Equivalent Citation: 1990 AWC 113 All
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Lucknow Bench
Lucknow Bench
Cr. Appeal No. 532 of 1982
Decided On: 07.07.1989
Appellants: State
Vs.
Respondent: Jagdish Prasad
Vs.
Respondent: Jagdish Prasad
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.B. Singh, J.
G.B. Singh, J.
(A) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Section 20--Sanction--Food Inspector stated that he produced the papers before the CMO who after going through the records and documents put up before him gave the consent for prosection--He further stated that the CMO signed on the sanction and he recognises his signatures--He was not cross examined--Sanction duly proved--Evidence Act, 1872, Section 47.
(B) Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 47--Scope of--Enough for a witness to say in examination-in-chief that he is acquainted with the handwriting--He need not state in the first instance that he knows a handwriting--It is the duty of the opposite party to explore in cross-examination the source of his knowledge, if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands.
(B) Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 47--Scope of--Enough for a witness to say in examination-in-chief that he is acquainted with the handwriting--He need not state in the first instance that he knows a handwriting--It is the duty of the opposite party to explore in cross-examination the source of his knowledge, if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands.
1. This is a State appeal against the order of acquittal of Jagdish Prasad, Respondent, from the charge under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge,Sultanpur.
2. The Case of the prosecution was that on 30-6-1980 R.K. Agnihotri, Food Inspector, along with Madan Lal, Vaccinator, went to Village Raghipur (Bhuwan Shahpur Mela), Sultanpur and found there that Jagdish Prasad, Respondent, was selling sweets at his shop. The Food Inspector tried to take sample of Imarti, which was coloured one, but Jagdish Prasad did not permit him to do so. He prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample by throwing Imarties on the ground, pushing the Food Inspector aside and crushing the Imarties by foot. The Food Inspector wrote a report on the spot and obtained the signatures on it. When the Food Inspector enquired from Jagdish Prasad if he had any licence to sell sweetmeats he could not produce it and the Food Inspector found that he was selling them without any licence. The Food Inspector, therefore, obtained sanction of the Chief Medical Officer and filed a complaint against Jagdish Prasad for selling articles of food without licence though licence was required under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and he prevented the Food Inspector from taking a sample as authorised by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and thereby he committed offences punishable under Sections 7/16(1)(a)(ii) and 16(1)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Special Magistrate (Economic Offences) found Jagdish Prasad guilty of both the offences. He convicted and sentenced him under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(ii) to one year's R.I. and a fine of Rs. 2000/- and under Section 16(1)(c) to one year's R.I. and a fine of Rs. 2000/-. It was further ordered that in case of default in payment of fine Jagdish Prasad shall undergo R.I. for one year against each fine. Against this Jagdish Prasad preferred appeal which was allowed on the ground that sanction given by the Chief Medical Officer was not duly proved. Feeling dissatisfied with this judgment the State has preferred this appeal.
3. It was vehemently argued before me by the learned Counsel for the State that sanction was duly proved by the prosecution and the judgment of the lower Appellate court allowing the appeal and holding the sanction not duly proved and setting aside , the conviction and sentence on this ground is not warranted by law. I find much force in this argument.
4. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act lays down that no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. It shows that before instituting the prosecution under this Act a written consent by the Central Government or a person authorised in this behalf by either of them has to be obtained. This written consent is sometimes referred to as sanction for the prosecution. It has not been disputed before me that the Chief Medical Officer has been authorised to give the requisite consent for the prosecution for the offences under the said Act. A document purporting to be a sanction by the Chief Medical Officer /Local Health Authority dated 16-10-1980 was produced in the case by R.K. Agnihotri Food Inspector PW 1 who stated that he produced the papers before the Chief Medical Officer, Sultanpur. He further stated that the Chief Medical Officer after going through the records and documents put up before him gave the consent for prosecution of Jagdish Prasad. He further added that the sanction (Ext. ka-3) bears Chief Medical Officer's signature and he recognises it. It is significant to note that this statement of the Food Inspector was left uncross-examined and no question was put to him in cross-examination to elicit as to how he recognises the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer. His statement in examination-in -chief is to the effect that the Food Inspector placed the relevant papers before the Chief Medical Officer and the latter gave his consent. It is true that he did not make specific statement to the effect that the Chief Medical Officer signed in his presence but the trend of his statement is to that effect and it could be clarified in cross-examination. Since no question was put to the witness in this connection in cross-examination it can be safely said that the witness was familiar with the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and on the basis of that acquaintance he identified his signatures and the written consent was obtained by the Food Inspector by placing the material before the Chief Medical Officer.
