Bombay HC: Remand of case should not be directed where the record is sufficient for final disposal and no prejudice is caused.

The revisional authority, having recorded a finding on the

defectiveness of the panchnama, was under a legal duty to test the

merits of the Mamlatdar’s order in the light of the other evidence

on record, and determine whether the decision suffers from

perversity or legal infirmity. Once the panchnama was found to be

of doubtful evidentiary worth, the correct course would have been to proceed with adjudication on available legal grounds, and not to relegate the parties to a fresh round of proceedings without justification. {Para 5}

6. The power of remand, when exercised in absence of

compelling legal necessity, leads to avoidable delay in the

resolution of disputes. Courts and quasi-judicial authorities are

expected to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and ensure effective

adjudication in the interest of justice. Remand should not be

directed where the record is sufficient for final disposal and no

prejudice is caused.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.5672 OF 2025

Kapil Satish Phalke & Anr.  V/s. The Sub Divisional Officer, Koregaon Sub Division, Koregaon, District Satara & Ors.

CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.

DATED : MAY 5, 2025.

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Bombay HC: If An Employee Is Exonerated In Disciplinary Proceedings, Interest Ought To Be Provided On Delayed Payment Of Retirement Benefits

 Thus, from a bare perusal of the order dated 09.05.2023, it is evident that the order imposing penalty dated 30.09.2008 and the rejection order dated 09.01.2013 were set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities. The said orders being set aside, S.M. Pillay would have to be treated as having retired on 31.01.2007 with a clean slate, consequently, being entitled to his retiral benefits, pension, etc. on the date of his retirement. The said payments were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. In view of the exoneration of S.M. Pillay in the disciplinary proceedings, the Petitioner would be entitled to interest on the delayed payment. Retirement benefits being due to him w.e.f. the date of his retirement, the delay in payment would have to be considered from 31.01.2007. {Para 9}

10. With reference to the contention of the learned Advocate for the Respondents that the proceedings filed by S.M. Pillay against the penalty order being abated, consequently Petitioner not being entitled to interest, will have to be rejected in view of the specific observation in the order dated 09.05.2023 which has set aside the penalty order on the ground of procedural irregularity. Mere observation that the proceedings stood abated would not come to the aid of the Respondent No.2 to deny Petitioner interest on delayed payments of the retiral benefits payable to S.M. Pillay. This is more so on account the fact that his retiral dues were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings.

11. S.M. Pillay retired from service on 31.01.2007 upon attaining the age of superannuation. Though S.M. Pillay was placed on the suspension on 22.01.2007, he was served with the charge memo on 05.02.2007. It is trite law that the departmental proceedings is not initiated merely by issuance of show cause notice, it is initiated only when charge-sheet is issued (see Union of India & Others versus K.V. Jankiraman MANU/SC/0445/1991 : 1991:INSC:209 : (1991) 4 SCC 109). Mr. Bhaskar Reddy, learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that the said Rules do not contemplate disciplinary proceedings after retirement of the employees. Mr. Tushad Kakalia, learned Advocate for Respondent No.2 was unable to point out any provision in the said Rules which would enable the Respondent No.2 to initiate or continue proceedings upon the retirement of its employees. This is an additional ground to hold that S.M. Pillay was denied his retirement dues, upon his retirement.

12. Upon exoneration of S.M. Pillay, the period of suspension Petitioner i.e. 22.01.2007 to 31.01.2007 would have to be considered on duty and consequently, he would be entitled to his full pay during the said period, less the subsistence allowance paid during the said period. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1918 of 2025

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Maheshwari Shanmugam Pillay Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge and Ashwin D. Bhobe, JJ.

Author: Ashwin D. Bhobe, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:17375-DB,MANU/MH/2387/2025.

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Supreme court: Sanction U/S S. 19 PC Act is Not Vitiated Due To Minor Edits In Draft Sanction Order Without Affecting Substance

 If a draft order is placed before the sanctioning authority and he is satisfied that nothing needs to be added/deleted therefrom, the grant of sanction cannot be faulted merely on the ground of absence of addition of words to/deletion of words from the draft. We have noticed that PW-3 made four minor corrections to ensure that the substance conforms to the form in which the sanction was required to be given, without altering the substance (i.e. the contents). That there has been a complete absence of application of mind by PW-3 is, thus, not proved; also, that there has been a failure of justice, has not been shown. On facts, we are satisfied that there has been no irregularity, far less illegality, in grant of sanction. We are, thus, not even required to invoke provisions of Section 465, Cr. PC.

 {Para 14}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (Crl.) NO. 13997 OF 2024]

DASHRATH Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 

Author: DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Dated: APRIL 24, 2025.

Citation: 2025 INSC 654.

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Supreme court: Contents Of FIR Inadmissible & Cannot Be Proved Through Investigating Officer If Informant Died A Natural Death

 Another important thing is that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved. It has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the same in the case. The F.I.R. can be used by the defence to impeach the credit of the person who lodged the F.I.R. Under Section 154(3) of the Evidence Act. In case the death of the informant has no nexus with the complaint lodged i.e. he died a natural death and did not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter, the contents of the F.I.R. would not be admissible in evidence. In such circumstances, the contents cannot be proved through the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer, in the course of his deposition, should not be permitted to depose the exact contents of the F.I.R. so as to make them admissible in evidence. All that is permissible in law is that the Investigating Officer can, in his deposition, identify the signature of the first informant and that of his own on the First Information Report and he can depose about the factum of the F.I.R. being registered by him on a particular date on a particular police station. {Para 34}

35. It is absolutely incorrect on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court to say that in the absence of the first informant, the police officer can prove the contents of the F.I.R. as per Section 67 of the Evidence Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1086 of 2017

Decided On: 30.01.2025

Lalita Vs. Vishwanath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala,  and R. Mahadevan, , JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0172/2025,2025 INSC 173.

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