it could be said that when wife found that her husband was not ready to shift to Nagpur she made her intention clear that she did not want to stay at Bhandara with the petitioner. I do not think that this act on the part of the respondent/wife could be said to be nagging at all. Even assuming that there was some kind of nagging or persuasion to the husband to shift to Nagpur from Bhandara, such persuasion could not be treated as a cruelty. Something more is required to be proved to make out case of cruelty.
10. Learned Judge in para no.23 observes clearly that nagging caused by wife Lalita to husband Deonath indirectly amounts to denial of sex by wife which positively amounts to 9
mental cruelty. Thus, in fact, the learned Judge clearly holds that by deserting the husband, the wife has caused cruelty to him. Denial of sex by a spouse may certainly amount to cruelty when both spouses are sharing the bed room. Shri Bhattad, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the Supreme court has held in the decision reported in 2009(1) SCC 422 (Suman Kapur ..vs.. Sudhir Kapur) that denial of sex by wife may amount to cruelty. The Supreme court in this decision has quoted the decision in the case of Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007)4 SCC 511. As stated, the decision cannot have bearing on the case at hand because the wife was living at Nagpur and husband was living at Bhandara. If, in fact the wife had deserted the husband, it could not be said that she was wrongly refusing to have sex with the husband. As stated earlier, had the wife been living with the husband sharing the same bed and had she then refused to have sex with her husband, then perhaps it could have been said that the intention of wife was to treat the husband with cruelty. But where the wife is living far away from husband, it could not be said that she was refusing to have an intercourse she with a 10
view to treat the husband with cruelty as such. Further, to my mind, where wife is leaving away from the husband and therefore, the husband is unable to have sex with wife, it could not be said that the wife was treating the husband with cruelty. The reason is; the Legislature makes available, desertion as a separate ground for divorce. If Legislature intended that desertion should or could be treated as cruelty there was no need to add desertion as one of the separate grounds for divorce. Both grounds are, therefore, separate and independent. At the costs of repetition, it must be said that if wife lives separately from husband that will not amount to cruelty as such, on any count. For this simple reason the decree passed by the appellate court needs to be set aside.
11. I may add here that the petitioner has failed to prove the ground of desertion also which would make him entitled to have a decree under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 13(1)(i-b) says that the spouse must have deserted the other one for a continuous period of two years preceding the petition. The date of marriage is 2/2/1987. From the contents of the petition, it appears that the respondent/wife had come 11
for naming ceremony of the child on 29/5/1988 and stayed for some days. It seems that the wife had last left house of the petitioner in September, 1988. The petition is filed on 3/7/1989. Thus, it is clear that there was no desertion for a continuous period of two years preceding the filing of the petition. Therefore, ground of desertion was also not available to the petitioner. The learned District Judge has patently gone wrong in passing the decree. It seems, the marriage has irretrievably failed because all attempts on the part of all the judges have failed. However, this court cannot confirm the decree on that ground, in as much as, such power vests the Supreme Court alone under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Shri Bhattad, the learned counsel for the respondent, had relied on the following decisions to which I do not propose to deal with, since none of them covers the controversy in question.
In the circumstances, the appeal must succeed. The appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court restored. No order as to costs.
JUDGE.
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