5. Section 47 of the Evidence Act lays down that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the hand writing of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. The statement of the Food Inspector is that by placing the relevant material before the Chief Medical Officer he obtained the sanction duly signed for the prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. His statement further indicates that in obtaining such sanctions he could be familiar with his signatures. Under these circumstances it could be said that R.K. Agnihotri, Food Inspector, was acquainted with the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and his opinion about the signature could be a relevant fact under Section 47 of the Evidence Act. His statement which was left uncross-examined could, therefore, be taken as a sufficient proof of the fact that sanction bears the signatures, of the Chief Medical Officer, Sultanpur.
6. The manner in which Section 47 is framed indicates that it is enough for a witness to say in examination-in-chief that he is acquainted with the handwriting and that if it is desired to challenge his statement he should be cross-examined on that point to show that he could not be acquainted with the handwriting in the circumstances of a particular case. In other words, a witness need not state in the first instance how he knows a handwriting since it is the duty of the opposite party to explore in cross-examination the sources of his knowledge, if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands. Since in the present case, the statement of R.K. Agnihotri PW 1 in examination-in-chief was left unchallenged in cross-examination it cannot be said that he was not acquainted with the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and thus his statement cannot be received in evidence and relied upon in holding the sanction proved.
7. Learned Counsel for the State argued that in the trial court the validity of the sanction for want of proof of signatures was not challenged and there would be a presumption that sanction has been accorded by the Chief Medical Officer. In support of this argument he relied upon Tulsi Ram v. The State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0390/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 666. In this case a letter from the Under Secretary to the State Government in its Home Department addressed to the District Magistrate informing that the Governor has been pleased to grant sanction for prosecution of certain persons named therein was relied upon to prove the sanction. It was held that it was an official communication and the presumption would arise that the sanction referred to therein bad in fact been accorded and that the official action granting sanction was regularly performed and such a document would meet the requirement of Section 196A Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be mentioned here that Section 196A Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 required previous sanction for prosecution for certain offences specified therein and the aforesaid observations were made in connection with the dispute raised about validity of that sanction. The observations made in this case show that the presumption under Section 114 Evidence Act can be raised in connection with such sanction. If this principle and the fact that the signature has been proved by R.K. Agnihotri who is acquainted with the signature of the Chief Medical Officer are taken together there remains no room for doubt that sanction was duly proved by the Food Inspector and the finding of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge cannot be supported.
8. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has relied upon Miss Hardevi Malkhani v. State MANU/UP/0078/1969 : AIR 1969 All 423. In this case a letter purporting to be signed by the Principal was produced and a Clerk in Principal's office claiming acquaintance with Principal's handwriting was examined. In this case there was no evidence that letters written by the Principal were in the ordinary course of business habitually submitted to the Clerk. It was, therefore, held that the Clerk cannot be said to be acquainted with the handwriting of the Principal. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the present one. The Food Inspector was in a position to come across the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer. He could, therefore, be acquainted with his signature and the rule of law enunciated in Miss Hardevi Malkhani v. State (supra) and relied upon by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge does not appear to have any application to the facts of the case.
9. In my opinion, the sanction was duly proved and the conviction and sentence could not be set aside for want of proof of sanction under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
10. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge Sultanpur, dated 1-3-1982 are set aside. The appeal is remanded to the Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, who will eier dispose it of himself or get it disposed of by some other Addl. Sessions Judge by transferring it to him in accordance with law. The record shall be sent down to the Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, forthwith and the appeal shall be heard and decided at an early date as it has become sufficiently old.
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